


CHRISTIAN AID'S RESPONSE
TO THE NORTH KIVU CRISIS FROM JANUARY TO OCTOBER 2009

FINAL EVALUATION REPORT



Water source built in Bagoyi, in the area of de Karuba, Masisi territory

DECEMBER 2009

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ACRONYMS

ACT	Action by Churches Together
ADEPAE	Action pour le Développement et la Paix Endogène
AMR	Appraisal, Monitoring and Review
ARV	Antirétroviral
CA	Christian Aid
CBCA	Communauté Baptiste au Centre de l'Afrique
CCMV	Centre de Conseil pour Mieux Vivre
CNDP	Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple
CWD	Congo Women Development
DEC	Disaster Emergency Committee
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DRP	Disaster Response Programme
ECC	Eglise du Christ au Congo
EO	Emergency Officer
ERP	Extended Response Programme
FAM	Finance and Administration Manager
FARDC	Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo
FCBO	Finance and Capacity Building Officer
FDLR	Forces de Libération du Rwanda
FFP	Fondation Femme Plus
HECKS	Hilfswerk der Evangelischen Kirchen Schweiz
ICCN	Institut Congolais pour la Conservation de la Nature
ICRC	International Committee for the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGR	Income Generating Activities
INERA	Institut de l'Environnement et de Recherches Agricoles
ISEA	Institut Supérieur d'études Agronomiques
ITN	Insecticides Treated Mosquito Nets
MDM	Médecins du Monde
MONUC	Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en RDC
NFI	Non Food Items
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PACODEVI	Programme d'Appui aux Comités de Développement des Villages
PARECO	Coalition de la Résistance Patriotique Congolaise
PFD	Programme Funding Department
PFO	Programme Funding Officer
PIAMF	Plate-forme des Institutions et Associations de Micro-Finance
PLHA	People Living with HIV/AIDS
PM	Programme Manager
PNLS	Programme National de Lutte contre le Sida
PNMLS	Programme National Multisectoriel de Lutte contre le Sida
REO	Regional and Emergency Officer
SMART	Specific, Mesurable, Achievable, Realist, Time-bound
SG	Solidarity Group
UC	Unaccompanied Children
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
VTC	Voluntary Testing Centre
WV	World Vision

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

Between August and December 2008, the North Kivu province was subject to heavy fighting that led to the displacement of more than 500,000 people, in addition to an estimated 800,000 people who were already displaced due to clashes occurred in 2007 between the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) and the rebel forces led by General Laurent Nkunda of the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CDNP), and also involving other rebel groups and local militias. After two needs assessment missions carried out in February and June 2008, Christian Aid (CA) decided to respond to the crisis through the launch of a CA appeal and the submission of a funding proposal to the Disaster Emergency Committee (DEC). Thanks to CA and DEC appeal funds, CA supported 7 projects implemented by 4 local partners, one of which being a church based organisation. The overall budget of £693,496 was aiming to fund the following projects: distributions of food, non food items (NFI) and medicines, assistance to Unaccompanied Children (UC), a food security and a water and sanitation projects, an HIV/AIDS mitigation project and two micro-credit projects. Targeted beneficiaries were internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and their host families in Goma and in the Masisi Territory. This report is based on the final evaluation of these 7 projects. The evaluation was carried out by 2 external consultants over a period of 22 days, including 19 days in North Kivu, meeting the 4 partners and interviewing beneficiaries in most of the project intervention zones.

Findings

On the whole the 7 evaluated projects were relevant in terms of target groups, geographical areas and types of intervention: While most of other international NGOs and United Nations agencies assisted IDPs taking refuge in camps (approx. 30% of IDPs), CA targeted IDPs outside the camps (approx. 70% of IDPs) as well as those hosted by families. Targeted intervention zones were within those in North Kivu that were the hardest hit by the conflicts and by the influx of IDPs and where a few other actors were intervening. The type of aid planned was responding to immediate and medium-term needs. However, very little quantitative baseline data on the beneficiaries' socio-economic and food situation was collected during needs assessments missions.

88.46% of the budget was implemented, which is a very good rate since one of the projects is still ongoing until the end of January 2010. Projects were sufficiently resourced, with the exception of monitoring budget that was too low, as was also lacking logistical support for community members who were very much involved in project implementation and monitoring. On the whole, partners used resources efficiently, making savings in some cases, thanks to strategic alliances. However, credit rotations have been too slow due to some administrative burdens. Partners have also correctly followed administrative and financial procedures and the purchase of goods was made on time, except for a few late distributions of seeds. Activities were implemented as planned with a good level of participation from local authorities, community representatives and beneficiaries. Partners carried out regular monitoring visits in the field and CA closely followed them up, however without sufficient field presence and documentation of this work. A mid-term evaluation was organised and led to very useful recommendations but only some of them were implemented, partly due to a lack of clarity on respective responsibilities between the too many CA staff members involved in the projects monitoring.

All partners delivered planned outputs and three of them achieved even more results than planned. Projects benefited IDPs and host families particularly hit by the fighting, responded to urgent humanitarian needs and contributed to improve living conditions in terms of food and income as well as health and sanitation conditions. However, due to the short duration of the intervention and limited funds, assistance provided was not able to cover all registered IDPs and host families, only benefited a small number of returnees, and impact will not always be sustainable if additional measures are not taken. Returnees did benefit from humanitarian aid through food and NFI distributions and from improved water and sanitation conditions, but very few of them were supported in their efforts to produce again food and/or generate income. In addition, cross-cutting issues such as HIV/AIDS and partners' capacity building were not sufficiently integrated into the projects implementation.

Priority recommendations

The following recommendations are directed at CA and are the most urgent ones:

- a) In order to avoid duplication and confusion in responsibilities and in the information sent out, the respective responsibilities of CA staff members involved in emergency projects planning, monitoring and reporting should be clarified, along with the hierarchical links between them and how respective responsibilities should be monitored. Furthermore, it is necessary to clarify which consultations should be made at which levels and by whom (including CA/London), and how information should flow.
- b) Support the partner PIAMF and its members PACODEVI and CCMV in a joint revision of their financial collaboration in order to: (1) make financial planning and monitoring permanently known to all parties; (2) approve credits and transfer funds to beneficiaries more rapidly; (3) gradually increase credit size according to beneficiaries' performances.
- c) Using its remaining appeal funds, CA should provide support to IDPs who have not been able to return home yet due to insecurity, and to their host families, as well as to returnees who can't access their fields. Priority should be given to IDPs and host families who have been registered, but have not yet been assisted, or to returnees who have only received humanitarian assistance. Financial micro-credits or carefully chosen small livestock (depending on the area of intervention) would be the most appropriate way to help them generate income. In addition, returnees who can access their fields should receive seeds on credit (and tools in some cases) to help them generate food and income.
- d) Through its appeal funds and, if possible using DEC balance, CA should support FFP to enable its mobile VTC to continue its testing and monitoring activities for a further 12 to 24 months period, in the intervention zones where FFP peer educators and Heal Africa community activists are pursuing their awareness-raising work. In order to monitor and support HIV-positive persons in a professional manner, it is suggested to establish alliances with other actors working in North Kivu and/or to integrate into the project an additional team of two social workers equipped with means of transport. These social workers should encourage the organisation and training of Solidarity Groups (SG), made of HIV-positive members, so that the latter can benefit from loans and generate income to cover the cost of their medicines in the long-term.
- e) CA should support its partners in their advocacy and lobbying work towards MONUC and FARDC forces who should not only protect roads and towns but also the fields where farmers are attacked and harvests stolen, in addition to women and children being often raped.

II. INTRODUCTION

The province of North Kivu has frequently suffered from armed conflicts since the early 1990s. Clashes between the FARDC and the rebel forces led by General Laurent Nkunda of the CDNP resumed in August 2007, following the noted failure of the attempt to mix elements of the CDNP into government armed forces. Several other rebel groups and local militias also became involved, including the Coalition of Congolese Patriotic Resistance (PARECO), the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR) and other local militias such as the Mai Mai. This situation created large population movements from Masisi and Rutshuru areas towards the city of Goma and Kalehe area in the South Kivu province.

In January 2008 the Goma agreement was signed between the Government of the DRC, Laurent Nkunda and the Mai Mai militias, leading to a cease-fire and to the withdrawal of rebel troops from the main centres as well as the setting up of a programme for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants into civil life or into the national army. However, the agreement was not followed and after sporadic attacks at the start of 2008 the conflict resumed at the end of August 2008, at which time the CNDP launched an offensive on the government military bases and on the zones under the protection of United Nations troops. After significant gains and the collapse of the FARDC's resistance, the CNDP took control of the city of Rutshuru at the end of October 2008 and began advancing on Goma, consolidating its position in the surrounding areas. Clashes between CNDP forces, Mai-Mai militias and governmental troops continued through December 2008 when the DRC and Rwanda signed an agreement to work together against the FDLR rebels.

Rwandese troops entered North Kivu territory in January 2009 and Laurent Nkunda was arrested. However, attacks by rebel FDLR continued until March 2009, leading to further waves of displaced populations. The Government of the DRC and the CNDP signed a peace agreement on that same month in order to transform the latter into a political party and integrate its troops into the FARDC. However, FDLR attacks did not cease, particularly in the areas of Lubéro and the territory of Beni. In March 2009 the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in DRC estimated the number of displaced persons in North Kivu at 803,136 and the number of displaced persons who had returned home at 306,000, most of these people being spread among the areas of Lubéro, Rutshuru and Masisi as well as the city of Goma and its surrounding areas.

It is in this context that Christian Aid (CA) carried out 2 needs assessment missions in North Kivu, in February and June 2008, in order to plan five emergency projects that were then complemented by two further projects. The projects were as follows:

Partner	Project	Source of funds	Planned duration	Budget (£)
CBCA	Distribution of food and non-food items and medicines	DEC appeal (with additional CA Appeal top up to cover exchange rate losses)	6 months (Dec 08-May 09)	238,652
CBCA	Assistance to Unaccompanied Children (UC)/orphans in Goma city	CA appeal	3 months (Feb-April 09)	47,596
ADEPAE	Food security	DEC appeal (with additional CA Appeal top up to cover exchange rate losses)	6 months (Jan-June 09)	75,241
ADEPAE	Water and Sanitation	DEC: £39,207 HEKS: £60,985	6 months (Dec 08-May 09)	103,888
PIAMF	Micro-finance in Goma	CA appeal	12 months (Dec 08-Dec 09)	54,967
PIAMF	Micro-finance in Masisi	CA appeal	12 months (Jan 09-Jan 10)	98,183
FFP	HIV/AIDS mitigation	DEC appeal (with additional CA Appeal top up to cover exchange rate losses)	6 months (Dec 08-May 09)	74,969
TOTAL				693,496

This report concerns the external evaluation of these 7 projects, 2 of which are still ongoing. The objectives of the evaluation were to assess the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of these 7 projects and to draw conclusions, lessons and recommendations for the benefit of the Humanitarian Division, CA/DRC and the partners (see Terms of Reference in Annex 1). In addition, the evaluation is in line with DEC requirements for its members. The evaluation was carried out by two external consultants over a period of 19 days in North Kivu and 3 days in Kinshasa and Montpellier (via Skype interviews). Seven days were spent interviewing various target groups in a number of the projects' intervention zones (without the partners being present), and 4 days were spent in meetings and documentary analysis (the results of which are in Annex 3) within each of the 4 partners' offices. In addition, individual interviews were carried out with 8 representatives of teams from the Humanitarian Division, CA/DRC, and the PFD involved in planning and/or monitoring these projects. The methodology used and the limitations of the evaluation are presented in Annex 2 of this report; the work schedule is detailed in Annex 4; the list of people met with is in Annex 5; and the documents consulted are given in Annex 6.

III. RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION

3.1. Relevance

Relevance of the 7 projects evaluated

Overall, the 7 projects were relevant in terms of selected beneficiaries, targeted geographic zones, and type and speed of the response.

- While most other international NGOs and United Nations agencies assisted displaced persons taking refuge in camps established for this purpose (approx. 30% of displaced persons according to the CA needs assessment mission of June 2008), CA targeted displaced persons outside the camps as well as those hosted by families (approx. 70% of displaced persons according to the same needs assessment mission), as well as those cared for by churches of the Central African Baptist Community (CBCA) in Goma. In order to provide relief for the host families, to prevent conflict and to promote community reconciliation, it was planned that support would benefit both the displaced persons and their host families.
- The targeted intervention zones were within those in North Kivu that were the hardest hit by the conflicts and by the influx of displaced people: Masisi, Nyiragongo and Rutshuru, as well as the City of Goma; Masisi area had relatively low coverage from other NGOs at the time of the June 2008 needs assessment.
- The type of aid planned for was responding to immediate needs, and for some projects also responding to medium-term needs : food and non-food items, water and sanitation, credit, seeds for market gardening (short-cycle cultivation), small livestock farming and HIV/AIDS prevention. The food and non-food items and credit were to benefit displaced persons and host families in Goma, while agricultural tools, seeds and small livestock were to benefit displaced people and their host families in Masisi, an area that has long been a source of supply of agricultural produce for the city of Goma, the province of South Kivu, Kinshasa and neighbouring countries.
- Support for commercial transactions planned within the PIAMF Masisi microcredit project was also relevant to avoid harvest losses.
- Direct support from PIAMF to certain existing informal associations in Goma was also relevant, as it was allowing PIAMF to test them before integrating them as platform members in the medium term.

- Finally, the 7 planned projects were to start in December 2008 or January 2009, immediately after the most intense skirmishes and when conflicts with CNDP troops were gradually ceasing, contributing to a more stable situation and thus facilitating CA partners' work.

There were, however, shortcomings in the design of some of the projects:

- The planned duration for the Femme Plus Foundation (FFP) HIV/AIDS mitigation project was intended to be 12 months but was reduced to 6, although this type of project requires at least 12 months of execution in order to achieve any significant impact: (1) sensitisation in an environment where HIV/AIDS is practically unknown takes time, and the demand for testing is therefore not immediate. As a result, the project led to numerous testing requests, to which FFP only responded partially due to the project end in June. (2) The psychological and material support to people who were found HIV-positive also requires time if these people are to be assisted in order to become relatively autonomous from a psychological and economic point of view. As DEC first funding phase could have been of 6 or 9 months, the project could have been planned over 9 months or 12 months if funded from CA appeal funds.
- HIV/AIDS was not integrated in the planning as a cross-cutting issue, although this could have been easily done: beneficiaries targeted by the "Platform of Microfinance Institutions and Associations" (PIAMF) and by the NGO "Action for Endogenous Development and Peace" (ADEPAE) were located in the same project areas as those of the FFP and could therefore have been sensitised on HIV/AIDS issues and tested if they wished, through the FFP's mobile Voluntary Testing Centre (VTC). However, CA did suggest such cross-cutting integrations to its partners prior to the launch of the projects and the issue was also addressed in the Appraisal Monitoring and Reviews (AMR) documents produced.
- The duration of the ADEPAE food security project was to be 12 months but was reduced to 6 months, even though: (1) cassava takes 12 months to grow to maturity; and (2) the introduction of a new crop (mushrooms) into a rural context also takes more than 6 months in order to ensure that producers adopt the new techniques and integrate them into their existing production systems, especially when seeds can't be found locally. As for the FFP project, this project could have been planned over 9 months if funded by DEC, or 12 months if funded from CA appeal funds.
- In two intervention zones (Bweremana and Mweso), PIAMF and ADEPAE planned to facilitate access to agricultural inputs with two contradictory strategies: ADEPAE planned to distribute agricultural inputs for free, while PIAMF intended to distribute seeds on credit at a 20% rate. Even though PIAMF AMR document specified that partners would work in different sites, some of the villages were finally the same, generating some frustration among PIAMF beneficiaries. It is regrettable that CA did not seek to promote a more integrated approach through which the two partners could have played complementary roles based on their respective areas of expertise (PIAMF in microcredit and ADEPAE in food security).
- While PIAMF is a platform whose main aim is to strengthen its members (article 3 of its statutes) and whose specific area is microfinance - and not food security -, the two projects in which it was involved led it to become operational on the one hand, and to intervene in a new sector, the agricultural sector, on the other hand. It is debatable whether it was really relevant to change the nature of PIAMF's work and whether it would not have been more appropriate, in the case of the Masisi microfinance project, to have PIAMF intervene through its member the "Programme d'Appui aux Comités de Développement des Villages" (PACODEVI), which was already acting in Masisi centre in the area of food security, with the support of the NGO CONCERN International.
- The food and non-food items (NFI) provided by CBCA to displaced persons who had returned to their villages in the Kibututu and Nyiragongo areas should have included a seeds and tools, or small livestock component (for those without access to their fields due to insecurity), so that these populations could benefit from a source of food and revenue that would facilitate their socioeconomic reintegration.

- The buildings constructed to house UC were ultimately not used by them, and the water tanks and latrines built by CBCA for displaced refugees in Goma also did not directly benefit to these people who returned home earlier than was anticipated. Given that the needs of displaced persons and their host families, as well as of returnees, are still enormous, it would have been more strategic to look for existing housing facilities in order to house UC rather than building new ones (even if CBCA will use them in the future as transit centres for children in need) and to support returnees in their socioeconomic reinsertion endeavours rather than rehabilitating CBCA infrastructures.
- The assistance provided by CBCA to displaced people in Goma should have included some games organised for their children to avoid their running wild in the streets of Goma, prey to its various dangers.

Relevance of the CA response with respect to its DRC strategy (2005-2010)

CA's response was partially in line with its work strategy in DRC:

- All projects were concentrating on CA/DRC priority work areas: secure livelihoods (ADEPAE, CBCA and PIAMF projects) and HIV/AIDS (FFP project).
- Among the 4 “direct” partners selected, 3 were NGOs without religious affiliations and 1 was a faith organisation. Among PIAMF partners there were many local associations and community groups, meaning that this partners selection was in line with CA's strategy for DRC that aims to work with different types of partners.
- Work on communication, advocacy and lobbying was a strong component of CA's response to the disaster.

However, CA's response did not integrate some of CA's priorities for DRC:

- With the exception of ADEPAE target groups who were sensitised on HIV/AIDS issues (but with no link made to FFP VTC), this issue was not addressed by the three partners as a cross-cutting issue.
- Aside from funding for office equipment and a few as-needed actions that benefited to CBCA, partners' capacity building was not integrated as a cross-cutting issue in all projects, although this was suggested in the needs assessment mission of June 2008. Even though capacity-building activities are difficult to implement in an emergency context, some basic tools could have been suggested to partners, particularly to improve the documentation of their monitoring work. In addition, the DRC EO could have used his existing knowledge and material to organise a formal training on SPHERE for the four partners' staff members.
- Actions for vulnerability and Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) were not always integrated into the projects. As a result, not all conditions are in place to make some of the impact achieved sustainable, as detailed in section 2.5 of this report.
- CA's response involved 2 new partners, although CA/DRC aims to have less and more strategic partners. However, one of them was already well-known to CA and could become a strategic partner.

Relevance of the CA approach and of partner choices

Among the 12 DEC agencies intervening in North Kivu, only CA, Action Aid, Help the Aged International and TearFund worked through local organisations, an approach relevant in that it allows for a better projects' integration within the local context, reduces implementation costs in the field, and contributes to strengthening local civil society. CA's intervention through 4 partners made it possible to respond simultaneously to the needs of more people, in a variety of sectors and in a wider geographical area.

Two of the 4 organisations - PIAMF and FFP - were CA partners, even though CA had not supported PIAMF since 2007. These two partners had already proven their expertise in their respective domains and both were very well integrated into local civil society as well as into the international community. The other two partners were new and selected according to a variety of criteria, the selection process having been neither systematic, nor documented. The selection criteria used, while incomplete for the selection of new partners, were however relevant:

- CBCA was already known to CA, mainly through the ECC which was already a partner of CA in South Kivu. The organisation is well rooted in the province of North Kivu, has its own infrastructures as well as human and logistical resources, enabling it to respond rapidly in an emergency context. Furthermore, a number of displaced adults and children had already taken refuge in CBCA churches and pastors' homes in Goma, and the organisation had begun to assist them, but without having sufficient means to provide an adequate response.
- ADEPAE was not present in North Kivu. However, the organisation had carried out, early 2008, a documented evaluation of the humanitarian situation around Kitchanga and Karuba, with the objective of intervening within the province. Conflict transformation and community reconciliation, extremely needed in the context of the projects' implementation, was ADEPAE's area of work and expertise. Lastly, due to ADEPAE's presence in South Kivu, CA DRC Emergency Officer (EO) knew the organisation's coordinator and ADEPAE was known to have already implemented United Nations Development Programmes (UNDP)-funded projects.

Projects' planning process

The planning process was very positive in certain ways:

- The targeting of beneficiaries, geographic areas, intervention types and strategies (through local NGOs and community groups) was made taking into account other international NGOs' and United Nations agencies' interventions, in order to provide support that would complement existing efforts rather than duplicate them: CA sought to intervene where a few other actors were present, provided a type of assistance (credit) that other NGOs did not dare provide, and adopted a partner-based approach that only a few agencies chose. This was confirmed during the evaluation: none of the beneficiaries interviewed had received external aid other than that provided by the CA partner.
- Partners were at the centre of the needs identification and planning processes.
- PIAMF and FFP had already worked together in the past, but did not know ADEPAE. Despite this, the three partners worked together in order to prepare a common needs assessment mission in June 2008 which they carried out together with CA: this certainly facilitated CA's penetration in that new province, stimulated exchanges and thoughts, contributed to reduce duplications in assessment work and expenses and generated a joint vision of the CA's response to give.
- The needs evaluation missions were carried out by CA and its partners in often very unstable natural – a seism occurred in February 2008 and had consequences in both Kivus – and security conditions - sometimes in zones under rebel control -, but nonetheless included visits in the field and discussions with displaced persons and their host families. As a result, projects' planning was largely based on needs expressed by the beneficiaries themselves.

However, several weaknesses also made planning more laborious and had subsequent consequences on the projects' implementation, monitoring and evaluation:

- Very little quantitative baseline data on the beneficiaries' socio-economic and food situation was collected during the needs assessments missions made by CA and the partners, which made a quantitative evaluation of the project impact difficult. The context of insecurity and emergency certainly did not ease this task, but the lack of data collection sheets also contributed to this lack of documentation.
- The REO planned the first 5 projects in Goma, with the partners, but without the participation of CA/Kinshasa or CA/Bukavu team members. Although the REO regularly kept both teams informed, this situation made it difficult, particularly for CA/Kinshasa staff members, to own the projects. In the same way, both teams were not sufficiently involved in the budgeting process and in the writing of the DEC proposal. This made the drafting of the first financial report to be submitted to DEC particularly difficult for the DRC Finance and Administration Manager (FAM) and the Finance and Capacity Building Officer (FCBO) in charge of producing this report. In addition, the Programme Funding Officer (PFO, based in Kigali) in charge of preparing the DEC proposal had to communicate with partners through the DRC EO (based in Bukavu) and the REO (based in Kigali), which required numerous email exchanges in order to clarify various issues. If possible from a security point of view, it would have been much more efficient to organise a workshop, with the participation of partners, CA/DRC representatives (especially those later directly responsible for programme and financial monitoring), the Humanitarian Division and the Programme Funding Department (if this department was to be involved) in order to jointly plan the projects, including their budgets.
- PIAMF did not sufficiently involve its members PACODEVI and the "Centre de Conseil pour Mieux Vivre" (CCMV) in the planning process, which created misunderstandings and frustrations.

Planning documents

Planning documents were of 4 types: (1) plans submitted to DEC; (2) plans relating to CA funding appeals; (3) AMR; (4) proposals submitted by partners. Documents (1), (2) and (3) were in different formats, and thus do not contain the same types of information, while the project documents submitted by partners are also in different formats depending on each partner's working practices. As a result, the process of drafting planning documents was confused, complicated and long. An analysis of partners' project documents shows important differences in their quality: FFP project document includes distinct objectives and results, their respective indicators and a clear and detailed budget, while ADEPAE's food security project document, without including any budget, is extremely brief, doesn't describe the project's organisation, and doesn't provide any quantitative data on agricultural inputs to distribute. With respect to the AMR documents, which CA uses as the basis for disbursement and monitoring work, the latter have different formats and most of them present significant weaknesses, partly because the template is long and complicated, several questions being included under the same title and thus leading to incomplete answers. The main shortcomings are the following: (1) many sections of the template are left empty; (2) the number of direct and indirect beneficiaries is not always clearly established and data are not disaggregated by gender; (3) beneficiary selection criteria are not always provided; (4) there is occasional confusion between the "activities," "results," "objectives," and "indicators" sections and most of the indicators are neither SMART nor tied to results or objectives; (5) the last section on cross-cutting issues is only partly dealt with.

3.2. Efficiency

Availability of means and inputs

Most of the difficulties faced related to the availability of financial means were generated by insufficient clarity in the respective responsibilities of the CA members involved in the management and monitoring of projects, and by the fact that some of them were not familiar enough with CA and DEC financial management and monitoring procedures. In addition, communication was slow and difficult between the DRC EO and the DRC FAM and some partners were delayed in sending their bank details.

As a result, the first transfer to CBCA and PIAMF was only made in January 2009 when two of their projects were due to start in December 2008. The second transfers to partners were however not delayed. CBCA was the only partner to pre-finance the launch of its project. PIAMF did not take a similar initiative as they were not authorised to do so, although none of the funding agreements signed between CA and the partners prohibits pre-financing once the contract is signed. Similarly, FFP was not authorised to use its balance of US\$15,633.44 even though section 2.5 of annex 1 of the funding agreement allows a partner to present a proposal to CA on how to use its balance once the project is completed. Lack of clarity on respective responsibilities (between CA and FFP) also contributed to the late purchasing of FFP vehicle serving as mobile VTC. This confusion in responsibilities and insufficiently pre-planned staff changes within CA also meant that several persons were successively involved in communicating with the donor HEKS. As a result, the contract between CA and HEKS was only signed at the end of May 2009 and the first transfer of funds was only received in July 2009, once the project was already completed. This did not, however, affect the execution of the project since CA pre-financed these funds.

Although such costs are usually not funded by CA in emergency situations, partners benefitted from equipment to facilitate projects implementation. However, partners were equipped on the basis of their requests rather than on the basis of an analysis of their current institutional capacities and of their respective needs for projects implementation and monitoring. As a result, provision of equipment varied widely from one partner to the other, although it was generally inadequate, in terms of means of transport, to allow them to carry out efficient project implementation and monitoring. Furthermore, the lack of internet connections within the FFP and PIAMF offices reduced work efficiency and hampered communication. In addition, PIAMF members, PACODEVI and CCMV, who were responsible for the implementation and monitoring of 48% of the loans granted to solidarity groups, did not benefit from any institutional support at all in terms of equipment.

Partners had a budget to hire vehicles, but the latter was not sufficient to allow them to carry out regular monitoring in the field, and some partners therefore had to invest their own resources – personal or those of the organisation – in the projects implementation: (1) CBCA had to use one of the organisation's vehicles and 20% of the fuel required to monitor the project was financed through its own funds. (2) PIAMF credit agents in Goma had to walk over 10 to 15km to monitor beneficiaries and collect repayments. (3) ADEPAE made a motorbike and a van available to the project from its own pool, in order to monitor its field staff.

It should also be noted that community representatives (monitoring committees and peer educators) and other local experts (such as the ISEA agricultural monitor) were very much involved in projects implementation and monitoring but received no (in the case of ADEPAE) or very little (in the case of FFP) logistical support, which generated frustrations among most of them.

Human resource levels were adequate for projects needs with the exception of FFP: the two social workers that were recruited were involved in sensitisation during VTC sessions as well as in pre- and post-testing counselling. In addition, they had to provide psychological and medical support to the 51 persons found HIV-positive, who were spread over a large geographical area. This had 2 consequences: (1) the VTC was under-used; and (2) monitoring of People Living with HIV/AIDS (PLHA) was sufficiently intensive. One additional social worker should have been recruited and equipped with a motorbike in order to monitor PLHAs and peer educators.

Strategic and economic use of resources

Although the mobile VTC was underused given the lack of sufficient social workers, its functioning was very efficient characterized by a very rapid installation and organisation allowing FFP to provide beneficiaries with professional services. This was partly due to an exchange visit organised with FFP/Bukavu which was already using a mobile VTC. This visit enabled newly project recruited staff to quickly understand the functioning of a mobile VTC and thus put it in practice to make the new mobile VTC rapidly operational.

In addition, the recruitment of medical staff within the project team (2 nurses and 1 laboratory operator), who had already worked in the project area, led to easier collaboration with the health zones and local authorities, and also increased the trust of the people who were sensitised.

FFP also made a very good use of existing national and international resources: (1) some of the peer educators were selected from community relays who had already been trained in health issues and were working within the national health system; (2) FFP involved the National Programme to Fight Against HIV/AIDS (PNLS) and the health zone staff in peer educators' training; (3) FFP was able to obtain a donation of condoms from the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), thus making savings on the budget originally planned for this item; (4) within the framework of its partnership with Médecins Du Monde (MDM), FFP was able to refer to them the PLHA requiring an antiretroviral treatment (ARV). The lack of collaboration in the field with Heal Africa should however be noted, since the latter was also carrying out sensitisation work on HIV/AIDS in Sake (one of FFP sites) through community facilitators, without however offering testing facilities. A partnership with this NGO to carry out joint and complementary activities could have contributed to a better use of resources available and increase the overall project impact.

CBCA also used its resources in a strategic and economic way: (1) as the reopening of some road networks led to a drop in food prices, CBCA was able to make savings which enabled the organisation to fund additional food and NFI distributions to people who had returned to their villages; (2) the use of CBCA's trucks, parishes and clinics allow for savings and contributed to generate internal sources of income: trucks were hired to transport items to be distributed and the UC were examined and treated in CBCA clinics; (3) the partnership established with the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) enabled the UC to benefit from 2 showers and 2 toilets built by the ICRC, and the organisation reunited 67 UC while CBCA reunited 90 with very few logistical resources. (4) Thanks to its collaboration with the Congolese Institute for Nature Conservation (ICCN), CBCA was able to benefit from bricks-production equipment which was used in its awareness-raising work on nature conservation and environmental friendly technologies, while the EEC and the Muslims representation body involvement in this work contributed to reach more people. With respect to ADEPAE's food security project, it should be noted that ISEA was not involved in a planned and formal manner in the project implementation and monitoring, particularly in the selection of the chickens, even though the institute has incubators in Goma and Bweremana. Similarly, neither the National Service for Seed stock (SENASA) nor the Institute for the Environment and Agricultural Research (INERA) were involved in the project's execution, although ADEPAE had planned to involve them in various training sessions.

A few administrative burdens hampered the efficient use of resources by PIAMF and its members: the latter must systematically transfer the capital reimbursed and interest paid to PIAMF before being able to benefit from fresh capital to grant new loans. However, it would be more efficient to have members deposit repayments in their respective bank accounts for rapid reallocation once reimbursement and new credit request controls have been carried out by PIAMF. As a result, SGs must sometimes wait for 3 months before receiving a new loan and not all SG who have been organised and trained have benefitted from loans so far. Furthermore, since the credit rotation is relatively slow, this reduces the amount of interests generated. PIAMF slow processing of credit requests is also due to the fact that the management software bought with project funds is still not up and running, although staff has been trained in its use. In addition, project human resources were not used as planned: the credit agent in Masisi, fired for embezzlement after 6 months, was only replaced by a new one in October 2009, and the agricultural agent whose initial 6-month contract was not renewed, has not been replaced so far.

Programmatic and financial execution

Of the total budget allocated to the 7 projects, 88.46% was executed, which is an excellent rate of execution, especially given the fact that two of PIAMF's projects are still ongoing. Only FFP has an execution rate somewhat lower, due to the late start of its activities and to some savings made on certain budget lines. The table below shows each project's execution rate **in pounds**:

Partner	Project	Duration	Budget	Spent	Balance	Spent %
CBCA	Distribution of food, non-food and drugs	6 months	238,652	218,744.56	19,907.44	91.66
CBCA	Assistance to UC / Orphans in Goma town	3 months	47,596	43,909.18	3,686.82	92.25
ADEPAE	Food security	6 months	75,241	69,968	5,273	92.99
ADEPAE	Water and sanitation	6 months	103,888	97,191	6,697	93.55
PIAMF	Micro-finance in Goma	1 year	54,967	49,219.90	5,747.10	89.54
PIAMF	Micro-finance in Masisi	1 year	98,183	72,952.84	25,230.16	74.30
FFP	HIV/AIDS impact reduction	6 months	74,969	61,458.86	13,510.14	81.98
TOTAL			693,496	613,444.34	80,051.66	
AVERAGE						88.46

Exchange rate used: 1 pound = \$1,5375

Apart from a few cases, partners have correctly followed administrative and financial management procedures. Weaknesses encountered were the following: (1) some of ADEPAE's project documents, in particular financial and training reports, are not available because the previous office manager left in August 2009, taking with him the keys and codes giving access to documents in hard and electronic versions. In addition, the information and archiving systems are not efficient. (2) With the exception of FFP, goods purchasing procedures were not always rigorously followed and in some cases, the call for tender did not provide details on the characteristics and quality of the goods to be purchased. (3) For the UC assistance project, CBCA did not recruit the site manager and the social worker following a standard recruitment process including vacancy publication and interviews, but recruited two persons already known to CBCA. However, this procedure can be justified for one of the persons recruited as she had already begun to provide support to the children. (4) CBCA does not have a manual for administrative and financial procedures but is in the process of producing one.

As far as the purchase and distribution of food, NFI and agricultural inputs, is concerned, this was done on time, apart from a few late distributions of seeds made by ADEPAE and PIAMF that led to late sowings in some cases (tomato and cabbage seed in Bweremana). According to the chief of M/Karuba, the construction work for water sources and latrines also suffered from delays due to the lack of sand and cinder-blocks in the project zone.

With the exception of these few delays, activities were implemented as planned with a good level of participation from local authorities, community representatives and beneficiaries: beneficiaries' Internally displaced Persons (IDPs) and host families were selected by the population itself, as were members of the various monitoring committees that were set up.

The only weaknesses identified relate to training and awareness-raising sessions: (1) Most of these (except for PIAMF) were organised without any training manual, and when a manual did exist, it was not always adequate. For example, ADEPAE manual for water sources management committees was in French, with a lot of text and very few drawings, although only a few of the committee members could speak or understand French. (2) FFP did not provide its peer educators with awareness-raising materials. (3) PIAMF, CCMV and PACODEVI beneficiaries were trained in credit management (and in agricultural techniques for beneficiaries of seeds), but were not trained in micro-enterprise management, nor advised on their business requirements and profitability, which resulted in some inadequate investments:

one beneficiary invested its three successive loans in three different Income Generating Activities (IGA) - the selling of charcoal, pigs' raising, and finally chicken raising - before finally realising that chicken raising was the IGA best suited for him due to its rapid profitability and the relatively smaller space required for this activity. Similarly, two beneficiaries met in Minova invested their loans in fuel selling, an activity they had practiced before, but they did very little to none profits due to the rise in fuel prices. (4) The training organised by PIAMF with the participation of SG, CCMV and PACODEVI accountants, was meant to harmonise their respective accounting systems but did not have any impact as templates worked out during the session were not disseminated afterwards.

Programmatic and financial monitoring

Partners carried out regular monitoring visits in the field and were assisted in this work by SG members, the various monitoring committees and other community representatives made responsible for this task. With the exception of PIAMF, this monitoring work has not been sufficiently documented due to the lack of knowledge and tools, at community and/or partners' levels: for example, FFP peer educators did not document their awareness-raising work within communities and CBCA staff did not document their regular visits to UC.

However, regular field presence enabled partners to produce monthly reports, that were submitted to CA generally on time, and to occasionally adapt activities in response to beneficiaries' and other local actors' suggestions: PIAMF extended the repayment period for some loans from 2-3 months to 5 months and CBCA integrated 12 women in its beneficiaries list following a suggestion made by the beneficiaries themselves.

CA's DRC EO did a regular monitoring through monthly office-level visits to each partner, but carried out very few monitoring visits in the various partners' intervention zones, and his monitoring activities were not documented. He also provided the partners with a template to use for narrative reports. Based on the partners' monthly reports, the DRC EO produced consolidated monthly reports that were sent to the partners, to CA/Kinshasa and to the Humanitarian Division of CA/London. These reports enabled other CA teams and departments to monitor projects' implementation. However, they did not include any summary financial report or specific recommendations for partners. In addition, the definition of monitoring indicators and the development of monitoring plans that were due to be worked out by the DRC EO in close collaboration with partners, did not take place as foreseen in the AMRs. This weakness led to monitoring work being more focused on activity implementation, than on the achievement of results and objectives.

The CA FCBO carried out 2 partners' monitoring visits that enabled them to better archive their receipts as well as improve the presentation of their monthly financial reports. However, these visits have not been documented which would have helped partners and CA to follow-up recommendations made.

The monitoring visit carried out in February 2009 by various members of CA/Kinshasa, the Programme Funding Department (PFD) and the Humanitarian Division (CA/London and CA/Kigali), along with the mid-term evaluation carried out in April 2009 in which all partners participated as well as representatives from CA/Bukavu and CA/London (Humanitarian Division), led to the suggestion of very relevant recommendations. These were documented and enabled partners to take some corrective measures: CBCA strengthened its collaboration with ICRC and increased its research work so that only 2 children are not yet reunited with their parents; FFP purchased another tent to facilitate confidential communication of HIV/AIDS testing results; and PIAMF held its first General Assembly which resulted in the election of a board and of an internal controlling commission.

However, some important recommendations were not properly followed up, due to the large number of CA members involved in monitoring combined with a lack of clarity on respective responsibilities. Recommendations that were not implemented include the following: families of reunited children should be considered as beneficiaries for various other projects; ADEPAE and PIAMF should coordinate more effectively in order to harmonise their intervention strategies; ADEPAE should support measures to reduce soil erosion around water sources and to protect them from contamination.

3.3. Effectiveness

This section aims to present the achievement of results in comparison to what was planned, project by project and on the basis of data drawn from partners' reports. In terms of quantity, all partners achieved planned results and three of them (CBCA, FFP and PIAMF) achieved even more results than planned. In addition, services and products delivered were generally of good quality except for a few weaknesses detailed in the following section 2.4.

Water and Sanitation Project – ADEPAE –

Indicators	Planned	Achieved
Number of beneficiaries	17,080 persons	More than 17,080
Number of water sources built	47	47
Average flow per water source	4 litres/3 sec	1 litre/3 sec**
Number of latrines built	100	100
Number of water source management committees organised and trained	47	47
Number of water technicians trained	188 persons (94 men, 94 women)	188 persons (94 men, 94 women)

** estimate based on two water sources visited in Karuba.

It should be noted that the number of latrines indicated above corresponds to the number of compartments, and thus to the number of doors. Each water source management committee is made up of 4 persons, 2 men and 2 women. The average rate of flow of a water source is only 25% of what was planned, according to the estimate made during the visits of two sources in Karuba. Despite this lack of capacity, the water sources are able to serve more people than was planned: based on the average rate of flow observed in Karuba, a single source can benefit 1,080 people for 13 hours a day according to SPHERE standards. Multiplying this number by 47 water sources, one may estimate that the latter can potentially benefit 50,760 people.

Food Security Project – ADEPAE –

Indicators	Planned	Achieved
Number of direct beneficiaries	3,000 families	3,000 families
Area sown thanks to distributed seeds and cuttings	20 ha including: 12 ha for market-gardening 5 ha for cassava multiplication 3 ha for yam multiplication	20 ha including: 12 ha for market-gardening 5 ha for cassava multiplication 3 ha for yam multiplication
Chickens distributed	1,000 chickens	1,000 chickens
Mushrooms produced	4 mushroom farms	4 (no longer operational)

When evaluators carried out a field visit in Bweremana (Masisi), vegetable had already been harvested. Only cassava plants could therefore be observed, which were healthy, but did not include any improved varieties.

Distribution of Food, Non-Food Items and Medicines – CBCA -

Food distribution (in kg)

DISTRIBUTION SITES	Households No. planned*	Households No. achieved	BEANS	CORN	OIL	SALT
GOMA (6 sites + 48 HF)	612/612	756	19,308	37,406	4,491	449.5
RUTSHURU (4 sites)	1,100/1,400	1,649	-	-	-	-
NYIRAGONGO (3 sites)	0/300	491	13,236	25,272	3,159	-
TOTAL	2,017	2,896	32,544	62,678	7,650	449.5

*The first number is drawn from DEC plan submitted in December 2008. The second number is drawn from revised DEC plan submitted in June 2009. HF = Host Families

Non-food items distribution

SITES	Blankets	ITN	Pans	Plates	Goblets	Basins	Cans	Ladles	Sheets
GOMA	1,760	1,759	1,766	4,254	4,269	705	705	1,170	233
RUTSHURU	3,080	3,050	3,050	5,403	5,403	907	1,000	2,039	1,000
NYIRAGONGO	-	-	1,215	-	-	-	-	-	122
TOTAL	4,840	4,809	6,031	9,657	9,672	1,612	1,705	3,209	1,355

Note: distributions on the Nyiragongo axis were funded with a project balance, so that beneficiaries received food aid (beans, corn, oil) but only part of the non-food items. ITN = Insecticide-Treated mosquito Net

Non-food items for women and children

SITES	Wax cloth	Skirts	Under-garments	Buckets	Soap	Children's clothes
GOMA	680	585	1,170	585	585	455
RUTSHURU	-	-	-	-	-	-
NYIRAGONGO	405	-	-	-	-	491
TOTAL	1,085	585	1,170	585	585	946

Note: the number of beneficiary women and children is not specified in the CBCA distributions summary document

Assistance to UC/Orphans in Goma town - CBCA -

UC registered	ICRC reunited UC	CBCA reunited UC	Non-reunited UC	UC examined and treated*	Hospitalised UC
159	67	90	2	89 (inc. 45F)	3

*When they were examined in March 2009, these children were suffering from worm infestations, anaemia and bad skin conditions

Food items distributed

Drinking water	Beans	Corn flour	Vegetable oil	Salt	Meals rich in animal protein
2,464 cans, 20 litres each	3,004 kg	6,728 kg	1,085 litres	100 kg	45

Note: Reunited children were sent home with a reinsertion kit including food and non-food items.

Non-food items distributed for hygiene and accommodation

Basins	Towels	Laundry powder	Clothing*	Mats	Blankets	Sheets	ITN
128	50	30 kg	124	92	128	150	128

*Each unit includes a shirt and a trouser or a dress

Non-food items distributed for food preparation, meals and games

Pans	Plates	Goblets	Spoons	Ladles	Toys / Balloons
7	216	96	216	20	92

Construction and furnishing of the three housing centres

Centres built	Tanks	Bunk beds	Mattresses	1 table + 6 chairs	Benches
3	3 x 2,000 litres	30	60	3	6

HIV/AIDS mitigation - FFP -

Indicator	Planned	Achieved
Number of peer educators trained (on 6 sites)	80	80 incl. 34 F
Number of persons sensitised (in 24 villages)	7,500	13,075
Number of condoms distributed	25,000 (M: 20,000. F: 5,000)	14,189 (M: 12,234. F: 1,955)
Number of persons tested	2,400	4,203
Number persons found HIV/AIDS positive	200	57 incl. 43 F
Number of HIV-positive persons assisted (food and NFI)	100	51
Number of HIV-positive persons benefiting from psychosocial support	100	51
Number of HIV-positive persons benefiting from cotrimoxazole	200	51
Number of persons referred to hospital for ARV treatment	-	1
Support groups	-	3

The number of persons sensitised only includes people who took part to awareness-raising sessions organised by FFP on the day of the testing. It does not include people who have been sensitised by peer educators who carry out daily awareness-raising work but did not document it.

The number of condoms distributed is well below the number planned due to the late project start and to social and cultural constraints: religious congregations prefer to advocate abstinence rather than the use of condoms.

Although 57 persons were found HIV/AIDS-positive, only 51 of them came to FFP to get their results and were subsequently assisted with food and NFI as well as psychological support.

Both HIV-positive persons interviewed in Minova had benefited from food and NFI distributions as planned (except for bed sheets that were not distributed), but they had received psychosocial support and cotrimoxazole only twice during the project implementation (in April and May 2009, after having been tested early April 2009) rather than each month as planned. This is due to insufficient human resources as explained in the efficiency section. However, they subsequently benefited from two other distributions in July and October 2009, except for one of them who was absent when the July visit occurred as FFP did not inform them with anticipation. However, psychosocial support is provided by the FFP social worker but also through support groups set up to allow HIV/AIDS-positive people to mutually help themselves: during project implementation, FFP facilitated the organisation of 3 support groups in Minova (4 members), Kitchanga (11 members) and Mweso (4 members).

Microfinance in Goma and Masisi – PIAMF –

Credits disbursed in Goma (US\$)

(438 displaced and host families and 50 artisans targeted)

ANALYSIS PARAMETERS	PIAMF / SG	CCMV	PACODEVI	TOTAL
1st ROUND				
Total amount lent	24,825	11,000	10,950	46,775
Number of beneficiaries				
- Host families	40	71	43	154
- Displaced	87	20	18	125
Capital reimbursed	10,705	6,716.67	7,450	24,871.67
Interest paid	631.88	403	447	1,481.88
Repayment rate	43%	61.06%	68.04%	53.17%
2nd ROUND				
Total amount lent	7,200	4,700	4,220	16,120
Number of beneficiaries				
- Host families	37	26	41	104
- Displaced	-	-	20	20
Capital reimbursed	6,650	2,735.33	4,220	13,605.33
Interest paid	523.5	117	253.2	893.70
Repayment rate	92%	58.20%	100%	84.40%
3rd ROUND (ongoing)				
Total amount lent	7,225	1,925	4,060	13,210
Number of beneficiaries				
- Host families	31	32	30	93
- Displaced	-	-	-	-
Capital reimbursed	0	0	1,075	1,075
Interest paid	0	0	366.47	366.47
Repayment rate			26%	8.14%

Note: 3 artisan support groups were created and trained by CCMV, but they have not yet received any credit.

PIAMF's reimbursement rate of 43.12% during the first round is explained by the fact that a group of 45 displaced persons coming from Rutshuru benefitted from a credit of US\$6,000, only US\$80 of which was reimbursed by group members before returned home. However, PIAMF is still monitoring these beneficiaries in order to encourage them to reimburse their loans. In order to help them start a living again, generate income and reimburse their loans, PIAMF is granting a new loan to some of them.

Credits disbursed in Masisi (in US\$)

(466 host families and 466 displaced families targeted)

ANALYSIS PARAMETERS	SAKE	BWEREMANA	MINOVA	KITCHANGA	TOTAL
1st ROUND					
Total lent	2,400	9,000	7,700	24.282	43.382
No. of beneficiaries					
- Host families	26	36	52	85	199
- Displaced	-	-	1	135	145
Capital reimbursed	1,930	6,759.5	5,636	10,070	24,395.50
Interest paid	125.24	682.5	360	640.71	1,808.45
Repayment rate	80.41%	75.1%	73.19%	41.47%	56.23%
2nd ROUND (ongoing)					
Total amount lent	700	3,200	2,900	3,590	10,390
No. of beneficiaries					
- Host families	5	16	38	29	88
- Displaced	-	-	4	10	31
Capital reimbursed	280	1,255	836	1,156	3,527
Interest paid	38	151.80	106.20	149.96	445.96
Repayment rate	40%	39.20%	28.82%	32.20%	33.95%

Regarding the first round in Minova, part of the capital repaid was “lost” following the bankruptcy of the CECREAM sub-office in Minova. However, PIAMF is currently negotiating with this cooperative in order to recover funds. It should also be noted that the Kitchanga repayment rate of 41.47% is due to the fact that a group of 60 displaced persons received US\$5,700, only US\$120 of which was reimbursed by group members before returning home. PIAMF is currently identifying the villages where these beneficiaries have returned in order to follow-up reimbursements.

In addition to financial credits, a total of 820 households benefitted from seeds given in credit, most of them being displaced households.

3.4. Impact and sustainability

Given that each of the 7 evaluated projects had distinct objectives, the impact and sustainability analysis below is presented project by project.

Water/Sanitation Project – ADEPAE -

Impact

This project’s objective was to improve hygiene and sanitation conditions of displaced people and host families in Rubaya and Karuba communities in Masisi territory.

Indicator in the DEC plan states “a reduction in diarrhoea cases” without giving any specific figures, an indicator that is also mentioned in the AMR. Other assessment elements listed in the AMR are: (a) reduction in cases of rape of women and young girls; (b) reduction in cases of HIV/AIDS transmission; (c) improved health conditions; (d) recovery of dignity.

As only 1 day per project was assigned to field evaluations, evaluators were not able to visit both Rubaya and Karuba, but only visited Karuba. As a result, the data below are drawn from interviews carried out in Karuba only.

A total of 27 water sources were constructed and 67 latrines were built in two of the four communities that are part of the Karuba area.

As Karuba was at the heart of recent conflicts, most of its population fled to Minova, Goma and Kitchanga, and much of its infrastructure was destroyed. Today 90% of Karuba's population has returned home, meaning that those benefiting from the infrastructures built are mainly returned IDPs.

Based on the average rate of flow of two sources visited in Karuba, and according to SPHERE standards, one water source built can supply drinking water to 1,080 people over 13 hours. This was confirmed by the members of 2 management committees, supervising two sources, who stated that more than 1,000 people per day were coming to fetch water at each of the sources. Assuming that all water sources have approximately the same rate of flow, it can be estimated that the 27 sources constructed in Karuba can supply water to 29,160 persons, making about 65% of Karuba's total population of 45,000 people. However, the head of M/Karuba group estimates that the 27 water sources supply only 30 to 35% of Karuba's population. On the whole and according to various sources of information, water sources were well distributed in the area but not numerous enough to cover all the needs, ADEPAE being the only NGO in the area intervening in the water and sanitation sector.

Before the project, the population was collecting its drinking water directly from the ground. Today the sources provide drinking water as well as water for personal hygiene and the cleaning of houses and clothes, while animals are not allowed to access them. The sources have contributed to reduce diseases: before being constructed, children often suffered from worms and their parents had to take them to the health centre at least once a week, whereas today they only need to go once a month. A male nurse working at one of the Karuba health posts used to see 10 cases of diarrhoea a day - diarrhoea resulting from intestinal worms, cholera-related diarrhoea and simple diarrhoea -, all related to the consumption of contaminated water, whereas today he is only seeing an average of 5 cases a day.

Latrines built were well distributed in the same two communities, out of 4, where water sources were constructed. They were built in public places attended by a large number of people such as the Karuba health centre, schools, markets, and parking areas, but not in all well attended public places: no latrines were built in local authority or police offices, nearby churches or within the 9 health posts being part of Karuba.

In the secondary school located in the centre of Karuba, which did not have any latrines, 8 of them were built and are used by 399 children. The children use the facilities but do not wash their hands afterwards because they are not used to do so, although both children and teachers have been trained on health and sanitation issues. Changing behaviours take time but it is more rapid if everything is in place to encourage such change: in this case, no bucket of water has been placed next to the latrines to encourage children to wash their hands.

Sustainability

The local population and authorities were involved in the choice of the construction sites for water sources and latrines, and the population dug trenches and transported materials, which contributed to their ownership of the new infrastructures. The community also purchased padlocks to secure the latrines, and those in the market are being supervised by a woman, who has been assigned to this task. The constructions are made of resistant materials and are well built. Besides, management committees have been organised to monitor the sources, the members of which have been elected by the community itself and trained to be able to assume their tasks. Despite these positive measures, impact sustainability is still questionable for the following reasons:

- The water sources are not well-protected, so that animals can easily contaminate them if they are officially not allowed to access them.
- Too few latrines were built, so that those in place run the risk of being overused and damaged, which could lead, in the medium term, to new sources of environmental contamination and epidemics.

- Some of the water sources have already been damaged by erosion and have begun leaking, which reduces their rate of flow.
- No community contribution system was organised to enable management committees to pay for maintenance or repair work and material when this would be needed. As confirmed by one of the persons interviewed, it will be now difficult to ask beneficiaries to contribute to these future costs after they have benefited from the infrastructures for free over several months.
- The majority of Karuba population was displaced by conflicts and lost everything, which means that financial contributions, even if they can be collected, will be of small amounts and will not cover maintenance and repair costs occurring in the short term.
- Water management committees were not given a stock of new pipes, to be able to do initial repairs while community financial contributions are progressively collected and saved.
- No system was put in place to remunerate the person in charge of supervising and maintaining the market latrines, although this is a lot of work for one person.

Food Security Project - ADEPAE -

Impact

According to ADEPAE's project proposal, this project was aiming at improving food security for 3,000 displaced and host families in the Sake-Mweso and Sake-Minova axes. According to DEC plan, the objective was to make food available for 932 host families and 932 IDPs. The AMR could not be made available to the evaluating team (neither the RDC EO, nor ADEPAE had to a copy of, whether in electronic or paper versions) and the ADEPAE programme document does not include any indicators. DEC document only includes the following two impact indicators: "3 meals per day for host families" and "3 meals per day including meat and mushrooms for IDPs."

Due to unstable security conditions, evaluators only visited Bweremana on the Sake-Minova axis. Bweremana has a population of 11,000 people and 735 persons, including IDPs and host family members, benefited from agricultural inputs and chicken. 72% of the beneficiaries were women, mainly widows and heads of household. According to Bweremana chief, the project benefited to 60% of host families and IDPs present in the area, and PIAMF and ADEPAE were the only NGOs intervening in the agricultural sector.

Through the provision of land and agricultural inputs, beneficiaries were able to produce and sell cabbages (primarily), yams, onions and aubergines, the production of tomatoes and carrots having failed due to late sowing and excessive rainfall. Each group the evaluators met was able to generate an income of US\$60 to US\$75 that was used to pay school fees (300 children started attending school), to rent a piece of land once project funding was over, and to buy new seeds and cuttings. According to Bweremana chief, the average daily income for a family of 7 has increased from US\$0.05 before the project to US\$1-2 after the project. However, the number of group members varied from 100 to 300 while the size of the land was the same for all groups, so that income per household was very different from one family to another.

Part of the cabbages, yams, onions and aubergines production, as well as the entire production of amaranth and mushrooms (very rich in animal proteins) were consumed by beneficiaries, thus contributing to improve their nutrition both in terms of quantity and quality: the number of meals per day increased from 1 before the war to 2 after the harvest and children were in better health conditions. As the production was sold on local markets, the entire population could benefit from it and improve their nutrition. In addition, beneficiaries were able to keep a stock of cabbage and potato seeds that will be used in subsequent farming seasons and they will have access to healthy cassava cuttings that will be harvested soon and were previously not available locally.

The use of community fields allowed for a better dissemination of improved farming techniques, and community work as well as the sharing of resources contributed to community reconciliation and peace-building: “people have learnt to know each other better.”

Although the distribution of chickens was aiming at increasing income, the distribution in Bweremana rather contributed to improve the quality of a few meals: around 60% of the chickens were eaten, 30% died and 10% are still being raised by beneficiaries. The mortality rate was high for two reasons: (1) beneficiaries were not sufficiently trained (they received only 1 day of training on how to raise chickens); and (2) prophylactic monitoring has not been adequate and beneficiaries did not stick to zootechnics’ requirements.

Sustainability

There are very positive conditions for sustainability: local authorities and population took part in the beneficiaries’ selection, and the latter chose monitoring committee members, while the Higher Institute for Agricultural Studies (ISEA) was involved in the implementation and monitoring of some of the activities, which contributed to local project ownership. Thanks to the project’s support, the three farming groups evaluators met in Bweremana had been to produce, harvest and sell their production as well as use part of their income to rent another piece of land and buy seeds and cuttings (of potatoes, peanuts, beans and cassava) in order to continue joint production. However, the conditions required for the project’s economic sustainability have not yet been met, mainly because the project’s implementation period was too short for the groups to save funds allowing them to face future production expenses. Additional factors put economic and technical sustainability at risk:

- The 3 groups met, with a total of 550 members during the project’s execution, have now rent smaller pieces of land because the income generated did not allow them to rent larger ones. Whereas project’s support allowed beneficiaries to rent plots of 1 hectare, their current plots now cover an area of 50 metres by 20-30 metres, which will significantly reduce total and individual income, even if every group now has a reduced number of members, about 30% of IDPs having returned home.
- The 185 members of the group that invested in cassava production will find it difficult to rent another plot because they will have to use part of their generated income to pay for the 6 months’ rent not covered by the project, that is to say an amount of US\$200.
- Beneficiaries were not trained in natural pesticide production techniques, and will therefore have to purchase chemical pesticides - that were previously supplied through the project - for the crops that require them. This will increase their production costs and thus decrease generated income.
- As it is the project’s agronomist who pulverised phytosanitary products, and not the beneficiaries themselves, who were not trained in the use of such products (only monitoring committee members were trained), they will not be able to use them without external support.
- The groups were not sufficiently trained in agricultural techniques: they received 3 days’ training in mushroom production and 1 day training in general farming techniques. ADEPAE strategy was to train monitoring committee members who had to transfer acquired knowledge to beneficiaries. However, none of the 5 committee members interviewed had an agricultural background. They received 5 days of training but without any manual, and they were unhappy to have worked for 10 months without having received any kind of financial or logistical incentive. As a result, it is unlikely that they will further provide support to the groups.
- Mushroom seeds can’t be found locally and are very fragile and demanding in terms of conservation (ADEPAE lost 80% of the first stock of seeds they purchased). The nearest supplier is in Bukavu but was not put in touch with the beneficiaries, who also did not practice mushroom cultivation in their respective fields. As a result beneficiaries will not be able to pursue this production by themselves.

Distribution of food, non-food items and medicines - CBCA -

Impact

The project objective was to improve the humanitarian conditions of IDPs in Goma and Rutshuru through several measures: (1) distribution of food - 612 families - and NFI in Goma - 612 families - and Rutshuru - 1,100 families; (2) provision of medicines to 6 CBCA clinics in Goma and Rutshuru (for 1,500 beneficiaries); (3) constructing in Goma 5 water tanks, 30 public latrines and 40 showers (for 612 beneficiary families). At the end of the project, CBCA planned to use the remaining funds to distribute food and NFI to 300 IDPs returned home in Nyiragongo territory and to build 5 water tanks in this same territory.

According to the beneficiaries of food and NFI evaluators interviewed, distributions had a very significant impact, especially on health (the number of illnesses dropped), since beneficiaries were returnees who had lost everything (their villages had usually been burnt) and had not benefited from any other kind of external help. Beneficiary villages were those which had been particularly affected by the war, and within each of these villages, the most vulnerable people were targeted, in particular widows, pregnant women, elderly and orphans. However, not all the needs were met: beneficiaries interviewed in Nyiragongo reckon that only 40% of the most vulnerable people, in the villages of Kibumba and Buhumba, were assisted while 62% of Kanyanja population - extremely poor and vulnerable - was assisted.

Thanks to CBCA's awareness-raising work among beneficiaries and due to a good planning of the distribution, most of the goods were neither stolen, nor sold. However, the number of NFI distributed did not vary according to the number of households members, even though some families had 3 children whereas others had 10 of them. As a result, distribution impact was not the same for each beneficiary family. In some distribution sites, IDPs and returnees also benefited from spiritual support, at their request, although this was not part of the project's initial planning.

Another important project impact was the development of alternative, more economical and environment friendly energy sources: instead of distributing charcoal to IDPs as initially planned, CBCA organised awareness-raising sessions on environmental protection involving in this work various churches as well as the Muslim community. CBCA used a theological approach based on the idea that nature conservation is God's will. People sensitised benefited from braziers and briquettes and found the idea and improved technologies very interesting for several reasons: (1) braziers allow for a reduction in wood consumption of 50%, which contributes to reduce lumbering and benefit the environment, but also diminish the risk for women and girls to be raped when collecting wood; (2) production costs of the briquettes - made of rice bran and paper - and of the improved charcoal - made of charcoal dust, clay and sawdust - are low compared to standard charcoal prices, whose monthly consumption in Goma comes to US\$54 per household and per month. In addition, improved charcoal has a more sustainable energy potential; (3) as these local technologies are not very much known yet but raise interest, they can become a source of income and an alternative to farming in areas where access to land is still too insecure. The initial awareness-raising work carried out by CBCA and other religious communities have already reached a significant impact in a short period of time: in Rutshuru for instance, several associations have been created to produce and sell improved charcoal and braziers.

Water tanks visited in Kibumba and Kanyanja have a capacity of 5,000 litres each and can serve a large number of people due to their location. The Kibumba water tank was built between the school and the church and is the only drinking water point in Nyiragongo. Some 100 people a day come there to get water. Awareness-raising sessions on water and sanitation have been organised in schools and churches in order to increase its impact. As a result, cases of seasonal diarrhoeas which used to be common in the area before the project have not been seen yet this year. In Kanyanja, a village of 295 households, the tank was built near a HEKS-funded housing estate the water point of which was destroyed during the war, forcing its population to walk 5km to get water. The tank supplies 250 households per day, at the rate of one 20-litre can per household and per day.

Although the supervision committee removed the tank's faucet to prevent children from wasting water, the quantity of water available is still not sufficient to cover all needs since every household normally requires three 20-litre cans per day. Despite of this, cases of diseases are less frequent, also partly due to the training on water and sanitation that was given to approximately 50 households.

Two 2,300-litre tanks visited in Goma were built in the very poor and populous neighbourhood of Kahembe Birere, in the courtyard of the parish where 500 displaced persons had taken refuge. Approximately 140 of these persons, who had not yet returned to their homes in February 2009, benefited from food and NFI distributions carried out by CBCA, but they did not use the 2 tanks or the 7 refurbished latrines since these constructions were only made in June 2009, at which time only 4 to 6 displaced families were remaining in the parish. However, these infrastructures are now being used by the neighbourhood's population: the two tanks are used by some 150 people a day, and it is estimated that some 450 CBCA church goers use the latrines on Sundays, while some 10 people a day use them during the week. In CBCA's school of Kahembe Birere, a 2,300 litre tank was also built with the project's support, and 9 latrines were refurbished. These works contributed to increase the number of children registered at school which rose from 900 to 1,015 pupils, including 546 girls. Thanks to the tank, the cleaning of toilets, classrooms and clothes is easier and there has not been any case of diarrhoea, whereas there used to be 5 to 6 cases a week. The tank will also contribute to reduce school fees paid by parents, as water was previously provided to the school at a cost of US\$200 a year which was included in the fees. It should however be noted that the Goma water tanks does not provide drinking water because they help collect rain water, the consumption of which is prohibited as it contains volcano ashes.

It is difficult to measure the impact of distributed medicines as they were mixed with other stocks and not subject to specific monitoring. Through the project, Kahembe Birere clinic benefitted from a stock of 2,000 medicines, which was added to a stock of some 20,000 medicines received from World Vision (WV). While the quantity funded by the project was insignificant compared to WV's contribution, distributed drugs were however more useful as they were matching the clinic's needs at that time, having been chosen by the staff of CBCA health department. In addition, distributed medicines particularly benefitted to IDPs since CBCA clinic is close to the road leading from Goma to Rutshuru (from where IDPs came), and to several churches and schools where IDPs took refuge. The total stock of 22,000 medicines allowed the clinic to treat 2,271 patients, especially cases of diarrhoea, malaria and respiratory illnesses.

Sustainability

Kibumba water tank is made of stone, a solid and lasting material, and its construction includes pipes to empty out water in excess. In Kanyanja, a committee of 4 members was set up by the community to ensure the water tank's security, but the committee lacks the technical and financial resources to be able to repair the tank if needed. The Goma water tanks are at the heart of CBCA parishes and schools which are functional enough to ensure the tanks' maintenance and repairs in the long term. Awareness-raising on environmental protection and the promotion of environmentally friendly technologies, which are easy to reproduce, will contribute to environmental and technical sustainability, while the integration of the need to protect the nature in churches and mosques will enhance the social sustainability of this CBCA initiative.

While Kahembe Birere clinic is able to fund its functioning (except for its staff funded by CBCA) through the selling of services and medicines, Kibututu and Buturande clinics, in Rutshuru territory, are not able to do so, which put at risk their financial sustainability, due to a general policy of free access to medical care backed by the NGO Merlin in collaboration with the Provincial Health Inspection.

Having taken part in the selection of NFI to distribute, beneficiaries are satisfied with these items which match their needs and are still being used today. However, those who returned home are finding it very difficult to survive because they lost everything through the war and it is difficult for them to resume their agricultural activities for several reasons: (1) some of them cannot access their fields due to insecurity;

(2) those who do have access to their fields do not have any seeds and have very few agricultural tools, most of which have also been stolen; (3) the harvests themselves are often looted. As a result, some beneficiaries in Nyiragongo have started to sell some NFI they had received in order to buy food.

Assistance to UC/Orphans in Goma town – CBCA -

The project objective was to improve the living conditions of 128 UC, facilitating their access to food, accommodation, cloths, medical care, and schools.

Impact

Thanks to the assistance provided, children benefitted from sufficient and nutritious food during about 4 months, had access to decent housing conditions with mats, blankets and mosquito nets, received clean clothes and the necessary supplies to be able to attend school. They also benefitted from regular visits by nurses or doctors when they became ill, and were even hospitalised in some cases: one young girl for instance, caught a severe infection and almost lost her leg, but today she is able to walk normally again after having been adequately treated.

Because of the social support and care they received, children did not wander about on the streets. They learnt to sing, and the games they played contributed to reduce the effects of the traumas some of them had suffered, as shown by the fact that they no longer have nightmares. ICRC assisted in the reunification of 67 UC with their parents, and CBCA has successfully reunited 90 UC with their families thanks to its strong presence within local communities and through radio broadcasts. Research is ongoing for the two remaining UC, and CBCA has already found the grandmother of one of them.

As CBCA psychologically prepared the children before they joined their families, none of them has returned to Goma yet, although they are now living in very difficult conditions after having experienced a relatively comfortable life in Goma. In order to ease their reintegration, CBCA provided each of them with a reinsertion kit including oil, flour and corn (enough for one month) as well as a mat, a plastic basin, a bed sheet, a blanket and a mosquito net. Nevertheless, the children who returned to Nyiragongo all fell ill when they arrived, partly because they had to readjust to drinking rainwater collected from the ground, since their village does not have any source of clean drinking water.

The impact of the assistance provided has therefore been very positive. However, the 3 buildings constructed to house the UC were not used for their intended purpose as children have joined their families much more quickly than planned. The buildings remain unused today but CBCA wishes to use them as transit centres to house street children.

Sustainability

Although the project had an extremely positive impact, its sustainability is not certain given the extreme poverty endured by the families of reunited children. In Nyiragongo, where 44 children were reunited, the UC's parents also fled their villages and most of their houses were burned down and their goods looted, including agricultural tools. As they do not benefit from any external assistance, they lend each other's the few tools they have left in order to work the land, which leads to delays in planting that is further constrained due to the lack of seeds. Whereas agricultural production in Nyiragongo territory used to supply Goma, Kisangani and Kinshasa before the war, today production levels do not even cover self consumption needs. One of the many consequences of these economic difficulties is that children who have been reunited with their parents are often expelled from school, because their parents cannot afford school fees, and now have only one meal a day.

HIV/AIDS Reduction – FFP –

Impact

The project aimed to reduce the transmission rates of HIV/AIDS as well as its impact among displaced people and host families in Masisi.

FFP data indicate that awareness raising work carried out during testing sessions reached 13,075 persons, although it was planned to reach 7,500 persons.

In fact, at least the double has been sensitised by the 80 peer educators spread over 16 health areas (24 villages) and selected from different social groupings in order to influence community at large: armed forces, police, civil servants, teachers, various religious communities, local associations, farmers. The setting-up of the VTC in well attended public places (markets, health centres, mosques, parishes and refugee camps) as well as in areas where awareness-raising sessions had previously been carried out by peer educators had a knock-on effect in terms of requests for HIV/AIDS testing.

The number of people who were tested (4,203 persons), far higher than the number initially planned (2,400 persons), shows the impact of this awareness-raising work, an impact that is still being felt today as peer educators are receiving many requests for HIV/AIDS testing. The approximately 30% increase in the rate of visits to FFP VTC in Goma also illustrates this impact (although part of this increase is due to FFP activities supported by the Global Fund), people informed by peer educators preferring to be tested “secretly” in Goma. Sake and Mweso communities requested the opening of a community VTC, which demonstrates again the impact of peer educators’ work. In some cases, this impact goes beyond the project area: in Sake for example, women’s associations that have been part of awareness-raising sessions reproduce this work within women’s associations organised in isolated communities in the mountains above Sake.

“People are beginning to understand that this disease exists and kills” (Director of Kirotshe hospital) and as a result behaviours are beginning to change. In Minova for example, people who were informed about the disease no longer visit nurses who use the same syringe several times, and in the local training institute the use of condoms has increased while the number of pregnancies has decreased. Furthermore, the two persons, evaluators interviewed, found HIV-positive after being tested by FFP mobile VTC in Minova, now use condoms to protect their wives. However, peer educators have found it difficult to promote the use of condoms within religious communities, as shown by the number of condoms distributed, much lower than the number planned. Nevertheless, the administrator of the Sake territory states: “since 2 years, I haven’t seen anybody affected by this disease. There are no more AIDS-related deaths.”

Monitoring and support to people found HIV-positive through FFP mobile VTC has been irregular for two reasons: (1) the limited number of project social workers to follow-up 51 HIV-positive persons spread over a wide geographical area; (2) the fact that peer educators can’t monitor and support HIV-positive persons because FFP keeps testing results confidential to protect infected people from being rejected by their communities. As a result, the two HIV-positive persons, evaluators met in Minova, had received some food, NFI, medicines and psychological support, but FFP social workers had only visited them 4 times over a period of 7 months (following their testing early April).

While the project has certainly had a positive impact in terms of awareness-raising and testing, and has exceeded expectations, its impact is however limited in terms of the number of people reached: none of the ADEPAE and PIAMF beneficiaries the evaluators met on the Sake-Minova axis, where FFP had worked, had ever heard of FFP, nor had they seen the mobile VTC. Minova peer educators also commented that on HIV/AIDS testing days, the same number of people who had been tested during the day was still waiting to be tested at the end of the day. The project short duration also reduced its impact in terms of testing. As FFP/Goma coordinator commented: “Just when people were feeling like being HIV/AIDS tested, the project ended!”. In the same way, the short project period also reduced its impact on HIV-positive people who have been monitored after the testing. On this, FFP coordinator added: “We didn’t have enough time to make everyone assume his/her infection and to stop living clandestinely”.

Sustainability

The project's strong grounding in different social contexts will contribute to make awareness-raising work on HIV/AIDS sustainable: the issue has been integrated into teaching programmes and masses, and trained community relays will continue to inform people as part of their work within the community. The fact that Sake peer educators set up their own association, the statutes of which have already been approved by local authorities, also shows their willingness to carry on this work.

However, FFP mobile VTC activities ceased at the end of June with the project end, and no other HIV/AIDS testing facilities exist in the three health zones covered by the project, so that peer educators are now unable to respond to the requests for testing generated by their awareness-raising work. This has contributed to reduce peer educators' credibility and motivation. In addition, while the mobile VTC is a very efficient way of raising awareness among isolated populations far-away from health centres, and of offering them testing facilities that they would not have otherwise, it does not offer the populations a stable and permanent opportunity to be tested, and cannot substitute state health centres that should be equipped with such facilities in the medium to long term.

Microfinance in Goma and Masisi - PIAMF -

Impact

These two projects aimed to improve food security and living conditions for IDPs and their host families in Goma and Masisi. More specifically, the objectives were: (1) to improve access to basic social services (health, food, children's education, accommodation) through a targeted daily income of US\$1; (2) to strengthen women's self-esteem; and (3) to develop beneficiaries' organisational skills.

According to field interviews, micro-credits have effectively benefitted to very poor and vulnerable IDPs and host families, and the impact has been very significant at various levels:

At the level of beneficiary families, credits have enabled them to increase their income and profits significantly, profits having sometimes doubled. These profits have primarily been used to eat better and more often, to send children to school or pay school fees more regularly to avoid children's expulsion from schools, to pay for health care and to buy new clothes. In addition, the profits often enabled beneficiaries to strengthen their IGA, for instance by renting a shop from where to sell their goods instead of selling them directly on the street, or in some cases to diversify these IGAs by investing in small livestock, or to revitalise their agricultural activities (in Masisi). In some cases, beneficiaries were also able to improve their houses or, for some displaced people, rent a house and thus ease the burden on the host family. Besides, the organisation of mixed Support Groups (SG), made up of host families and IDPs, strengthened the bonds between group members and helped prevent conflicts.

At households' level, profits generated helped reduce the pressure exerted on the head of the household and thus also strengthened cohesion within the household itself. Beneficiary women have also gained increased self-esteem, recognition and respect, in particular from their husbands.

At the level of groups or associations which were jointly responsible for credits, the project contributed to strengthen mutual self-help and efforts to overcome difficulties and challenges faced. Additional income generated by individual loans also resulted in more regular financial contributions to group savings that enabled organisations to start granting credits internally. Some groups were able to make investments that benefitted the entire group, such as the Fuka Mbuya group in Bweremana whose members used the income generated by increased agricultural production to purchase 7 piglets. Another group was able to save seeds for the following farming season, after having repaid its credit to PIAMF, and was also able to give seeds on credit to other members. In some cases, such as for Congo Women Development (CWD), the dynamics created by credits led to an increase in membership requests.

At community level, projects contributed to the promotion of a peaceful cohabitation between beneficiaries from different local communities, credits creating common interests. Furthermore, funded IGAs make traded products locally available, which benefits to the entire community.

PIAMF support to commercialisation activities allowed beneficiaries of seeds to sell their surplus in Goma, which contributed to reduce harvest losses, in particular in project areas where ADEPAE was also supporting agricultural production, and in a context of very low purchasing power. In addition, agricultural produce benefitted to a SG supported by PIAMF in Goma, whose members thus improved their nutrition.

However, the too slow credit rotations did not allow PIAMF and its members to serve all registered host families and IDPs: PACODEVI only served 58% of registered host families and 56% of registered IDPs, while CCMV has only supported 35 of the 60 SG they have organised and trained. In the same way, PIAMF has not been able to serve all SG members which has sometimes contributed to reduce motivation and, in some cases, has affected joint work at group's level. Additionally, a few external factors has reduced the impact of credits: (1) beneficiaries found it difficult to repay credits in US\$, since their commercial activities and income generated are in Congolese francs; (2) IGAs are often subject to illegal government taxes; (3) the DRC government has not taken any measures to protect micro-businesses from imports coming from Rwanda and Burundi; (4) the theft of crops by starving IDPs, before their harvesting, has often contributed to reduce production and income levels.

Sustainability

The support provided by PIAMF and its members in terms of organising beneficiaries into solidarity groups who would be responsible for the repayment if their members would fail reimbursing, as well as the training given before any funds were disbursed and the close monitoring of beneficiaries, are activities that resulted in relatively good reimbursement rates despite the overall context of poverty and instability in which the projects have been implemented.

However, the slow financial credit rotations - some SGs had to wait for three months before benefitting from a new loan - made the development of financed IGAs more difficult, especially when there was no regular increase in the credit amount, despite beneficiaries' good performances in terms of reimbursement and IGAs management. This situation sometimes contributed to a lack of motivation and repayment delays and also reduced the amount of interests generated that directly contribute to PIAMF and its members' and collaborators' institutional sustainability. In addition, the retrocession of 70% of interests generated to PIAMF members and collaborators - when the usual rate is 50% - bears the risk of creating wrong expectations among new collaborators (CWD for instance stated that it had been surprised to benefit from such a good rate) and also contributes to weaken PIAMF financial sustainability, when the latter is already fragile for several reasons: (1) three of its six micro-finance institutions and associations are in debt and therefore not receiving credits ; (2) PIAMF operates in a context of high mobility of persons and capital; (3) PIAMF does not have any other external donor apart from CA.

As far as the Masisi project is concerned, conditions for sustainability seem to be met: SG evaluators interviewed were able to develop their agricultural and livestock activities and to save seeds for the following agricultural season; crops that were cultivated (cabbages and beans) do not require phytosanitary products and are therefore less costly to maintain, easy to grow and environmentally friendly. Following the support they received from PIAMF to commercialise their production, seven SG working in Bweremana, making up a total of 266 members, including 187 women, set-up a cooperative - UMOJA 3 - in order to jointly sell their products. During the coming agricultural season, the cooperative intends to negotiate with truck drivers to commercialise its production in Goma, showing in that sense that SG are willing to take over responsibility now that PIAMF support is coming to an end.

“Synergy”

“Synergy” is the name the 4 CA partners in North Kivu gave to their new consortium. After initial joint meetings organised by CA, and while only two of them already knew each other’s (PIAMF and FFP), partners organised themselves to meet every month in order to exchange views and experiences on the context, to mutually assist and support themselves (internal loans, technical support between agronomists, etc.) and to gradually develop complementary and joint activities, some of which have had a significant impact:

- CBCA and PIAMF began working together in order to assist returnees in Rutshuru: CBCA set up 5 SGs including a total of 80 members, in particular women who no longer have access to their lands due to insecurity. SG members were jointly trained in credit management by CBCA and PIAMF and two of the SGs received credits from PIAMF over a 3-months period, the first tranche of which has already been reimbursed with the support of CBCA which is monitoring beneficiaries and payments.
Although credits to the groups are of a small amount and cannot benefit to all its members, there are the only funding opportunities accessible to these SG who can’t present any guarantees as required by local cooperatives. The loans enabled their beneficiaries to strengthen their commercial activities, mainly focusing on the selling of cassava, tomatoes, charcoal, oil and fuel. Although the credits were only disbursed 2 months ago, their impact is already significant: beneficiaries are now able to regularly pay for school fees so that their children are no longer expelled from schools, the number of meals has increased from 1 to 2 meals a day, and some goods have been purchased to improve living conditions (cloths and mattresses).
- PIAMF initiated a similar collaboration with ADEPAE: two ADEPAE beneficiary groups are currently being organised and trained by PIAMF in order to benefit from credits.
- ADEPAE, CBCA and PIAMF jointly took part in the Goma Agricultural Fair, which contributed to strengthen the links between them and increased their visibility.
- FFP facilitated awareness-raising sessions on HIV/AIDS during of some of ADEPAE’s training course.
- The 4 partners produced a joint position paper to feed into CA’s lobbying and advocacy work.

However, partners do not know each other’s strengths and weaknesses well enough, and projects implementation period was too short and work intensive, to enable partners to fully benefit from their “synergy”. As a result, meetings organised have not enabled partners to exchange views and thoughts on intervention strategies in specific areas or sectors and there isn’t any joint vision for the future of this synergy: some partners see it as an opportunity to develop an integrated programme in which every partner could cover a specific theme/sector and/or geographic area depending on their respective expertise, while other partners see it mainly as an opportunity to get funding through their partnership with CA.

3.5. Cross-cutting issues

Partners’ capacity building

Partners’ capacity building was not integrated into projects, partly because partners did not request it, and partly because it is difficult to take this aspect into account in an emergency context. However, a few activities were carried out: (1) PIAMF and ADEPAE attended training on SPHERE standards given by the DRC EO in October 2008 to South Kivu partners. However, this training did not benefit ADEPAE staff recruited for the 2 evaluated projects, with the exception of the Goma office manager who now left the organisation. (2) CBCA staff was introduced to SPHERE standards and humanitarian principles (but without any specific syllabus) through meetings with the DRC EO and the REO. (3) The CA philosophy relating to “no small change” was presented by the DRC EO and the REO to all partners, along with some documentation on the subject.

(4) At the DRC EO's recommendation, CBCA was able to take part in ACT-organised training on psychosocial care. (5) PIAMF benefited from a credit management software in the use of which its staff was trained. (6) The two monitoring visits carried out by the DRC FCBO enabled partners to improve some of their administrative and financial practices and their financial reporting. (7) CBCA is currently developing a manual for administrative procedures and will be helped in this task by a CA funded external consultant.

In addition, projects implementation has also contributed to strengthen some of the partners: (1) partners benefitted from a few office equipments. (2) CBCA gained more visibility and is now perceived as a professional organisation in the field of humanitarian aid. In Rutshuru, the number of its believers rose, as did the membership of the associations CBCA is supporting. (3) Thanks to its mobile VTC, FFP increased its visibility and obtained new funding from Trocaire, while other international NGOs have approached the organisation.

Projects have had a mixed impact on PIAMF strengthening: while direct credits to some associations have encouraged the latter to become PIAMF members (as it is the case with CWD), the fact that PIAMF did become itself operational, instead of working through its members and strengthening them, created misunderstandings and frustrations among these members.

In order to improve the quality of the projects planning, implementation and monitoring, it would have been useful for CA to strengthen partners' capacities in needs assessment as well as project planning and monitoring. As detailed below, training sessions on other cross-cutting issues would also have enriched project strategies.

Gender approach

This approach is not well known to partners, and it will be necessary to train them in this area in order to better integrate gender issues into the planning, implementation and monitoring of their projects.

Among the 4 partners, only FFP has systematically disaggregated data according to gender. However, partners have taken a number of measures to involve women in project activities: in terms of quantity, women did represent around 70% of the 7 projects' direct beneficiaries and partners have systematically encouraged - or even required - the integration of women within the various management and monitoring committees set up, as well as among peer educators. 42.5% of the latter are women, even though peer educators had to be literate to be selected. Having achieved such a rate in rural areas is a success in a context where most women can't read and write. FFP also required that peer educators voted as site supervisors, on each of its 6 intervention sites, include one woman and one man: out of the 12 people elected, 7 women were chosen.

Some actions also took into account specific roles and needs of women: (a) CBCA distributed kits specifically made for women and its food and NFI distributions mainly benefited to women - in particular pregnant ones -, children and the elderly; (b) activities introduced by CBCA aiming at reducing the consumption of firewood will primarily benefit women (and children) in the long term, since there are the ones responsible for collecting firewood; (c) in order to make husbands accountable, PIAMF loan agreements are also signed by them, even if their wives benefit from the credit; (d) on prenatal consultation days, many women meet at the health centres: on these days women therefore had a priority access to FFP mobile VTC. In addition, the latter did often set up close to markets in order to reach women more easily; (e) when a woman is found HIV-positive, FFP systematically tries to raise awareness of her husband. However, it should be noted that awareness-raising sessions did not particularly target men, with the exception of policemen and armed forces, although it is often men who take the decision to use condoms and allow their wives to do the test.

With respect to project staff recruitment, women were also encouraged to apply for advertised posts but very few of them were ultimately recruited (5 out of 26, that is to say 19%) due to inadequate skills or a lack of willingness to work in rural areas.

HIV/AIDS

It is obvious that FFP project contributed to raise awareness and change behaviour in its project area. It has also led to some initial conclusions that question hypothesis: in a province where the prevalence rate is officially at 5.1% and supposedly high among military forces, FFP found a prevalence rate of 1.4% that was higher among civilians than among military forces.

Assistance provided through the 6 other projects had no obvious impact on HIV/AIDS prevention or reduction. HIV/AIDS was generally not addressed as a cross-cutting issue, although CA had, before the projects' start, verbally encouraged partners to take this issue into account when implementing their projects. Apart from ADEPAE which integrated it into some of its training sessions, but without encouraging its beneficiaries, on the Sake-Minova axis, to get tested through the mobile VTC active in the same area, PIAMF and CBCA did not integrate HIV/AIDS into their activities.

However, since CBCA is highly involved in HIV/AIDS prevention – the World Bank has selected the organisation to manage its HIV/AIDS funding – its clinic staff always informs patients on the disease which is also integrated into CBCA church services. As CBCA and FFP both have experience in HIV/AIDS and VTCs, complementary activities could have been implemented to promote beneficiary awareness-raising and testing across the 6 projects implemented, but the “Synergy” was not used in that sense, the DRC EO having perhaps not sufficiently monitored and encouraged this integration.

SPHERE

While CBCA was informed, at several occasions, on SPHERE standards common to all sectors and on those standards relating specifically to food aid, and discovered SPHERE through CA sessions on these requirements, ADEPAE and FFP staff do not know SPHERE standards and therefore did not take them into account, although some aspects relating to the participation of local population and state services were integrated into the projects planning and implementation. On the whole, partners adhered to the 8 minimal standards common to all sectors and relating to participation, initial evaluation, intervention, targeting, monitoring, evaluation, competencies and responsibilities of humanitarian workers and staff supervision, management and support, with the exception of the initial evaluation and monitoring standards with respect to data collection and processing.

However, due to budgetary constraints and in view of the numerous needs not covered partly because the humanitarian response was not adequately geographically spread, it was not always possible to stick to SPHERE standards: (1) the water tank CBCA built in Kanyanja is supplying water at a rate of one 20-litre can per household and per day, although the minimum required, according to SPHERE standards, is 15 litres per person and per day. (2) In Rutshuru territory, the number of blankets to be distributed had to be reduced due to the arrival of new IDPs once the beneficiaries' registration had already been made. (3) In the case of ADEPAE's project, it was also not possible to adhere to the requirement to have water points at least 500 metres from houses.

Apart from the few cases mentioned above, CBCA carried out distributions of food and NFI according to the minimum standards common to all sectors and according to the ones related to food and non-food aid: (1) the quantity of food aid to be distributed was calculated on the basis of SPHERE standards and nobody reported having received damaged food; (2) NFI were appropriate and there has been no claims from beneficiaries; (3) distribution committees' members were selected by the various religious communities with a presence in the area and trained in humanitarian principles before the distributions took place. As a result, distributions were participatory, transparent, equitable, and well planned and controlled, so that nobody reported any loss or theft of items. (4) The three wooden buildings constructed for UC in Goma are comfortable and in line with construction standards: they have latrines for children and 4 water tanks and each building has 4 sleeping rooms and one living room.

Nonetheless, CBCA distributions did not meet all urgent needs and beneficiaries did not receive any other external assistance. For example, returnees to the territory of Rutshuru (Kibututu axis) did not receive food aid, although some of them can't access their fields, and the NFI received did not include some important items such as mattresses and cloths. Returnees on the Kanyanja and Kibumba sites (Nyiragongo axis) did receive food aid but did not receive plastic sheets, as the population in Kibati did, whereas these serve as shelters and help to collect rainwater. In addition, although it is necessary to strengthen the links between emergency aid and rehabilitation, this was not done within the two CBCA projects: assistance provided was purely humanitarian and did not enable beneficiaries to acquire a source of income and/or food in the short or medium term.

According to CA's emergency policies and procedures, "CA should lobby in order to ensure that aid is allocated in an effective, appropriate and timely manner in order to respond to needs" (principle 21, page 7). In North Kivu, most of the aid from international organisations is concentrated in the camps that are "their own hunting preserve" (an expression used by one of the partners) and are not easily accessible to local NGOs. Donations outside these camps are occasional, isolated and do not adhere to SPHERE standards. Furthermore, MONUC and the government's armed forces are concentrated in towns and along the main roads and thus do not protect the fields that are key to the populations' survival. During the projects implementation, CA did not do any lobbying on these issues as it was its first important intervention in North Kivu, furthermore in an emergency context. However, if CA intends to have a more permanent presence in North Kivu it would be important to get involved, with its partners and other interested DEC and ACT agencies, in advocacy and lobbying actions to ensure that humanitarian agency interventions are more in line with SPHERE standards and that MONUC and the FARDC help protect population's fields.

Accountability

Beneficiaries and community representatives involved in the ADEPAE, FFP and PIAMF projects did not know if and how they would be further supported. PIAMF members, in particular PACODEVI and CCMV, were not involved in budgetary planning and did not know each project's overall budgets (except for PACODEVI coordinator who is part of PIAMF internal controlling committee). In addition, CCMV and PACODEVI did not participate in the approval and disbursement process of new loans, the planning of which, in terms of amounts and periods, does not involve members and is not communicated to them in advance.

The monitoring committee set up by ADEPAE in Bweremana (with 10 members including 3 women) made several requests for logistical support in order to be able to carry out its work, but was not given any concrete answer during the whole project period. Committee members also sent a letter to ADEPAE to express their worries about the renting of the cassava field beyond the 6 months' project period but have not received any answer so far.

While partners were at the heart of the project planning and implementation, the ones who received visits from CA/London staff (journalists and Africa Division Senior Advocacy Officer) did not receive any feedback on these visits afterwards. In particular, they did not receive pictures that were taken, whereas the latter could have enriched their own promotional work (CBCA for instance has both a website and an internal newsletter). All partners would have liked to be informed on CA's strategic objectives and work principles and policies as an organisation (for example partners' and programmes' selection criteria), as well as on CA's strategic and operational plans in DRC and more specifically in North Kivu. They wish they had been more closely involved in decision-making processes, particularly for the new DEC phase, and in the future they would like to take part in CA's planning process. As one of the partners puts it: "we need to move from a partnership based on activities towards a partnership based on a joined development philosophy".

IV. CONCLUSIONS

On the whole the 7 evaluated projects were relevant in terms of target groups, geographical areas and types of intervention. They all benefited to displaced persons and host families who were particularly hit by the fighting that occurred during the course of 2008. Projects responded to some urgent humanitarian needs and had a very significant impact on the beneficiaries in terms of food and income as well as contributed to improve their water and sanitation conditions.

However, due to the short duration of the intervention and as funds were limited and not always invested to respond to the most urgent needs, assistance provided was not able to cover all registered IDPs and host families, and benefited only a small number of returnees. The latter did benefit from humanitarian aid through CBCA food and NFI distributions and from improved water and sanitation conditions through ADEPAE project, but very few of them were supported in their efforts to produce again food and/or generate income.

Given this, it is urgent to continue to provide support taking into account the recommendations given below in order to: (1) have more efficient, effective and sustainable intervention strategies in the agro-pastoral and micro-credit sectors; (2) better integrate cross-cutting issues, in particular HIV/AIDS, gender, capacity building and accountability; (3) carry out a more rigorous and better-documented monitoring so that corrective measures can be taken on time.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Priority recommendations

- f) In order to avoid duplication and confusion in responsibilities and in the information sent out, the respective responsibilities of the DRC Programme Manager (PM), CA's DRC EO, the new REO for Central Africa, the DRC FAM and the FCBO (based in Bukavu) should be clarified, along with the hierarchical links between them and how respective responsibilities should be monitored. Furthermore, it is necessary to clarify which consultations should be made at which levels and by whom (including London), and how information should flow.
- g) Support PIAMF, PACODEVI and CCMV in a joint revision of their financial collaboration in order to: (1) make financial planning and monitoring permanently known to all parties; (2) approve credits and transfer funds to beneficiaries more rapidly; (3) gradually increase credit size according to beneficiaries performances.
- h) Using its remaining appeal funds, CA should provide support to IDPs who have not been able to return home yet due to insecurity, and to their host families, as well as to returnees who can't access their fields. Priority should be given to IDPs and host families who have been registered, but have not been assisted yet (case of CCMV and PACODEVI beneficiaries), or to returnees who have only received humanitarian assistance (case of CBCA beneficiaries). Financial micro-credits or carefully chosen small livestock (depending on the area of intervention) would be the most appropriate way to help them generate an income. In addition, returnees who can access their fields should receive seeds on credit (and tools in some cases), in particular the parents of the UC assisted by CBCA, and beneficiaries of ADEPAE water and sanitation project to help them generate an income part of which can be saved for the maintenance and repairing of constructed water sources.

- i) Through its appeal funds and, if possible, using DEC balance, CA should support FFP to enable its mobile VTC to continue its testing and monitoring activities for a further 12 to 24 months period, in the intervention zones where FFP peer educators and Heal Africa community activists are pursuing their awareness-raising work. In order to monitor and support HIV-positive persons in a professional manner, it is suggested to establish alliances with other actors working in North Kivu (MDM and AMO-Congo among others), and/or to integrate into the project an additional team of two social workers equipped with means of transport. With PIAMF or PACODEVI support, these social workers should encourage the organisation and training of SG, made of HIV-positive members, so that the latter can benefit from loans and generate income to cover the cost of their medicines in the long-term.
- j) CA should support its partners in their advocacy and lobbying work towards MONUC and FARDC forces who should not only protect roads and towns but also the fields where farmers are often attacked and harvests stolen, in addition to women and children being often raped.

5.2 Recommendations to CA's Humanitarian Division

- a) When a disaster occurs, the respective responsibilities of the Humanitarian Division, PFD (if involved) and DRC team staff members, in the various phases of the response (needs assessment as well as programmatic and financial planning, proposal writing/budgeting and monitoring) should be clarified and communication channels clearly defined.
- b) It is important to maintain a reduced number of people directly involved in the response to the crisis in order to avoid duplication and to make coordination and communication easier.
- c) CA country team members who will be responsible for the financial and programmatic monitoring of the projects as well as for reporting should be involved in needs assessment and projects planning as from the beginning. In this way, CA country strategy and priorities will be better taken into account during the planning phase.
- d) To be able to assess the impact of their work, CA and its partners need to collect quantitative and qualitative baseline data. In order to carry out this work during crisis in a rapid, systematic and comprehensive manner, it is recommended that the Humanitarian Division disseminate the check lists included as annexes in the SPHERE guide, so that CA and partner staff can make use of them.
- e) Make sure that Emergency Task Force meetings involve representatives from the CA country team as from the beginning of the crisis.
- f) Ensure that Emergency Task Force meetings really take place once a month and are based on consolidated monthly reports produced by the CA DRC EO, in order to ensure better coordination, communication and information flow between the various CA teams/persons involved in the disaster response (CA/DRC, Humanitarian Division, communication, media and advocacy).
- g) Harmonise and simplify the content of the various documents required by CA (AMR and Rolling Plans). For emergency projects it would be useful to have more precise templates with specific questions that lead to short and clear answers. In order to facilitate quick information processing, it is also suggested to develop a simple, clear and concise project document template (including a narrative and a budget sections) to be used by partners who would thus submit the same type of clear, specific and detailed information.

- h) Review the narrative and financial reporting requirements for projects funded by CA appeal funds so that reporting schedules and contents are more precisely defined and are in line with reporting requirements for code 2 funded projects described in the “CA Guide on emergency policies and procedures”. Reporting requirements for projects funded by CA appeal funds should also be included in that guide.
- i) All members of CA country teams (especially new members) should be informed on the respective responsibilities of the various CA teams and departments involved in the response to a crisis and the country programme and finance staff should be trained on CA and DEC’s funding conditions and requirements in terms of project planning, budgeting and reporting.
- j) For DEC funded projects, ensure that Disaster Response Programme (DRP) evaluation is carried out before the planning of its extension (ERP) so that evaluation’s finding can be fed into the ERP.
- k) In order to develop a joint vision for the development of the North Kivu province that leads to plan complementary rehabilitation and development programmes (as several DEC agencies wish it), it is suggested that the REO promotes and encourages better coordination between DEC agencies based in North Kivu, taking into account their needs and expectations, and making sure that coordination efforts do not substitute, but be complementary, to OCHA forum.
- l) Influence DEC to have its committee revise their eligible areas for funding and include micro-finance among its funding priorities.
- m) Influence DEC so that its committee investigates the number of agencies which will submit extension requests (ERP) and provides each agency, before they submit their ERP document, with an estimate of the budget available.

5.3 Recommendations to CA/DRC

Planning and Monitoring

- a) As soon as security conditions make it possible, CA DRC EO and REO should carry out a monitoring visit on the Kitchanga-Mweso axis in order to evaluate ADEPAE’s and PIAMF’s interventions in this area, since CA did not visit this intervention zone since the projects started.
- b) Together with partners, it is suggested that the CA DRC EO be more proactive in identifying and targeting partners and beneficiaries in order to respond to urgent rehabilitation needs, making use of the remaining CA appeal funds.
- c) CA and its partners should document their needs assessment work and baseline data collection and CA should support its partners in the development of their monitoring and evaluation systems.
- d) Be more involved in the response to a crisis, as from the beginning, making sure that staff members directly responsible for programmatic and financial monitoring actively take part to projects planning and budgeting and to the development of funding proposals.
- e) Maintain a limited number of people directly responsible for programmatic and financial monitoring, but establish clear mechanisms of supervision of these people, specifying who is responsible for their supervision and how this should be done.
- f) In order to give more technical advice to partners, it would be useful for the CA DRC EO to carry out more frequent monitoring visits in project intervention zones, even if these visits are done anonymously, as some partners have requested it.

- g) Monitoring visits carried out by the CA DRC EO and FCBO should lead to short, written monitoring reports, including clear and specific recommendations in order to facilitate monitoring by partners and by CA.
- h) As the DRC PM is responsible for programmatic and financial monitoring of all development and emergency programmes, it is recommended that the PM be also responsible for supervising the various project officers, including the DRC EO.
- i) In order to carry out a more independent and objective monitoring work, not only based on the DRC EO's reports, the DRC PM and FAM based in Kinshasa could carry out more frequent monitoring visits in the field, meeting partners and beneficiaries.
- j) In coordination with the various actors present in North Kivu that are key for CA (partners, DEC agencies, ACT network members and large donors) and with the REO's support, plan CA's future work in North Kivu in the short, medium and long term, in terms of projects in the field, communication, advocacy and lobbying work, and in terms of partnerships and financial resources.

Communication

- k) Improve office equipment in CA Bukavu and Goma offices (within CBCA) as well as the equipment used by the DRC EO, FCBO and REO in order to speed up communication whether these persons are in the office or at home (security conditions often requiring them to leave the office early).
- l) When another external donor is involved in funding one or more projects, it is less risky to have this funding implemented by a partner known to CA and with strong capacities in project management and monitoring. In addition, it is important to formalise such collaboration, before the project start, and to clarify who will be communicating with this donor.
- m) When CA takes decisions or makes choices in relation to project funding, reasons for these choices and decisions must be clearly and proactively explained to partners in order to minimise frustrations and misunderstandings. Ideally, decision-making processes (especially prioritisation criteria) should actually involve the partners.
- n) Inform all North Kivu partners about CA philosophy, principles and objectives as an organisation and about its future work in DRC, in particular in both Kivu provinces.
- o) Ensure that partners receive feedback on DRC related communication, media, advocacy and/or lobbying work carried out by CA, particularly those partners who were visited and thus contributed to this work.

Partners' selection and strengthening

- p) Carry out a continuous and proactive research on local NGOs active in North Kivu in order to identify partners through which CA could intervene in case of an emergency, having previously assessed their institutional strengths and weaknesses.
- q) Select the CA North Kivu partners that are considered as being strategic in relation to CA/DRC's priorities, due to their capacities and presence in the province and/or due to their particular expertise in a sector or on a specific issue, and strengthen these partners after having carried out with them an institutional diagnostic and developed a capacity-building plan.
- r) Partners identified as having the required capacities to respond to future emergencies should have their communications systems strengthened and have internet access in their offices, as recommended in "CA Emergency Response Policies and Procedures" (principle j, page 8 of this document): "Appropriate technology will be developed and used to facilitate all forms of communication ».

- s) If CA continues working with the four evaluated partners, their capacities should be strengthened in the following priority areas: project planning and monitoring, SPHERE standards, gender, HIV/AIDS (as a cross-cutting issue). In addition, the partners that CA will continue supporting could be assisted in the diversification of their funding sources through simple measures such as informing them about funding opportunities and introducing them to other donors with whom CA has close links.
- t) With the support of a student specialised in micro-finance (in order to reduce the cost of such a work), draw out the lessons learned from PIAMF experience in microfinance in an unstable and emergency context and use them to lobby donors so that they integrate micro-finance into their emergency funding priorities.
- u) In future projects, all budgeted credit funds should be included in the first transfer of funds made by CA, so that credit funds can make several rotations over the project period.
- v) Given the institutional weaknesses identified during the evaluation, and PIAMF dependency on a single donor (CA), it is suggested to assist PIAMF in its process of becoming a more formal and professional organisation in order to ensure that this process is comprehensive, transparent, but also relatively rapid. Provided that PIAMF board and General Assembly agree on these recommendations, the following is suggested: (1) to carry out an organisational financial audit so that PIAMF can present to potential donors the minimum documentation required for any micro-finance organisation; (2) to carry out an institutional assessment of the platform and of its members (current and potential) in order to analyse the platform's sustainability in its current organisation and functioning in the context of the DRC and North Kivu micro-finance sector; (3) depending on the results of the institutional assessment, to support a strategic planning process to enable PIAMF and its members to define its vision, purpose, objectives and services in the medium and long term.

Advocacy and lobbying work

- w) In collaboration with the humanitarian division, CA/DRC should carry on its lobbying work so that international agencies (especially ACT agencies) do not only concentrate their interventions in camps but intervene according to needs, coordinating their support with local NGOs.
- x) It is suggested that CA/London advocacy team, in coordination with CA/DRC, analyse synergies and complementary aspects between CA and CBCA advocacy and lobbying work at regional and international levels so that both organisations mutually feed their respective work and possibly carry out joint actions.

5.4 Lessons learned and general recommendations

- a) Due to its strong presence in North Kivu, as well as its infrastructures, logistics and staff, CBCA is a strategic partner for rapid, effective and efficient responses to emergencies.
- b) Agricultural production and HIV/AIDS prevention projects require an implementation period of more than 6 months: CA should therefore fund this type of project through CA appeal funds (which can be spent over three years), rather than DEC appeal funds (which must be spent within a first phase of 6 months according to new DEC procedures).
- c) It is relevant to integrate HIV/AIDS into emergency projects through systematic awareness-raising on the disease among all projects beneficiary groups. However, it is important to also integrate HIV/AIDS testing as well as post counselling and support to HIV positive people into the project planning, over a period of at least 12 months, as awareness-raising activities on HIV/AIDS is a slow process but has an important impact and rapid multiplication effects in terms of demand for HIV/AIDS testing.

- d) Micro-finance projects are feasible and sustainable in an emergency context if credits are given with certain preliminary conditions and managed in a flexible but rigorous way. In addition, micro-credits can have a considerable impact over a very short period of time in terms of income generation.
- e) When communication is difficult, it is much more effective to plan emergency projects during a joint planning workshop, inviting the various stakeholders at CA and partners' levels. This allows for faster, more participatory and easier to understand project planning, and subsequently makes monitoring and reporting easier.
- f) All emergency project planning should systematically include rehabilitation and sustainability aspects and tackle disaster risk reduction issues.
- g) Before being selected as a partner, identified local organisations should be subject to a quick institutional assessment - a checklist could be drawn up for this - and answer a number of criteria. This assessment and selection process should be documented and discussed with the CA country representative and his/her programme officer(s). In this way, risk linked to the selection of a new partner are reduced and demonstration can be made to external actors - whether partners, donors or evaluators - that the process was carried out in a professional, objective, rigorous, formal, participatory and transparent manner.
- h) It is important to plan emergency projects taking into account beneficiaries needs but also partners strengths and weaknesses to avoid "adapting" partners to CA's intended response. If several partners are assisting people in the same project area, CA should make sure that they do not have contradictory intervention strategies. In addition, resources invested in the rental of vehicles would be more strategically used if invested in the purchase of motorbikes or in the co-financing of cars (if the partner can contribute to this purchase) thus strengthening partners' capacities in the long term.
- i) Rather than cumulating functions or leaving posts empty, CA should plan for an adequate handover phase between a person leaving her/his post and the person taking it over, whether temporarily or in the long term. This helps ensure continuity in work and communication.

5.5 Recommendations to partners

Recommendations to all partners

- a) In every intervention zone, baseline data on the socio-economic and sanitary situation of a sample of beneficiaries should be collected, and this work should be documented to serve as baseline data for mid-term and final project evaluations.
- b) Operational and monitoring costs for field staff, as well as means of transport (bikes) and promotional and teaching materials for community representatives (such as peer educators and monitoring committees) should not be underestimated since this support makes monitoring more efficient and contributes to stimulate and thank people for their involvement and efforts.
- c) Training sessions should always include the distribution of training manuals matching the education level of the participants. Such manual help memorise the training content and can later be used by participants to reproduce training at community level.
- d) Projects should be implemented in a transparent way to ensure that field staff members, community facilitators and beneficiaries are all well informed, before the project starts, about its implementation period, its perspectives of extension, and the financial and material support they will receive.
- e) It is important to recognise one's institutional weaknesses and include an "institutional strengthening" component - in the form of equipment or training - in budgets submitted to CA.

- f) It is suggested to be more proactive when dealing with CA in order to be more and better informed on CA work and to draw CA attention on the needs of specific groups and/or areas.
- g) It is recommended to continue reflecting on the “Synergy” ’s objectives and pursue efforts to develop complementary activities, making sure to maintain autonomy in decision-making processes and funding.

Recommendations to ADEPAE

- a) ADEPAE should fund the renting of the cassava field in Bweremana for another 6 months to allow the crop to mature and enable producers to harvest and sell their production and thus rent another plot by themselves to continue producing.
- b) In short-term projects that target particularly poor and vulnerable people, introducing crops that require pesticides, such as tomatoes, should be avoided as such products are usually difficult to find locally, increase production costs and contribute to damage the environment if not properly used.
- c) Ensure that field areas match the number of producers to make profits distribution more equitable.
- d) Ensure coherence with other local and international NGOs’ intervention strategies working within the same project zone.
- e) Assist management committees in Karuba and Rubaya with the planting of natural fences, around constructed water sources, to protect them from being contaminated by animals.
- f) In the context of the new project phase (ERP), set up a mechanism that allows producers to access mushroom seeds and produce mushrooms by themselves.
- g) In the context of the new project phase (ERP), involve other experienced local actors in project’s implementation and monitoring - such as the Higher Institute for Agronomic Studies in Bweremana - rather than setting up community monitoring committees whose members do have the required skills.

Recommendations to CBCA

- a) In coordination with CA, identify IDPs who have returned home but do not have any means of subsistence (as it is the case of many returnees in Nyiragongo, Kanyanja and in the villages around Rutshuru) and identify their priority needs in order to support their socio-economic reintegration. For returnees who can access their fields, it is suggested to support them with seeds in credit (to create a rotating seeds fund) and tools if needed, and for those who cannot access their fields due to insecurity, it is suggested to assist them with hybrid chickens or goats distributed on credit or with financial micro-credits (in coordination with PIAMF).
- b) When a distribution of NFI is planned, the number of certain items (such as blankets) to be distributed should depend on the size of the household.
- c) Spiritual assistance should be integrated into the planning process in order to make it available to beneficiaries who would ask for it.
- d) When assistance is given in Goma to IDPs with many children, children’s activities should be integrated into the project planning to avoid having them running on the streets.
- e) In Rutshuru territory (and elsewhere if required), activities strengthening health centres should be planned in coordination with the provincial health authority and other organisations intervening in the health sector so that prices for services and medicines, as well as levels of financial support to the functioning of health centres, are harmonised.

Recommendations to FFP

- a) In future projects, it is recommended to equip peer educators with means of transport and awareness-raising material, which can then remain within the community, rather than give them financial incentives the funding of which stops with project end and does not generate any long-term benefits.
- b) Peer educators should be assisted in their awareness-raising methodologies so that condom use can be better accepted among believers.
- c) It is important to develop and implement awareness-raising strategies to specifically target men, since they are the ones who usually take the decision to use condoms and allow their wives to be HIV/AIDS tested.
- d) If the mobile VTC carries out its work in rural areas, it is recommended to continue documenting monitoring to investigate if initial conclusions drawn from the DEC funded project (regarding prevalence rate in rural areas and among police and armed forces) are confirmed.
- e) FFP should work towards strengthening state services, rather than replacing them, with the objective of having one integrated and independently-managed VTC in every health zone. FFP's mobile VTC can contribute to create the initial demand for HIV/AIDS testing and respond to it in the short term, especially in isolated areas which are far away from health centres, but the latter should be able to respond to this demand in the medium to long term.
- f) FFP should diversify suppliers of laboratory inputs in order to reduce the risk of supply shortages.

Recommendations to PIAMF

In addition to the recommendations given in the "Priority Recommendations" and "Recommendations to CA/DRC" sections, the following is suggested:

- a) Distribute to the CCMV, PACODEVI and SG participants to the training the accounting template that has been developed to harmonise accounting procedures and formats.
- b) Facilitate a more rapid rotation of credits and gradually increase credit amounts according to beneficiaries' repayment performances and investment needs.
- c) Advise beneficiaries on their investments - while respecting their choices - to enable them to invest in more profitable activities. In order to achieve this, PIAMF and its members' staff should permanently maintain themselves informed about current and future profitable IGAs in North Kivu (taking into account competition from neighbouring countries). For this, it would be useful to follow-up a sample of beneficiaries in order to monitor the profitability of various types of IGAs being funded.
- d) Together with members and collaborators (associations), PIAMF should review the distribution of interests taking into account respective monitoring work carried out and institutional sustainability needs.
- e) Plan and negotiate projects with the involvement of all PIAMF members.

ANNEXES

ANNEX 1

Evaluation Terms of Reference

(Terms have been modified due to the consultant team's reduction to 2 members – following mail exchanges of 1st November with CA DRC Representative)

Evaluation of Christian Aid's response to DR Congo crisis for the period from January 2009 to October 2009

1. Purpose of the evaluation

- To assess the outcomes, impact and sustainability of Christian Aid and its partner's response to the DR Congo crisis on the lives of Congolese men, women and children.
- To assess the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of Christian Aid's and its partner's response to the DR Congo crisis and learn lessons for the future.

2. Objectives

Within the context of Christian Aid, other International NGO's and local partners working in Eastern DRC:

1. **To evaluate the impact and outcomes of the appeal on the lives of Congolese men, women and children.** This will involve looking for evidence to demonstrate:
 - Improved economic and physical well being
 - Increased survival and resilience against shocks and threats
 - Reduced mortality, morbidity and asset depletion resulting from the armed conflict
 - Involvement of communities in the process of needs assessment, implementation and evaluation of the work
 - IDPs and their families assessment of the ongoing challenges they face
 - Projects met their planned objectives and outcomes
2. **To evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of Christian Aid's internal management of the appeal in order to draw out lessons and improve in the future.** This will involve looking at coordination across the organization as well as specific programme support and should include:
 - Grants and financial management
 - The effectiveness of how resources have been allocated.
 - Compliance to Christian Aid's policies and procedures for appeals. e.g. finance, grant making, DEC and CA Appeal funds
 - That funds were spent according to the agreed plans
3. **To evaluate the quality and relevance of partners' work and Christian Aid's support.** This will involve looking at:
 - The range and coherence of work supported with DEC and CA appeal funds and whether it is in line with the aims of the appeal
 - The change in the capacities of Christian Aid's partners as a result of the Christian Aid partnership in response to DRC crisis.
 - The quality of the project work (needs assessment, M&E, gender, SPHERE, coordination)
 - The extent to which projects met Humanitarian Standards
 - Capacity of partners to implement the work
 - The involvement of, and accountability to, the beneficiary community at all stages of the project cycle
 - The link between the response and Christian Aid's longer term strategy for work in DRC
 - The extent to which the project has incorporated lessons from previous experiences

3. Outputs

Prior to the evaluation:

- Consultation with relevant staff on methodology/sampling design, quality assurance and travel itineraries and meetings schedules.
- A short inception note setting out an evaluation plan / timetable and methodology

During the evaluation:

- Verbal reporting on initial findings and conclusions to the Evaluation Steering Group
- Draft report to Steering Group by 27th November
- De-briefing meeting with relevant stakeholders (partners, beneficiaries, CA staff and Steering Group 27th Nov – 4th Dec) to discuss findings and recommendations of draft report and develop draft Management Response from each.
- Final evaluation report produced in English by (14th December 2009) with the following format
 - Executive summary
 - Findings
 - Recommendations for key stakeholders CA (Humanitarian Division, DRC programme, partners)
 - Recommendations and areas for learning should be categorised (...with guidance of how to be)
 - Identification of top 5 priority findings
 - Conclusions
- Steering group - to produce final management response

Management response to evaluation conclusions and recommendations: To be prepared by steering group upon receipt of final evaluation report. This will include a timetabled action plan addressing accepted recommendations and identifying who should take points forward. The final evaluation report should be no longer than 30-40 pages and should include specific recommendations, of which the evaluator should identify the 5 key priority recommendations for CA and its partners to address.

After the evaluation

The findings of the evaluation will be communicated within Christian Aid in an open forum session. A summary version will be made available for Christian Aid supporters and other external stakeholders as appropriate.

4. Key principles

- *Effectiveness* – To what extent have planned objectives been achieved, or are expected to be achieved.
- *Relevance* – The extent to which the objectives and timing of the response were consistent with affected communities' requirements and priorities and context
- *Appropriateness* – The extent to which interventions were consistent with CA's partners and their communities' local situation and capacity
- *Accountability and transparency*
- *Bias*: Bias must be addressed and acknowledged where relevant.

5. Cross cutting issues

- *Partnership* – Assess the effectiveness and the added value of CA's partnership approach
- *Gender* – Evaluate how well the needs or roles of women, men and children affected by the DRC crisis were responded to, and identify examples demonstrating gender sensitivity in the programme
- *Capacity building* – Assess the level of change in local capacity as a result of CA supported intervention.

6. Methodology

The final methodology should be developed and agreed with the lead evaluator, and will include:

- A desk review of existing documents
- Partner proposals, AMRs, CPP, reports and other related documentation
- Interviews, discussions and de-briefing sessions with CA's partners (Adepae, FP, CBCA and PIAMF)
- Interviews, discussions and de-briefing sessions with relevant CA staff
- Interviews and focus group discussions with a sample of direct and indirect beneficiaries identified with partner and CA staff if possible.
- Direct observations through visits to project and partner sites
- A lesson learnt workshop with partners and relevant CA staff

7. Evaluation team

The evaluation team will be made up of:

1. An external team leader (name to be confirmed) with strong background of humanitarian response and understanding of the DRC context
2. An external evaluator with strong understanding and overview of Christian Aid structures and ways of working – including communications, fundraising, and policy
3. CA Team member to assist in country with data gathering / interviews.

The team will between them have experience of the DRC context, recovery programmes in sensitive areas, and knowledge of the livelihoods approach and framework.

8. Management

The evaluation team will report to Helen Horn et Kate Ferguson. Chirha and Antoine are the contact persons for the DRC. An evaluation steering group will oversee the management of the evaluation and ensure it fulfils its purpose. This group will sign off the TOR and then meet as required. This is likely to be at least twice – once to agree and sign off the inception note and once to review and collate their feedback on the initial findings from the evaluation. They will also assist with communicating the findings of the evaluation

Steering group suggested membership:

Helen Horn; Kate Ferguson; Jacques Miaglia; Antoine Kasongo; Chirha Murhambo
Andre Nsengiyunva; Oliver Cooper.

9. Timeframe

Dates	Action
Fri 18 th Sept	Sign off TORs
From 21 st Sept	Tender for lead evaluator
Mon 5 th & Tue 6 th Oct	Review tenders
Fri 9 th Oct	Select lead and inform
Mon 12 th Oct – Fri 16 th Oct	Finalise contract
Fri 16 th Oct	Send budget to DEC
Wed 21 st Oct	Request approval from DEC and sign contract
Sat 31st Oct – Weds 18th Nov	Carry out evaluation
Fri 20 th Nov – Fri 27 th Nov	Evaluator to write first draft
Fri 27th Nov	Draft report to CA
Fri 27 th Nov – Fri 4 th Dec	Partner and beneficiary workshops/de-briefs –this should create a management response from the partners and beneficiaries
Fri 4 th Dec	Deadline for CA Steering Group feedback to evaluator in the form of draft management response
Mon 7 th Dec – Mon 14 th Dec	Draft report revised to include partner, beneficiary and Steering Group management responses and feedback
Mon 14th Dec	Final report to CA
Fri 18 th Dec	Latest date to submit final report to DEC
Fri 8 th Jan '10	Agree management response

10. DRC crisis partners

Actions Pour Le Développement Et La Paix Endogène - ADEPAE

Fondation Femmes Plus - FP

Communauté Baptiste En Afrique Centrale - CBCA

Plate Forme des Institutions et Associations de Micro Finance - PIAMF

11. DRC programme partners prior to the crisis

FP and PIAMF.

12. Suggested Reading materials

CA Rolling Plan: DRC crisis

CPSP (draft)

CPP, Review April 09

Partner reports

DRP interim and final reports

ETF and Alert meeting minutes

Audit reports

External reports

AMRs

CA Emergency Response Policy and Procedures

CA Corporate Secure Livelihoods Strategy 2007-2010

HAP

Humanitarian Charter and Sphere Project – ‘Common Standards’

RC/RC Code of Conduct

THIA

No small change

Reports on previous assessment visits carried out in February, June and May 2008

CA policies and procedures for appeals

DEC/CA Appeals

ANNEX 2

Evaluation authors

Team leader consultant: Marion GUILLERMARD. Self-employed consultant. France.
N°Siret : 511 208 183 000 18

Associate consultant: Bienvenu MOKILI. Self-employed consultant . DRC.

Methodology

Data collection methodology

1. Documentary analysis based on narrative and financial documents prepared beforehand by each partner (list of documents to prepare given to partners)
2. Evaluation workshops with each partner's project staff
3. Focus groups with the various target groups and final beneficiaries of the programme (list of target groups and final beneficiaries, per project, submitted by consultants beforehand)
4. Field Visits and observation of production plots and infrastructures
5. Review of documentation kept by target groups
6. Individual interviews (CA, local authorities, State technical services, community leaders, and other actors in each intervention zone)

Sampling

The selection of sites to be visited was made according to the following criteria:

- Sites with a diversity of activities/results
- Sites with a geographical concentration of activities/results
- Sites with a high number of beneficiaries
- Sites with various socioeconomic levels
- Sites with various levels of population's dynamism
- Sites with various levels of beneficiaries ownership
- Sites where partners had already worked and other sites where partners had never worked
- Secured area
- For distant communities, availability of on-site accommodations

Work principles

- Evaluate projects/partners successively
- Meet all direct and indirect beneficiary groups
- Meet target groups without the partners being present
- Consultants select beneficiaries based on lists provided by each partner
- Meet fewer groups over a longer time, rather than many groups over a short period of time
- 1 day in each partner's office and 1-2 days of field visits
- Data processing every evening

Facilitating evaluation conditions

- Great availability, openness and flexibility demonstrated by partners and individuals interviewed
- Respect of our request to meet a diversity of target groups and have confidential interviews
- Perfect logistical support
- No time lost, thanks to good partner preparation (of documentation and target groups)
- All documentation requested was provided
- Good CA supervision of security conditions
- CA's effectiveness in resolving issues encountered

Constraints encountered

1. No baseline data and very few SMART indicators.
2. Partial evaluation with respect to geographical coverage: Kitchanga-Mweso axis was not accessible for security reasons, and Rubaya was not visited due to the lack of time.
3. The number of days assigned to field visits was not sufficient: evaluators only met a limited number of beneficiaries (in particular for PIAMF and ADEPAE projects) and very few local actors such as teachers, health centres' staff and other representatives of organisations with which partners worked (ICRC, SENASEM, UNFPA, MDM, etc.).
4. Paper-based documentation from the DRC EO could not be reviewed because it had been left in Bukavu.
5. Several key documents were only received during the writing of the report which made their thorough analysis difficult.
6. Due to the short period of time assigned to the evaluation and as skype communication was not good enough, 4 individual interviews had to be carried out during the writing of the report.

Limits of the evaluation

- Constraint 1 did not allow for a proper quantitative evaluation of the project impact, which therefore had to be assessed mainly from a qualitative point of view.
- Constraints 2 and 3 meant that evaluators were not able to adequately cross-check and counter-check information gathered, so that data are not 100% reliable. When partner's information was not matching field information, field information was preferred if confirmed by various sources.
- Constraint 4 had no significant impact on the evaluation given that most of the DRC EO documentation was received in electronic form.
- Constraints 5 and 6 prevented the report from being submitted within the required deadline.

Guide used for evaluation workshops with the project staff of each partner

1. Brief overview of the partner organisation

- *Founded in ?*
- *Type of organisation*
- *Yearly internal and external organisational audit*
- *General assembly? Board's mandate period*
- *Number of offices at national level and permanent staff in North Kivu (how many)*
- *Work and communication equipment (internet)*
- *Types of projects implemented, sectors targeted and intervention zones*
- *Annual budget*
- *Funding sources: own and external, with number of donors, respective percentage from each donor, and percentage of own funds.*

2. Targeting of areas, villages and activities

- *Targeting methodology: who was consulted and how?*
- *Who was involved in needs assessment? Did CA support the needs assessment? How?*
- *Do you think the final version of the project (after CA's review and comments) was relevant to respond to the needs of the targeted populations, and do you think you were sufficiently involved in the project's design and development?*

3. Project organisation – in Goma and in the field

- *Units/human resources allocated to the project (men and women)/Responsibilities*
- *Recruitment (criteria, selection process) and staff stability during project execution*
- *Offices, equipment*
- *Difficulties encountered*

4. Programmatic monitoring

- *Did you set up a database? If not, why not?*
- *Who set up this database and who entered data? How was it used?*
- *Respective responsibilities for monitoring*
- *Policies and procedures manual and/or templates provided by CA*
- *Knowledge, understanding, adaptation of CA's policies and procedures and adherence to these policies and procedures? If not, why not?*
- *Types and frequency of monitoring*
- *Reports/recommendations (internal and by CA) and monitoring of recommendations*
- *Difficulties encountered*
- *CA monitoring: by whom? Frequency of visits, visit reports received, recommendations made by CA, measures taken following these recommendations, support/advice and training received? Was support sufficient and well-adapted?*

5. Financial and administrative monitoring

- *Respective responsibilities*
- *Archiving system used: which documents were archived? In what format and by whom?*
- *Policies and procedures manual and/or templates provided by CA?*
- *Knowledge, understanding, adaptation of CA's policies and procedures and adherence to these policies and procedures? If not, why not?*

- *Which procedures were used for purchasing goods and services?*
- *Ways of carrying out financial monitoring and frequency*
- *Reports/recommendations (internal and from CA) and monitoring of recommendations*
- *CA financial transfers: on time? Matching funding requests?*
- *CA monitoring: by whom? Frequency of visits, visit reports received, recommendations made by CA, measures taken following these recommendations, support/advice and training received? Was support sufficient and well-adapted?*
- *Difficulties encountered*

6. Evaluation and lessons learning

- *Internal evaluations? Who took part? Methodology? Measures taken to follow-up evaluations?*
- *External or CA-supported evaluations: how many? Measures taken following these evaluations?*
- *Lessons drawn from projects? Learning document available?*

7. Consultation and partnerships (including with CA partners)

- *Which partners/allies and which areas of collaboration with each of them?*
- *Types of partnership? Formal partnerships?*
- *Which added value drawn from these partnerships?*

8. Beneficiaries' and other actors' participation

- *Was participation adequate? If not, what were the constraints?*
- *What mechanisms were used to take into account beneficiaries' complaints/suggestions? How was the project amended following beneficiaries' complaints/suggestions?*

9. Integration of gender issues within the project

- *Staff selection and project planning, implementation and monitoring*

10. Staff training and partners' capacity building

- *What training was received and on which themes?*
- *Usefulness of this training in project implementation and monitoring?*
- *Exchange visits? With which other organisations, on which issues, and with which results?*
- *Which capacities were strengthened through projects' implementation? Was capacity-building sufficient and appropriate?*
- *Was partner's visibility increased? This will make funding negotiations easier in the future?*

11. SHERE Standards

- *Are SPHERE standards known? Training and documentation received? By whom?*
- *Which standards were taken into account and how?*

12. Communication and media

- *Activities carried out? With CA support?*
- *Results achieved/usefulness?*
- *Partner's capacities in this area?*

13. Positions, advocacy, lobbying

- *Activities carried out? With CA support? Results achieved?*
- *Necessary, or is it better to leave this work to other organisations?*
- *Activities feasible in the framework of emergency projects?*
- *Partner's capacities in this area?*

14. Strengths, weaknesses and lessons learned

List of documents to be prepared by every partner

- Folders used for archiving
- Reports on assessment missions
- Baseline data on target groups
- Approved project proposals and budgets
- Transfer sheets
- Monitoring plan developed with CA
- Intermediary and final narrative and financial reports
- Audit reports
- Monitoring visit reports and minutes of project staff meetings
- Lists of distributions to beneficiaries
- CA-partner funding agreement
- PIAMF-beneficiary memorandums of understanding
- Credit and repayment monitoring sheets (PIAMF)
- Monitoring tools for agricultural production
- Reports on tendering processes
- Inventory sheets, expedition and reception slips
- Order forms
- Contracts with suppliers and other collaborators
- Radio broadcast programmes (cassettes)
- Programme of monthly commercial exchange sessions
- Other relevant documentation

ANNEX 3

Results of the documentary analysis

ADEPAE

Documents	Does/does not exist	Comments
Folders used for archiving	Documents are filed by department	
Problem identification mission reports	No	The previous office manager resigned and kept part of the documentation without leaving the password to access electronic documentation
Baseline data on target groups	No	
Approved project proposals and budgets	Yes	
Receipts of CA financial transfers	Yes	Funds were received into a Rwandese bank account
Monitoring plan	No, there is only an activities' plan	
Budget monitoring plan	No	ADEPAE/Goma does not have any overall monitoring plan for its activities and does not have any monitoring plans for the two CA-funded projects.
Intermediate and final monthly narrative reports	Yes	
Intermediate and final monthly financial reports	Not available	Some financial reports are included in the narrative reports
Audit reports	Yes	Audited by Business Solutions Worldwide strong Nkv on 30.07.2009
Activity monitoring reports	Yes but only for the food security project	
Distribution lists	Yes	
Reports/minutes of staff meetings	Yes	There is no standard template. At each meeting, the person assigned to the minutes drafts a report in his or her own format
CA-partner funding agreement	Yes	
Reports on tendering processes	Yes for the two motorbikes, the two laptop computers, 2 telephones, for construction materials and for cassava cuttings, sweet potato cuttings and hoes.	No pro-forma invoices for the laptop computers
Inventory sheets, expedition/reception slips	Yes	

Documents	Does/does not exist	Comments
Order forms	Yes	
Contracts with suppliers, other partners	Yes	
Contracts with constructors of latrines and water sources	-	Water engineer recruited for the project
Archive for field visits authorisations	Yes	
Staff contracts	Yes	
Staff recruitment reports	Yes	Jobs advertisements , applications, pre-selection of candidates, written and oral tests and computer test
Training reports	No	The previous office manager resigned and kept part of the documentation without leaving the password to access electronic documentation
Financial and administrative procedures	Yes	

CBCA

Documents	Does/does not exist	Comments
Folders used for archiving	Yes	Documents are filed and archived by department
Needs identification missions reports	No. Only lists of persons who were to benefit from various distributions	Assessment was carried out on the basis of mails received from CBCA staff members and pastors based in the field. CBCA also set up an internal crisis committee to analyse the context and reflect on intervention strategies
Baseline data on target groups	Yes but only basic data	Name of the household's head, age, spouse's name, children's names, village of origin, arrival date and sex
Approved project proposals and budgets	Yes	
Receipts of CA financial transfers	Not as such, but bank statements	Funds were transferred in two instalments
Monitoring plan	Yes but was not used	
Budget monitoring plan	Yes	
Intermediate and final monthly narrative and financial reports	Monthly narrative reports - yes Monthly financial reports – yes Final report – yes	Hard copies and electronic versions
Audit reports	Not yet	Audit planned for January 2010
Reports on monitoring visits	Yes, a few reports but monitoring is not systematically documented	Update reports, reports on distributions, report on the project closing day
Distribution lists	Yes	
Reports/minutes of staff meetings	Yes	
CA-partner funding agreement	Yes	
Reports on tendering processes	Yes, for building materials (latrines and tanks), food and NFI, and for women-specific kits	Characteristics of the goods are not detailed in the call for tenders
Inventory sheets, expedition/reception slips	Yes	No expedition slips for Goma distributions but they do exist for Rutshuru and Nyiragongo
Order forms	Yes	
Contracts with constructors	Yes	For the building of latrines and water tanks
Archive for field visits authorisations	No	Field visits authorisations are filed in each department's archives
Staff contracts	No	
Staff recruitment reports	No	2 persons, already known to CBCA, were recruited.
Training reports	Yes	Training on humanitarian assistance and on SPHERE standards
Financial and administrative procedures	No	Being developed

FFP

Documents	Does/does not exist	Comments
Folders used for archiving	1. Administrative and technical documents: MoU with various health zones, minutes of meetings, activity reports, assistance distributed, evaluation reports, supervision reports, narrative reports, peer educators reports, training reports, contract with CA, inventory sheets	
	2. Financial documents Bank statements, bank reconciliations, inventories of equipment, bank books, table for financial monitoring, monthly financial reports, cash control sheets	
Needs assessment reports	Yes	This document was drafted by the FFP-N/Kivu team. But the team consulted other partners for certain important information (OCHA, health zones...).
Baseline data on target groups	No	-
Approved project proposals and budgets	Yes, but the version modified by the DRC EO	The original version designed by FFP-N/Kivu is in Kinshasa.
Receipts of CA financial transfers	Not as such but FFP has bank statements	
Monitoring plan (with indicators, periods, etc.)	Yes, FFP uses a chronogram to monitor activities and results, but does not monitor impact	
Intermediate and final monthly narrative and financial reports	Yes, final narrative reports (Jan-June 2009); monthly narrative reports (Jan-June 2009); monthly financial reports (Jan-June 2009) and financial monitoring table	Reports (financial, narrative) produced according to CA template. But since FFP operates in the health sector, it also has to present reports to the health zone according to PNLS and PNMLS templates
Audit reports	No	The audit will be done in January 2009
Reports on monitoring visits	Yes	
Reports/minutes of staff meetings	Yes	
Distribution lists (material aid)	Yes, lists related to food and NFI	
CA-partner funding agreement	Yes	
Staff recruitment reports	No, but documents relating to the recruitment process: jobs advertisements, jobs' applications, candidates selected, written and oral tests and recruitment decision	

Documents	Does/does not exist	Comments
Staff contracts	Yes	
Reports on tendering processes	Not as such, but FFP has pro-forma invoices for the vehicle (3 suppliers) and for promotional materials (3 suppliers) as well as final invoices	
Inventory sheets, expedition/reception slips	Yes, drugs inventory and laboratory inputs sheets	
Order forms	Yes for the vehicle	
Contracts with suppliers, other partners	No	Purchases are made as needed
List of persons tested by the VTC	Yes, there is a registration sheet, a sheet for blood testing, and a sheet for tests results	
Archive for field visits authorisations	Yes	
Memorandum of understanding with every health zone	Yes	

PIAMF

Documents	Does/does not exist	Comments
Folders used for archiving	Yes for administrative, technical and financial documents	Each department manages its own documents and the coordinator manages the consolidated documents
Reports on needs assessment missions	No	Carried out with CA and PIAMF did not receive CA report
Baseline data on target groups	No	Micro-finance software was purchased and data are currently being entered into the database. Staff has been trained in its use
Approved project proposals and budgets	Yes	Projects are presented in the template suggested by CA
Receipts of CA financial transfers	Yes	Funds received in 2 instalments
Monitoring plan	No but PIAMF has its own activities monitoring plan	
Intermediate and final monthly narrative and financial reports	Yes: Goma and Masisi intermediate reports; monthly narrative reports; monthly financial reports; financial monitoring table (in CF and US\$)	Given that projects are still being implemented, PIAMF has not produced any final narrative report. Monthly financial reports are attached to narrative reports, as recommended by CA
Audit reports	No	Audit will be carried out once the 2 projects are completed
Monitoring visit reports	Yes	
Reports/minutes of staff meetings	Yes	Weekly staff meetings. Minutes include: date, agenda, points discussed, resolutions taken, observations, participants
List of loans to beneficiaries (solidarity groups)	Yes: reception sheets for agricultural inputs, list of formal partners and of autonomous groups	Goma: PIAMF has formal partners (two, CCMV and PACODEVI) as well as autonomous solidarity groups Masisi: PIAMF only works with solidarity groups.
CA-partner funding agreement	Yes	
Collaboration agreements	Yes, with CCMV and PACODEVI	
PIAMF-beneficiary/partner loan agreements	Yes	Contract is in Swahili
Land rental agreements	Yes	Contract is in Swahili
Reports on tendering processes	PIAMF has pro-forma invoices for the laptop computer and agricultural inputs, as well as final invoices.	Jackets, digital camera, safe and other small equipment were not subject to tender procedures
Loan and repayment monitoring sheets	Yes, kept by credit agents	

Documents	Does/does not exist	Comments
Inventory sheets, expedition/reception slips	Yes, inventory sheets for farming tools and seeds, but no slips related to their expedition or receipt.	
Reports on agricultural production	Yes	Sheet with the following data: day and date, activities carried out, beneficiary association, location, results achieved, observations
Contracts with suppliers and other partners	No	Purchases were made as needed
Supplier contracts (seeds)	No, PIAMF did not find any suppliers	In Masisi, no supplier was meeting selection criteria as documented in PIAMF report. Seeds were purchased by the beneficiaries themselves with the support of the project agronomist.
Archive for field visits authorisations	Yes	
Reports on monthly commercial exchanges	Yes. Reports on the Goma-Bweremana commercial transaction and on the Goma-Kitchanga commercial transaction	
Staff contracts	Yes	
Recruitment reports	Yes	
Training reports	Yes	
Credit portfolio	Yes	
Administrative and financial procedures	Yes	
Members' reports	Yes	Every member submits a monthly activities' report

ANNEX 4

Evaluation work calendar

DAY	ACTIVITY
31/10	Flight Paris-Kinshasa: review of documentation
01/11	Flight Kinshasa-Goma: review of documentation. Meeting with DRC EO : security, logistics, evaluation objectives and programme, checking of documentation received
02/11	Preparation of evaluation plan to be presented to partners. Workshop with partners to review and discuss evaluation plan. Interview of the DRC EO
03/11	Preparation of workshop and of documentation review at every partner's office (issues to discuss, list of aspects to check and division of work between the 2 consultants). Discussion of evaluation tools to design. Design of the evaluation tools
04/11	FFP evaluation – Goma. Workshop with FFP staff and review of FFP documentation
05/11	FFP evaluation - Masisi. Sake: (1) meeting with the administrator of the territory; (2) meeting with representatives of Heal Africa; (3) observation of the functioning of the mobile VTC; (4) meeting with Sake peer educators. Kirotshe: (1) meeting with the Director and supervisor of the hospital. Minova: (1) meeting with Minova peer educators; (2) meeting with 2 HIV/AIDS infected persons
06/11	PIAMF evaluation - Goma. Workshop with PIAMF staff and review of PIAMF documentation
07/11	PIAMF evaluation – Goma: (1) meeting with CWD, visit of a micro-enterprise producing soap, visit of a pig-raising unit; (2) meeting with PACODEVI staff; (3) meeting with PACODEVI beneficiary (breeding chicken); (4) meeting with PACODEVI beneficiary (selling bananas); (5) meeting with CCMV staff; (6) meeting with CCMV beneficiary group TSHIPUKIZ; (7) meeting with a member of TABITA, SG supported by PIAMF.
08/11	PIAMF evaluation – Masisi. Minova: (1) meeting with 2 members of SG AMANI; (2) meeting with the association ASMA (2 focus groups). Bweremana: (1) meeting with 6 SG beneficiaries of credit for trade activities; (2) meeting with 7 SG (forming “Umoja trois”) beneficiaries of seeds on credit. Sake: (1) meeting with PIAMF credit officer; (2) meeting with 2 SG beneficiaries of seeds
09/11	CBCA evaluation – Goma. Workshop with CBCA staff and review of CBCA documentation
10/11	CBCA evaluation - Rushuru: (1) meeting with beneficiaries of NFI in Kasasa; (2) meeting with distribution committee members for Kasasa site; (3) meeting with returnees in Rushuru benefiting from CBCA/PIAMF support; (4) meeting with association AFECOPROSE, producing environment friendly charcoal and stoves; (5) meeting with beneficiaries of NFI in Kibututu. (6) meeting with Kibututu local authority. (7) meeting with chief nurse - Kibututu health centre. (8) meeting with assistant nurse & accountant - Butarande health centre
11/11	CBCA evaluation - Kibumba: (1) meeting with children reunified with their families; (2) meeting with children's parents; (3) meeting with beneficiaries of FI and NFI. Kibumba: visit of a water tank and discussion with CEPAC pastor. Kanyanja: (1) visit of a water tank; (2) meeting with beneficiaries of FI and NFI. Kahembe-Birere: (1) meeting with administrator and chief doctor of CBCA clinic having benefited from medicines; (2) visit of latrines and water tanks in the compounds of CBCA church and discussion with pastor; (3) visit of latrines and tank of a CBCA school and discussion with school director. Goma: (1) visit of Himbi Institute: meeting with director and chaplain; (2) visit of Lubangu health centre and meeting with nurse; (3) visit of Virunga Hospital and meeting with administrator.
12/11	ADEPAE evaluation. Workshop with ADEPAE staff and review of ADEPAE documentation
13/11	ADEPAE evaluation. Karuba: (1) meeting with chief of M/Karuba; (2) meeting with Karuba secondary school director; (3) meeting with members of 2 water sources committees and with the supervisors of the 27 water sources constructed in Karuba; (4) observation of latrines built near the school and on the market; (5) meeting with the male nurse of the Karuba health post; (6) visit of the Kanyanja 2 and Bagoyi water sources
14/11	ADEPAE evaluation. Bweremana: (1) meeting with the local chief; (2) meeting with the local agricultural engineer teaching at the “Institut Supérieur d’Etudes Agronomiques” ; (3) meeting with 3 groups of beneficiaries (from Bweremana, Kafuta and Renga) ; (4) meeting with the members of the supervision committee; (5) visit of ADEPAE field and discussion with beneficiaries working in that field
15/11	Hotel Goma: preparation of Monday meeting and processing of partners' information
16/11	Hotel Goma: processing of info and planning of CA interviews. CBCA office: meeting with “the synergy”
17/11	Hotel Goma: processing of information
18/11	CBCA office Goma: meeting with partners to feedback on evaluation results
19/11	Flight Goma-Kinshasa
20/11	Kinshasa. Interviews of 4 CA staff members. Meeting with CA staff: short Feedback on evaluation results
23-25/11	4 Interviews with 4 CA staff members

ANNEX 5

List of individuals and organisations met

PERSON	GENDER	POSITION	ORGANISATION
ADEPAE			
GOMA			
Tharcirse Kayira	M	Coordinator	ADEPAE
Mathieu Munyakazi	M	Office manager	ADEPAE
Ananie Bateyi Wabo	M	Supervisor/Programme officer	ADEPAE
Byimana Mutabazi	M	Hydraulic specialist	ADEPAE
Marc Bwira	M	Agronomist	ADEPAE
Felix Ndakiyimana	M	Agronomist	ADEPAE
Grâce Sombola	F	Accountant	ADEPAE
Odette Karangwayire	F	Cashier-Secretary	ADEPAE
KARUBA			
Bahati Mukuba	M	Head of M/Karuba group	-
Sebageni Ndazigaruye	M	Headmaster of secondary school where 8 latrines were constructed	Secondary school
Charles Bavuga	M	Secondary school prefect	Secondary school
Kambari Ruziga	M	Head of Karuba centre – Supervises 4 sources	-
Bavuga Muhashi	M	Nurse	Health post
KARUBA – MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES			
Macho Uwimana	M	Member of Kanyanja 2 water source management committee	Water and Sanitation project
Duniya Muhawe	F	Member of Chona Rurembo water source management committee	Water and Sanitation project
Pierre Ronga	M	Member of Chona Rurembo water source management committee	Water and Sanitation project
BWEREMANA			
Cleophas Muhindo	M	Chief of Bweremana	-
William Ngabo Ndamwenge	M	Agricultural monitor teaching at ISEA	-
BWEREMANA - BENEFICIARIES			
Amuli Munguiko	M	Farmer – Kafuta axis	Food sec project
Charlotte Vumilia	F	Farmer – Bweremana axis	Food sec project
Bahuti Furaha	F	Farmer – Bweremana axis	Food sec project
Marceline Safari	F	Farmer – Bweremana axis	Food sec project
Justine Mumbara	F	Farmer – Bweremana axis	Food sec project
Vick Tolinabo	F	Farmer – Kafuta axis	Food sec project
Kade Binyere	M	Farmer – Bweremana axis	Food sec project
Agnes Ibrahim	F	Farmer – Kafuta axis	Food sec project
Ester Ombeni	F	Farmer – Kafuta axis	Food sec project
Mundinda Nabuira	F	Farmer – Bweremana axis	Food sec project
Akilimali Ndalich	F	Farmer – Renga axis	Food sec project
BWEREMANA – MONITORING COMMITTEE			
Sylvestre Takuru Mumbara	M	Professor	Food sec project
Isaac Wetemwani	M	Professor	Food sec project
Donat Musemakweli	M	Unemployed	Food sec project
Marta Nabiti Bulenda	F	Childcare centre worker	Food sec project
Christine Safari	F	Unemployed	Food sec project

PERSON	GENDER	POSITION	ORGANISATION
CBCA			
GOMA			
Désiré Safari Kanyena	M	Director, Diacony and Development	CBCA
Jean-Pierre Kanyamunyu	M	Programme supervisor	CBCA
Judith Mwenge	F	Programme supervisor	CBCA
Kakule Kasereka	M	Director	Institut Himbi
Kiakimwa Mutero Defrose	F	Almoner	Institut Himbi
Katsongo Kasika	F	Head nurse, Lubangu Health Centre	CBCA
Kambusu	M	Administrator. Reference hospital - Virunga	CBCA
RUTSHURU			
Busimba Kwesi	M	CBCA Pastor in Buturande	CBCA
Shadrak Kambale	M	Animator – CDR Kibututu	CBCA
BENEFICIARIES – KASASA SITE			
Approx. 70 persons	F: 80% M: 20%	Beneficiaries of the non-food items distribution, Kasasa site	-
DISTRIBUTION COMMITTEE - KASASA			
Maria Kahambu	F	Farmer in Kiwanja. Chair of the Women and Families department, CBCA	CBCA
Paluku Kigombe	M	Chairperson of a seed bank in Katoro (Catholic)	-
Kanyere Mashahuri	F	Farmer in Kiwanja. CBCA Secretary	CBCA
Muhindo Mavutsu	M	CBCA Pastor in Buturande	CBCA
Sembagare Semasaka	M	CBCA Pastor in Kiwanja	CBCA
Kisuba Kanduki	M	Farmer (Protestant)	-
RUTSHURU – CREDIT BENEFICIARIES			
Approx. 50 persons distributed in 5 SG	F: 71% M: 29%	5 SG set up by CBCA, 2 of which received loans (total amount of US\$2.000)	
RUTSHURU – SENSITISATION/ENVIRONMENT			
Approx. 20 persons	F: 98% M: 02%	President and producers	AFECOPROSE Association
KIBUTUTU			
Paluku Muhumbirwa	M	Head of the Kibututu distribution site	-
Kakule Ndato	M	Head nurse, Kibututu health centre	CBCA
BUTARANDE			
Paluku Kazi	M	Assistant head nurse, Butarande health centre	CBCA
Munfano Kanyere	F	Accountant, Butarande health centre	CBCA
KIBUMBA – UC AND PARENTS			
25 reunited UC	F: 60% M: 40%	-	-
Semvumbi Lukamga	M	Pastor in Buhumba	CEPAC
Hangi Kabumba	M	Butcher in Kibumba	-
Tusenge Nitemwera	F	Farmer in Kibumba	-
Esperance Nyambuga	F	Farmer in Buhumba	-
Annocianta Kahombo	F	Farmer in Kibumba	-
Mujawimana	F	Farmer in Kibumba	-
Bonane Bihigi	M	Farmer in Buhumba	-
Sebyera Basabose	M	Farmer in Buhumba	-
Kasimba Ndahomduye	M	Farmer in Kibumba	-
Bafike Mumyanikusi	M	Farmer in Kibumba	-
Bihinguru Barianga	M	Farmer in Buhumba	-

PERSON	GENDER	POSITION	ORGANISATION
Buzukira Kabare	M	Farmer in Kibumba	-
Dafrose Nyarabavukure	F	Farmer in Buhumba	-
Bonane Bimenwa	F	Farmer in Buhumba	-
Riziki Nyakazi	F	Small trader in Kibumba	-
KIBUMBA			
61 persons	F: 90% M: 10%	Beneficiaries of food and non-food items	-
Serubaya Matembera	M	Pastor	CEPAC
KANYANJA			
Marc Semakuba	M	Village chief	-
Approx. 150 persons	F: 60% M: 40%	Beneficiaries of food and non-food items	-
GOMA (KAHEMBE BIRERE)			
Felix Kambale	M	Head doctor at CBCA health centre	CBCA
Vutya Kisumba	M	Administrator, CBCA health centre	CBCA
Kauta-Vindu	M	Reverend Pastor - Kahembe parish	CBCA
Mr. Siluhwere	M	Head of Kahembe CBCA school	CBCA
FFP			
GOMA			
Rebecca Bernadette Mulunda	F	Provincial coordinator	FFP
Derrick Manegabe	M	Provincial technical assistant	FFP
Stephane Mutia Mutaka	M	Programme officer	FFP
Paulin Baderhekuguma	M	Social worker	FFP
Rubain Mbhonekuba Nyamonde	M	Laboratory technician	FFP
Joelle Maale	M	Financial assistant	FFP
Papy Balume M.	M	Driver	FFP
SAKE			
Djuma Boulenda	M	Resident administrator	-
Guerschom Paluku	F	"Choose your life" programme supervisor	Heal Africa
SAKE – PEER EDUCATORS			
Sabiki Mushengezi	M	Evangelist. 8 th CEPAC	CEPAC
Augustin Kanane Bintu	M	Head of tourism department	-
Matata Ndale Mikia	M	Association secretary	MUMAMA
Bahati Bulenda Masudi	M	Advisor - Congo Islamic Committee	COMICO
Venani Nzayaha	M	Pastor	-
Kibeya Waluka	F	Midwife	Centre santé
Kisuba Kabetsi	F	-	-
KIROTSHE			
Edgar Musubao	M	Directing doctor	Reference hospital
Antoine Rukundo	M	Supervising nurse	Reference hospital
MINOVA – PEER EDUCATORS			
Vincent Akilimali Simwa	M	Teacher	-
Rachel Chibalonza-Rugadjo	F	Community relay (and shopkeeper)	-
Kature Kapimba	M	Policeman	-
Nalwanyo Matembero	F	Community relay	-
Esperance Mwavita	F	Community relay (and teacher)	-
Francine Riziki	F	Community relay	-
Bijou Buhoro Mugaroli	F	Community relay (and teacher)	-
Louis Mishungu Mpabamti	M	Nurse. FARDC Lieutenant	FARDC

PERSON	GENDER	POSITION	ORGANISATION
MINOVA – HIV POSITIVE PERSONS			
Confidential	M	Teacher	-
Confidential	M	Farmer	-
PIAMF			
GOMA			
Mastola Muhindo	M	Coordinator	PIAMF
Michel Mungungu	M	Programme officer	PIAMF
Patrick Bahati M.	M	Assistant programme officer	PIAMF
Jonadab Bwenge	M	President, PIAMF board	CCMV1
Mathe Musumba	M	Vice-President, PIAMF board	BOAD
Katikati Muhongya	M	Member, PIAMF board	COOPECCO Centrale
GOMA – BENEFICIARIES OF CREDITS IN CASH			
Masika Muhongya	F	Member	CWD
Kavira Ngitsi	F	Member	CWD
Masika Musukali	F	Member	CWD
Kahindo Mukuhi	F	Member	CWD
Kalsmo Musumba	F	Member	CWD
Kavira Kalolomera	F	Member	CWD
Joséphine Kavira Musambaghani	F	Member	CWD
Jeannette Faïda Longhi	F	Member	CWD
Fitina Matundu	F	Member	TABITA
SAKE			
Romain Kanane Rukotsa	M	Credit agent	PIAMF
SAKE – BENEFICIARIES OF SEEDS ON CREDIT			
Amini Mupenda	M	President	FUKA MBUYA
Muhindo Kalembe	M	Secretary	FUKA MBUYA
Amani Kiana	M	Member	FUKA MBUYA
Maoneo Balume	M	Member	FUKA MBUYA
Bulenda Bakengere	M	President	ASVODI
Alain Muhanuka	M	Secretary	ASVODI
BWEREMANA – BENEFICIARIES OF SEEDS ON CREDIT			
Approx. 15 persons	F: 70%	Members	Association NAC
Approx. 15 persons	F: 60%	Members	SAPA
Approx. 15 persons	F: 80%	Members	GCND
Approx. 15 persons	F: 70%	Members	ACADECO
Approx. 15 persons	F: 60%	Members	Tous en Action pour le Développement
Approx. 15 persons	F: 90%	Members	BUUMA
Approx. 15 persons	F: 60%	Members	Displaced persons for development
BWEREMANA – BENEFICIARIES OF CREDITS IN CASH			
Dieudonné Munguiko	M	SG chair	UMOJA 2
Feza Buhuru	F	SG member	UMOJA 2
Furaha Bahati	F	SG member	UMOJA 2
Ndoole Mbonoke	F	SG member	UMOJA 2
Sifa Mulengezi	F	SG member	UMOJA 2
Safi Musemakweli	F	SG chair	UMOJA 1
Christine Safari	F	SG secretary	UMOJA 1
Beatrice Kanane	F	SG member	UMOJA 1

PERSON	GENDER	POSITION	ORGANISATION
Byasi Muleyi	M	SG chair	MAPENDO
Maneno Muletsi	M	SG vice-chair	MAPENDO
Riziki Masuruku	F	SG chair	BARAKA
Bwira Kanyenche	F	SG member	BARAKA
Sifa Kasiwa	F	SG member	BARAKA
Maria Machumu	F	SG member	BARAKA
Josephine Simire	F	SG chair	BUSHASHIRE
Maene Mawazo	F	SG member	BUSHASHIRE
Mastake Mutumai	F	SG member	BUSHASHIRE
Tosha Kahunga	F	SG member	BUSHASHIRE
Kahindo Tulinabo	F	SG member	BUSHASHIRE
Mangayani	F	SG member	BUUMA
MINOVA – BENEFICIARIES OF CREDITS IN CASH			
Cristina Biamana	F	SG member	AMANI
Yvette Matchozi	F	SG member	AMANI
Charlotte Masha	F	SG vice-chair	ASMA
Furaha Mushagalusa	F	SG secretary	ASMA
Claudine Muhindo	F	SG vice-secretary	ASMA
Victorine Nyansira	F	SG member	ASMA
Kabuo Mali Kidogo	F	SG member	ASMA
Charlotte Buhoro	F	SG member	ASMA
Odette Maheshe	F	SG member	ASMA
Kabuo Petronile	F	SG member	ASMA
Josephine Bahati	F	SG member	ASMA
Furaha Bagaya	F	SG member	ASMA
Rwanoga Namashande	F	SG member	ASMA
Georgette Matondekane	F	SG member	ASMA
Environ 40 autres pers.	F	SG member	ASMA
CCMV			
GOMA			
Jonadab Bwenge	M	Director	CCMV1
Camel Bashomeka	M	Credit officer	CCMV1
Masika Furahini	F	Cashier	CCMV1
GOMA – BENEFICIARIES OF CREDITS IN CASH			
Elisa Bora	F	Shopkeeper	AMANI
Djamula Amisi	F	Shopkeeper	AMANI
Mamie Bandahami	F	Shopkeeper	AMANI
Nancy Kayumb	F	Shopkeeper	TCHIPUKIZ
Nsimure Nsirhariwa	F	Shopkeeper	TCHIPUKIZ
Noëlla Nzigire	F	Shopkeeper	TCHIPUKIZ
Asifiwe Mapendo	F	Shopkeeper	TCHIPUKIZ
PACODEVI			
GOMA			
Jérémie Ntamimo	M	Coordinator	PACODEVI
Albert Luanda	M	Programme officer	PACODEVI
Fabrice Muhindo Shemitima	M	Secretary	PACODEVI
Rhétó Miancho Mafulukko	M	Credit officer	PACODEVI
Samuel Muhima	M	Credit agent	PIAMF/PACODEVI
Patrick Sobelea	M	Credit agent	PIAMF/PACODEVI

PERSON	GENDER	POSITION	ORGANISATION
GOMA – CREDIT BENEFICIARIES			
Jean de Dieu Emusekura	M	-	-
Luanda Bwira	F	-	-
CHRISTIAN AID			
Jacques Miaglia	H	DRC Country Manager	CHRISTIAN AID
Antoine Kasongo	H	DRC Programme Manager	CHRISTIAN AID
Chirha Murhambo	H	DRC Emergency Officer	CHRISTIAN AID
Oliver Cooper	H	DRC Finance and Administration Manager	CHRISTIAN AID
Todd Schafer	H	Programme Funding Officer (Programme Funding Department)	CHRISTIAN AID
Andre Nsengiyumva	H	Country Manager for Rwanda and Burundi (Regional Emergency Officer to Sept. 2009)	CHRISTIAN AID
Helen Horn	F	Humanitarian Programme Unit Manager, Africa	CHRISTIAN AID
Kate Ferguson	F	Emergency Support Officer (Humanitarian Department)	CHRISTIAN AID

Participants in the Goma meeting on evaluation results

PERSON	GENDER	POSITION	ORGANISATION
Chirha Murhambo	M	DRC Emergency Officer	CHRISTIAN AID
Mathieu Munyakazi	M	Coordinator	ADEPAE
Ananie Bateyi Wabo	M	Officer manager	ADEPAE
Byimana Mutabazi	M	Supervisor/Programme officer	ADEPAE
Marc Bwira	M	Hydraulic specialist	ADEPAE
Désiré Safari Kanyena	M	Director, Diacony and Development	CBCA
Jean-Pierre Kanyamunyu	M	Programme supervisor	CBCA
Judith Mwenge	F	Programme supervisor	CBCA
Derrick Manegabe	M	Provincial technical assistant	FFP
Stephane Mutia Mutaka	M	Programme officer	FFP
Mastola Muhindo	M	Coordinator	PIAMF
Michel Mungungu	M	Programme officer	PIAMF
Patrick Bahati M.	M	Assistant programme officer	PIAMF
Jonadab Bwenge	M	President of PIAMF board	CCMV1
Musayi Mbale	M	Credit officer	CCMV1
Albert Luanda	M	Programme officer	PACODEVI
Rhétó Miancho Mafuluko	M	Credit officer	PACODEVI

ANNEX 6

List of main documents reviewed

(Does not include documents reviewed in each partner's office)

TITLE	AUTHOR
CHRISTIAN AID DOCUMENTS	
STRATEGY AND POLICY DOCUMENTS	
Transformer l'espoir en action: une vision d'un monde sans pauvreté. Canevas stratégique 2005-2010.	CA
DRC Country Policy & Strategy Paper for 2005-2010. June 2006.	CA
Emergency Response Policies and Procedures. Alistair Dutton. November 2006.	CA
AMR AND ROLLING PLANS	
Water and sanitation for IDPs at Rubaya and Karuba in Masisi. ADEPAE . Appraisal report. 2008.	CA
Emergency assistance to IDPs in Goma and Rutshuru. Appraisal report. Draft version. 2008	CA
Assistance to abandoned children and orphans in Goma, North Kivu. Appraisal report. 2009.	CA
HIV mitigation in displacement prone zone in Masisi. Appraisal report. 2008.	CA
Goma Urban Microfinance for IDPs and host families. Appraisal report. 2009.	CA
Microfinance for IDPs and host families in Masisi. Appraisal report. 2008.	CA
Rolling Plan for Appeal Funds. December 2008.	CA
Rolling Plan for Appeal Funds. August 2009.	CA
CONTRACTS	
Contrat de financement entre CA et la CBCA. 2008.	CA
Contract of cooperation between HEKS and CHRISTIAN AID. 2009.	CA
ASSESSMENT AND MONITORING REPORTS	
Evaluation des besoins humanitaires en province du Nord Kivu. Février 2008.	CA
Visit to North Kivu and Burundi. 9-21 June 2008.	CA
Rapport trimestriel d'activités des projets financés par DEC. Décembre 2008 - Février 2009.	CA
Rapport de suivi des projets d'urgence au Nord Kivu. Janvier 2009.	CA
Rapport de suivi des projets d'urgence au Nord Kivu. Mars 2009.	CA
Rapport de suivi des projets d'urgence au Nord Kivu. Avril 2009.	CA
Rapport de l'évaluation à mi-parcours des projets d'urgence au Nord Kivu. Avril 09.	CA
Rapport de suivi des projets d'urgence au Nord Kivu. Juin 2009.	CA
Emergency Task Force Meeting – North Kivu Emergency Programme – Juillet 09.	CA
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED TO DEC	
Disaster Response Programme Plan (narrative). December 2008.	CA
Disaster Response Programme Revised Plan (narrative). June 2009	CA
Disaster Response Programme Report (narrative). July 2009.	CA
Extended Response Programme Plan. September 2009.	CA
ADEPAE DOCUMENTS	
Rapport d'évaluation de la situation humanitaire au Nord Kivu - 18-21 juin 2008.	ADEPAE
Rapport d'évaluation et d'identification des sources à aménager dans les localités de Karuba et Rubaya, territoire de Masisi – 28-30 novembre 2008.	ADEPAE
Appui à la sécurité alimentaire des familles déplacées et familles d'accueil au Nord-Kivu. Proposition de projet. 2008.	ADEPAE
Aménagement de 47 sources d'eau potable, construction de 100 latrines et éducation sur l'hygiène et l'assainissement dans les localités de Karuba et Rubaya. Proposition de projet. 2008.	ADEPAE
Manuel des procédures administratives et financières. 2006.	ADEPAE
Manuel des procédures administratives et financières. 2009.	ADEPAE
Organisation comptable au sein de l'ADEPAE. 2008.	ADEPAE
Module de formation de fontainiers locaux en techniques de maintenance des ouvrages hydrauliques . 2009.	ADEPAE
Rapport final sécurité alimentaire. 2009.	ADEPAE
Rapport final watsan pour Karuba et Rubaya. 2009	ADEPAE
Rapport financier consolidé final - 15 décembre 2008 – 08 juin 2009 -	ADEPAE
Rapport d'audit externe sur les états financiers, période de 15 décembre au 30 juin 2009, projet Water and sanitation in Karuba and Rubaya in Masisi Territory, North-kivu	Business Solutions Worldwide

TITLE	AUTHOR
CBCA DOCUMENTS	
Projet d'assistance humanitaire dans la ville de Goma et les territoires de Rutshuru et Lubero au Nord-Kivu. 2008.	CBCA
Projet d'encadrement des enfants non accompagnés et orphelins de guerre dans la ville de Goma. 2009.	CBCA
Compte-rendu de la réunion des partenaires et de CA du 27 novembre 2008	CBCA
Compte-rendu de la réunion CBCA-CA du 23 janvier 2009	CBCA
Synthèse générale des distributions réalisées. 2009.	CBCA
Rapport de traitement des enfants du centre de santé de Lubango. 2009.	CBCA
FFP DOCUMENTS	
Projet d'assistance humanitaire aux déplacées et familles d'accueil au nord Kivu : prévention de la transmission du VIH/SIDA chez les déplacés et les familles d'accueil dans les zones de retour au nord Kivu. 2008.	FFP
Rapport final de la phase I (janvier –juin 2009), projet Mitigation. Juillet 2009.	FFP
Convention de collaboration avec la zone de santé. Mars 2009.	FFP
Rapport de la formation des pairs éducateurs tenue à Mwenso. 2009.	FFP
Analyse SWOT du projet HIV/AIDS mitigation. Juillet 2009.	FFP
DOCUMENTS PIAMF	
Statuts de PIAMF. Mars 2009.	PIAMF
AUTRES DOCUMENTS	
DEC DRC Crisis Appeal. Monitoring Mission. Final Report. July 2009.	MDF