

Evaluation of the Save the Children UK Response  
to the Eruption of the Nyiragongo Volcano,  
in the Democratic Republic of Congo in January 2002

*Draft, for comment*

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## 1. Executive Summary

1.1 Against a backdrop of chronic conflict and large-scale humanitarian needs throughout eastern DRC, in January 2002 Mount Nyiragongo near Goma on the Congolese / Rwandan border erupted. Between 300,000 and 500,000 people evacuated the town, and though some remained for a short period of time at camp locations inside Rwanda, the majority quickly returned to the damaged town and set about trying to re-establish homes and restore livelihoods.

1.2 SCUK, well positioned to act through its existing programmes in both DRC and Rwanda, responded with work including child protection, health, food and non-food assistance, camp management, and livelihood support through rehabilitation activities. Total income of around £1m was secured from a variety of sources for the emergency response, with the programme implementation largely completed within a six-month period through to July 2002.

1.3 This evaluation, undertaken at the request of programme management, finds the emergency intervention to have been generally robust. Overall programme design correlated closely to the areas of major impact of the eruption on the affected population, with activities ranging from those to mitigate against further risks to physical integrity, through to support for livelihoods recovery. Of particular note are the timeliness of response and practical manifestations of a commitment to effective co-ordination within the wider institutional environment. SCUK was amongst the first organisations to respond both in Rwanda and Goma town, and on each side of the border demonstrated leadership in promoting and contributing to broadly successful collaborative efforts involving a variety of institutions.

1.4 The SCUK response can be seen as generally appropriate to pre-existing programme competencies, and includes important examples of creative advocacy work. The response was underpinned by instances of timely support from other programmes within the region, namely the Burundi programme which was able to deploy human and material resources to the affected areas, and the South Sudan programme support office in Nairobi, which contributed through its efficient procurement capability. Featuring throughout the evaluation is SCUK's post-first-phase research into household economies within Goma town, which led to the development of cash-for-work rehabilitation initiatives. While this component of the work remains to be fully evaluated by a technical team, it represents an innovative attempt to promote developmental solutions based on an enhanced understanding of household conditions.

1.5 The evaluation highlights some areas for strengthening in anticipation of future emergency responses. While there is a body of circumstantial evidence that programme activities have contributed to broader objectives, there is little evidence of the practice of systematic monitoring or the use of indicators in order to substantiate outcomes. In addition, concerns are raised with regard to financial monitoring and management, including one particular case of failure to properly communicate donor timeframes and operating formats. This is seen to contribute to an under-usage of resources, to the detriment of the affected population. Similarly, the decision to retain in storage a large quantity of relief items procured specifically for the volcano-affected population is questioned, both in terms of continuing needs on the ground and accountability towards donors.

1.6 Special credit should be given to the efforts of all those involved in the light of the generalised evacuation from Goma, which personally affected SCUK staff and their

families. The fact that first phase response operations continued successfully in spite of the displacement of staff and the loss of programme infrastructure should be recognised. These events have, however, highlighted the need for enhanced maintenance and dissemination of evacuation contingencies.

1.7 A review of pre-existing emergency preparedness planning and its relevance to the response also highlights areas for renewed efforts. The report concludes with a short discussion around the implications of future programme closures for response to sudden onset emergencies, and suggests areas for consideration within regional preparedness frameworks.

## 2. Background to this Evaluation, and Acknowledgements

2.1 SCUK programme management commissioned this internal evaluation, including the East and Central Africa regional desk at London headquarters, and those country programmes directly involved in the response to the Nyiragongo eruption. The evaluation is part of SCUK's ongoing efforts to enhance the quality of its work related to disasters and emergencies, and recognises the need to promote institutional learning through a commitment to critical review.

2.2 Terms of reference for the evaluation were developed with participation from a variety of SCUK stakeholders. Building on an initial spread of potential areas for inclusion offered by the Emergencies Adviser, the final terms of reference incorporated modifications suggested by programme staff and other advisers at central and regional level. The extensive range of issues requested for inclusion in the evaluation, including a set of internal institutional aspects, means that the depth of investigation into each specific area is inevitably limited. Nevertheless, this report attempts to paint an overview of the main characteristics of SCUK's response, its appropriateness within the operating context, and its relevance to institutional learning.

2.3 The author of this report is one of the SCUK Emergencies Advisers from the Emergencies Section at London headquarters, who visited the region during the month of July 2002 to undertake a short period of fieldwork with field staff in eastern DRC and Rwanda. In addition, the report draws on meetings and documentary submissions from stakeholders in the Burundi country programme, the South Sudan country programme support office in Nairobi, the East and Central Africa Regional Office in Nairobi, and the central office in London.

2.4 The approach to the evaluation is one of consultation and participation, and views of parties external to SCUK, such as partner organisations and beneficiary families, have been incorporated. Activities have included: – project site visits; interviews with representatives of external agencies; conversations with the local population including project participants; discussions with SCUK staff members at different locations (both individually and in teams); an informal workshop with a cross section of staff from the SCUK programme in eastern DRC; and a review of documentary information (both internal and from secondary sources).

2.5 The author would like to thank all those who have contributed with either verbal or written information. In particular the author is grateful for the co-operation, openness and hospitality displayed by staff in eastern DRC and Rwanda during the evaluation visit, as well as by advisory staff in Nairobi. A list of principle informants is included at annex (b).

2.6 In many instances the evaluation finds that a broad consensus exists amongst stakeholders regarding specific issues around the emergency response, and the work of the author has been to synthesise and record such consensus. Where a diversity of views exists, the author has attempted to present a balanced view while at the same time making judgements as to the substantive learning points. This report is therefore the work of all those who have participated in the exercise, while any errors contained within it are entirely the responsibility of the author.

### 3. General Context and Overview

#### (a) Context and Impact of the Eruption of Mount Nyiragongo

3.1 Mount Nyiragongo, six miles north of Goma on the Congolese / Rwandan border, started to discharge lava from fissures during the morning of January 17<sup>th</sup>, 2002<sup>i</sup>. According to volcanologists, this eruption was caused by tectonic spreading of the Kivu rift causing the ground to fracture and allow lava to flow from ground fissures out of the crater lake, and possibly from a deeper conduit near Goma<sup>ii</sup>. The lava split into three main flows, and by the evening of the same day one of these flows was reported to have cut the town of Goma in two, with houses and fuel storage facilities in the town reported to be in flames.

3.2 By January 18<sup>th</sup>, between 300,000 and 500,000 people were estimated as having fled Goma<sup>iii</sup>, the majority eastwards and across the border into Rwanda (Gisenyi and onwards to Ruhengeri) and others westwards or southwards within the DRC (towards Sake and Bukavu). All international humanitarian aid workers in Goma were reported as having entered Rwandan territory. Early estimates from the Red Cross, these being used initially by many of the UK based NGOs and the Disaster Emergencies Committee (DEC)<sup>iv</sup>, indicated that around 40% of the town had been destroyed. This percentage was adjusted downwards<sup>1</sup> during subsequent days as conditions allowed for better access to Goma, and for more detailed assessments by a variety of agencies.

3.3 Initial impressions that a major relief effort for displaced persons inside Rwanda would be needed were quickly superseded by a renewed focus on Goma itself, due to the spontaneous return of many of those who had initially left. This was influenced by the decision of the Rwandan authorities that assistance would only be provided to those prepared to reside in two former refugee camps close to the border. By January 23<sup>rd</sup> OCHA reported that only 15,000 people remained in these displacement camps (Nkamira and Mudende) situated in Gisenyi<sup>v</sup>. At the same time, estimates of the total number of affected people ranged from 65,000 (USAID/OFDA) to 350,000 (local authorities). Besides those in the two Gisenyi camps, displaced populations were reported in Bukavu, Sake, Ruthuru and along the north-western and southern shores of Lake Kivu<sup>vi</sup>.

3.4 Seismic movements and fears of further eruptions continued for many days after the initial lava flows. The area contains Africa's most active volcanoes, the most volatile being Nyiragongo itself and nearby Nyamuragira, which expelled significant lava flows as recently as July 2002. Little is known about Nyiragongo's eruptive history, though the previous eruption in 1977 may have caused several hundred fatalities. Most of the town of Goma, which has expanded enormously since its role as a major refugee location in the 1990s, is built on previous lava flows. Nyamuragira erupts more frequently – over 20 times in the 20<sup>th</sup> century – with lava often entering Lake Kivu. Activity is related to hydrostatic pressure conditions of the lake, and scientists indicate that the destabilisation of the lake's waters during an eruption could lead to the expulsion of lethal carbon dioxide and methane gases stored within the lake<sup>vii</sup>.

3.5 DRC has been afflicted since the late 1990s by a chronic and complex emergency, most affecting those civilian populations in the northern and eastern

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<sup>1</sup> Informants during the evaluation visit estimated at around 23% the actual percentage area of the town affected by the lava flows.

parts of the country. Conflict has been fuelled in part by attempts to gain or maintain control over natural resources, and until recently involved up to six foreign armies. The situation in DRC has been described as one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. Although recent developments within a fragile peace process have given some cause for optimism, the war in DRC has been Africa's most widespread, with perhaps as many as 2.5 million deaths since 1998 due largely to poor health and nutritional conditions<sup>viii</sup>. Of an estimated two million people still displaced, around half have no access to humanitarian relief<sup>ix</sup>.

3.6 Recent developments since the evaluation visit and prior to the completion of this report have focussed on the further withdrawal from Congolese territory of occupying forces. While most observers welcome this as a significant step forward in efforts to achieve a lasting peace, the immediate effect has been to further destabilise parts of eastern DRC, with pockets of increased conflict and displacement in the ensuing power vacuum.

## **(b) Background to the SCUK Programmes in the Goma Region**

### **Eastern DRC**

3.7 The SCUK programme in DRC has its country office in the capital Kinshasa. At the time of the eruption the Country Strategic Plan (CSP) had not yet been agreed, though the three key areas of ongoing work included social protection, health and nutrition, and food security and livelihoods<sup>x</sup>. The CSP for 2002 – 2004, revised in June of this year, includes child protection, health and food security as its three main areas. The disruptive effects of the war have meant that the eastern DRC programme experiences relative isolation from Kinshasa, compounded by difficult communications and limited practical opportunities for integration. In this sense, although part of an overall DRC programme, the work in eastern DRC has over recent years been run somewhat autonomously and with a great deal of independence. With regard to the Nyiragongo emergency response, it should be noted that after a succession of acting post holders from August 2001 onwards, the new DRC Programme Director was undertaking induction in London at the time of the eruption, before arriving in Kinshasa on January 20<sup>th</sup>. As such, the team in the Kivus inevitably developed the emergency response programme in relative isolation from the country office in the capital and the ongoing work in western DRC.

3.8 Work in the Kivus began in 1994 with a large-scale family-tracing programme for Rwandan children in the context of the infamous genocide and massive displacements<sup>xi</sup>. In 1996 this tracing programme was wound down, and in 1998/99 SCUK's social services work began looking at vulnerable Congolese children, not just Rwandan refugees. Work in this sector has focussed on community level child protection networks. Emergency health projects were initiated in the Kivus in 1996/97, with a focus on the rehabilitation of health infrastructure and nutrition work. Since then activities have included a response to cholera epidemics, supplies of medicines and institutional support to local health authorities, vaccination campaigns and support to EPI work. In the area of food security and livelihoods, work in the Kivus has been grounded in household food economy analysis, including the training of staff and partners, and the application of this methodology to orient rehabilitation and livelihood support programmes with returnee populations.

3.9 The eastern DRC programme works under difficult conditions and in often trying circumstances. Staff recruitment has historically proved difficult and issues around

stewardship in 2001 highlighted the need for additional support and capacity building in the areas of administration and logistical systems. As detailed later in this report, the fact that the SCUK office in Goma itself was destroyed by the lava flows, with the consequent loss of equipment and records, created an additional challenge to be overcome in the context of the emergency response.

## **Rwanda**

3.10 As in eastern DRC, the SCUK programme in Rwanda was born in the early 1990s in response to the Great Lakes crisis and the well-documented genocide. Since towards the end of that decade the programme has undergone a difficult transition in a fast changing environment characterised by reduced aid flows and donor engagement with Rwanda as a whole. As a consequence, the SCUK programme has experienced significant downsizing and a high turnover of personnel.

3.11 The Rwanda CSP<sup>xii</sup> for 2001 – 2005, developed at the end of 2000, cites social welfare, health, food security, education and emergency preparedness as core areas of work. Since 2001 the Rwanda programme has been identified for closure by 2005 as part of a global reduction in the number of countries where SCUK will continue to be operational. The Preliminary Transitional Plan<sup>xiii</sup> envisages the termination of project work by 2004, with one additional year for the completion of institutional exiting arrangements.

### **(c) Brief overview of the SCUK emergency response**

3.12 Given the rapid and spontaneous return to Goma of many of those initially displaced away from the town, SCUK's response to the volcano emergency has focussed primarily on work in Goma itself – but with important additional activities undertaken within Rwanda. Work in Goma has been built on existing programme components and capacities, in the areas of children's protection, health, and livelihood support and rehabilitation. In Rwanda SCUK prioritised issues of children's protection and health, building on the historical programme strengths. Initiatives included a brief but important period of camp management at a temporary site in Ruhengeri.

3.13 In Goma, SCUK was amongst the first agencies to implement food and non-food item distributions, as part of a first phase response characterised by close co-ordination amongst agencies. SCUK distributed a one-week general food ration in conjunction with the WFP to 11,500 families – a total of around 300MT of maize flour, beans, oil and CSB. In addition, these same 11,500 families received non-food items including blankets, jerry cans and soap. These non-food items were provided through a 'clearing house' system administered by UNICEF, representative of a humanitarian community wide effort to pool available resources and to facilitate consistent levels of assistance across all of the affected population in Goma. A second targeted distribution by SCUK of non-food items assisted 2,343 families, with the aforementioned items as well as plastic sheeting and cooking utensils. All of these distributions were carried out within a three-week period immediately following the eruption.

3.14 SCUK in Rwanda was likewise involved at the very earliest stage of response. Although many of those arriving in Ruhengeri quickly returned to Goma or to the camps nearer the border in Gisenyi, a small population remained at the Cyuve camp in Ruhengeri. Established within three days of the eruption, SCUK activities at



this site included the construction of school areas and facilitation of non formal education; the construction of three separate latrine blocks and the provision of shelter materials; awareness raising with youths and adults around HIV issues; support to the preparation of food with emphasis on children's requirements; and the undertaking of a leading role in overall camp management and co-ordination. Work at the camp continued for approximately one month until the facility was closed and the remaining people relocated to Goma or the Gisenyi camps nearer the border.

3.15 Building on the health component of the ongoing programme in Ruhengeri, the Rwanda team was able to provide co-ordinated support to local health authority. Activities included immunisation work, the provision of medicines, and the financing of hospital costs for displaced Congolese. Following the immediate emergency phase, SCUK provided the health authorities with storage facilities for medicines and supplies provided by other donors.

3.16 In Goma, the health programme provided WHO health kits to the local health administration; supported the establishment of a new therapeutic feeding centre in the general hospital to replace one at another location that was destroyed by the lava; supported the establishment of one supplementary feeding centre; financed ongoing operating costs (staffing, materials) at these feeding facilities; supported the establishment of a cholera ward at the general hospital; and provided cold chain support for vaccination work.

3.17 Following the recommendations of a study of household economies in Goma undertaken in February / March, SCUK terminated further distribution work and moved to livelihood support through cash-for-work infrastructure rehabilitation. This component of the programme has provided materials and remuneration for labourers involved with the following – the rehabilitation of one secondary and two primary schools; the rehabilitation of a 2.5 km stretch of road, connecting the periphery of Goma to its centre via the central market; the collection and disposal of household rubbish, in collaboration with a local NGO; and the restoration of three aqueducts in collaboration with the local water authority and the ICRC. These inputs have underwritten a total of approximately 20,000 person-days of work, at a total cost of around £90,000.

3.18 Both in Goma and Rwanda, child protection work played a major part in SCUK's response action, and probably represented the area of greatest co-ordination and co-operation between the two country programmes. In Rwanda an estimated initial caseload of around 450 unaccompanied children was quickly reduced through immediate and spontaneous reunification. Of the remaining caseload of 207 children a total of 183 were reunited with their families and at the beginning of April 2002 the remaining 24 children were transferred to Goma. With the assistance of the Division of Social Affairs and the SCUK team in Goma all but 11 of these were promptly reunited with their parents, while the others spent some time in a transit centre before eventual reunification.

3.19 In Goma, assistance to unaccompanied children during the period of emergency following the eruption was a joint action by UNICEF, ICRC, SCUK and many local NGOs. A co-ordinated structure of training for partners and activities for family reunification was led by SC UK. ICRC's mandate included the consolidation of all data related to family reunification – of 1,227 registered unaccompanied children 950 were reunified with their parents, a further 248 'spontaneous' cases of

reunification occurred, seven cases were of a special<sup>2</sup> nature, and at the time of writing a further 22 cases remain pending.

3.20 Finally, SCUK in Goma has historically supported the work of volcanic surveillance and the monitoring of seismic activity in conjunction with local authorities and the UN. While this is not an area of organisational expertise, SCUK has played an important role by acting as a conduit for donor funds and ensuring transparent administration of resources. Following the eruption, a further grant was secured for the strengthening and continuation of this work.

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<sup>2</sup> Falsely reported, deceased, one Rwandan child repatriated. ICRC figures quoted in internal SCUK documents.

## 4. Findings of the Evaluation

### (a) Appropriateness

#### Scale of the response

4.1 Some concerns have been expressed as to the overall dimensions of the combined response of the humanitarian community to the volcano eruption, when compared to ongoing levels of assistance to the prevailing conditions throughout war torn DRC<sup>xiv</sup>. Total resources estimated at between US\$20 – 30m were deployed in the volcano response, compared to only \$80 million raised for the whole country in response to the 2001 UN Consolidated Appeal (CAP)<sup>xv</sup>. Similarly, observations have been made regarding the relatively high level of media attention and resource allocations for the volcano response as compared to the ‘silent’ and ongoing crisis in Burundi. Shortly after the launch of the DEC appeal in the UK, member agencies came under criticism from certain sectors of the media for having allegedly overestimated the scale of the disaster and consequent needs.

4.2 Certainly the initial confusion and dynamic in terms of the movement of displaced people, combined with limited access to affected areas and the fact that the basic infrastructure of some of the leading agencies in Goma was destroyed, meant that some days passed before consistent and reliable information as to the real level of needs emerged. Preliminary and qualified estimates of damage by non-governmental organisations were refined as better information became available. At the same time, major media players were quickly present following the onset of the emergency, and undoubtedly helped to shape public awareness in donor countries and the scope of the overall response.

4.3 Notwithstanding this, the evident effects of the volcano eruption in Goma aggregated with already poor baseline conditions in eastern DRC clearly necessitated an urgent injection of significant resources to limit risks to in the first instance to health, and secondarily to livelihoods. While there may be substance to the argument that the humanitarian community should be doing more in its efforts to secure greater assistance to the wider, long-suffering Congolese population, the historically limited level of resources assigned to humanitarian work for DRC as a whole does not, in itself, detract from the appropriateness of the scale and scope of the volcano response. In terms of the overall efforts of the humanitarian community, and in relation to the additional risks faced by the population derived from the volcano’s destruction, a spread of opinion and evidence presented during this evaluation indicates that the scale of the combined response to the eruption may be considered as broadly appropriate.

4.4 Within the overall response, the scale of SCUK’s intervention should be considered. In line with overall population movements, needs in Rwanda were of a more transitional nature. The extent of activities undertaken there by SCUK was in accordance with this, and in line with the capacity of a small programme with modest resources, undergoing significant change processes. The SCUK team in Rwanda showed great commitment and flexibility in adapting plans and activities to a fast changing dynamic, and for continuing to support operations in Goma once the epicentre of the relief effort had returned there.

4.5 In Goma, in the face of exceptional difficulties for staff personally affected by the volcano’s eruption coupled with the loss of programme infrastructure, the efforts and

resourcefulness of the SCUK programme to mount an important response should not be understated. However, and having argued above that the overall scale of response by the humanitarian community was broadly appropriate, the evaluation raises concerns as to the final scope of SCUK's response in Goma. Some analysis of resource use is provided later in this report<sup>3</sup> – to summarise here, of an income of around £1m obtained specifically to meet the needs of the volcano-affected population, and with an apparent shortfall in required funding of a further £0.4m, by the end of July 2002 a total of only around £700,000 had been deployed. Subsequently, under spent income allocated to SCUK's work was returned to institutional donors, yet no-one would dispute that basic needs for some remain unattended, and that the livelihoods of many have not been restored to pre-volcano levels.

4.6 While this evaluation is not intended as formal financial audit, and indeed at the time of writing some final expenditures have yet to be confirmed, it would appear that the level of direct provision to the beneficiary population in Goma was in fact lower than could feasible have been achieved. Specifically the decision to discontinue distributions of household items (large quantities of which remained in storage at the time of the evaluation), coupled with a significant under spend of income from one donor, means that the 'footprint' left by the SCUK intervention could reasonably have been greater. These issues are discussed in more detail later in this report.

### **Type of response**

4.7 The types of programme interventions undertaken by SCUK in response to the volcano eruption can be considered as broadly appropriate to the needs of those affected. In terms of first phase priority actions, testimonies from affected people, technical opinions from professionals, representatives from other humanitarian agencies, local government officials, and a variety of reference documents consistently indicate that the priority areas for intervention were those of public health, food, shelter and essential non-food items, as well as children's protection including family reunification. SCUK prioritised these areas on both sides of the border, and chosen activities were consistent with the primary impacts of the disaster on the population.

4.8 In addition, and of particular note, is the household economy research undertaken by SCUK in Goma town, which should be recognised as unique within the operating theatre in respect of its efforts to bring a greater degree of analysis to programme design in the recovery phase. The findings of this work<sup>xvi</sup> are widely cited by other organisations and individuals in Goma as a major contribution to the general understanding of livelihood realities in the post eruption setting, and have influenced responses beyond those of SCUK. The loss of income opportunities due to physical destruction and disruption to economic life, and the consequent need to re-establish livelihood opportunities in an urban context, were consistently highlighted as priority concerns throughout the evaluation. SCUK's efforts to contextualise its response with a second phase livelihoods component should be recognised.

4.9 Aside from conditions on the ground, the types of response undertaken by SCUK can also be assessed as appropriate from the perspective of the organisational operating context. Responses were broadly in line with historical and contemporary areas of programme expertise, as outlined in the background to SCUK's work in the region, above.

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<sup>3</sup> See 'Use of resources', page 20 onwards.

## Determination of Needs

4.10 The needs of the affected population were determined in a variety of ways by SCUK programme staff. In Rwanda, staff members from both the Ruhengeri and Kigali offices were among the first on the ground to observe the conditions of the displaced and to accompany them. In Goma, SCUK staff lived through the additional difficulties of evacuation and displacement along with the general population, nevertheless within two to three days were re-grouped and re-engaged with co-ordinated response initiatives. Visual observation and direct interface with affected people therefore constituted a principle means of assessing need in the earliest moments.

4.11 While co-ordination *per se* is discussed below, its relevance to needs determination is highlighted here. Much of SCUK's programme design appears to have stemmed from secondary information emerging from co-ordination forums and from the exchange of information with other entities. The immediate and continued engagement by SCUK programmes on both sides of the border with ongoing co-ordination structures was key in the determination of programme activities and is consistent with good practice in ensuring a response sensitive to needs and the actions of other actors. Thus in addition to direct observation and contact with affected people, the use of secondary sources of information and attempts to triangulate such information are also in evidence.

4.12 There are cases where further work to corroborate needs would have been appropriate. For example, in Goma there was no evidence from discussions with the SCUK health team that any efforts to obtain an independent appreciation of needs was undertaken. As such, the determination of SCUK's inputs to the health effort in Goma appears to have been based entirely in response to the requests of the Central Health Bureau, rather than in any first hand reconnaissance or field work. This is not to argue that the health inputs in themselves were misplaced (indeed the combined inter-agency response in the health sector appears to have been effective in preventing a major public health emergency), rather to highlight the need for rigour in making efforts to independently establish needs.

4.13 For the first phase activities undertaken in both Rwanda and Goma there is little internal documentation to evidence the use of structured, sector specific assessments. Amongst staff from both country programmes there appears to be limited knowledge of, and exposure to, the use of recognised assessment tools, such as those developed by the Sphere Project or produced by other established authorities. SCUK's overall needs evaluation and programme plans were first documented in the general intervention proposal elaborated by January 25<sup>th</sup>, eight days after the first eruptions<sup>xvii</sup>, however this evaluation failed to uncover any supporting documentation giving details of specific pieces of field based needs assessment work using structured tools or formats. Nevertheless, and as outlined elsewhere, there is a body of evidence that most actions undertaken were broadly consistent with conditions on the ground.

4.14 Finally, the household economy assessment underpinning SCUK's second phase initiatives in Goma has been highlighted earlier, and merits further mention here as a good example of an in depth and participatory determination of needs on which subsequent actions were based.

4.15 To summarise, from the types of response activities undertaken, SCUK's initial determination of needs is seen as having been largely effective in terms of appropriate sectoral responses. Quantitative estimations were progressively refined during the subsequent implementation period in response to evolving conditions on the ground, including emerging responses from other agencies. In some cases further work in first hand corroboration of needs could have been appropriate, while the rigour and transparency of needs determination could be enhanced by a greater level of documentation and the use of structured tools.

#### **Participation of affected population**

4.16 SCUK's emergency response includes several examples of practical commitment to the ideal of beneficiary consultation. The work in Cyuve camp in Ruhengeri involved efforts to promote and facilitate mechanisms for beneficiary representation in the determination of assistance. Committees were established, and indeed were re-elected at an early stage to enhance the level of genuine representation. Food preparation in communal kitchens and the distribution of food aid involved groups of displaced persons, in an attempt to make such assistance as appropriate as possible in terms of customs and practices.

4.17 Also in Cyuve camp, SCUK made special efforts to involve mothers from the camp population in decisions regarding activities, while children were consulted regarding the provision of education and recreation, and protection needs. The delivery of informal education to both unaccompanied children and those with their families was facilitated through the recruitment of Congolese teachers from within the displaced population. As well as adult teachers, SCUK worked with a core group of adolescents who were able to replicate awareness raising around issues of protection and HIV.

4.18 In Goma, the first phase food and non-food item distributions were planned with little direct interface with those affected. The determination of items to be distributed was through sector working groups involving operational agencies and local authorities, and was contingent upon the actual and projected availability of supplies. It is important to recognise the practical limits to consultation in the immediate response to rapid onset emergencies where there is a premium attached to decisive action to protect the physical integrity of those affected. However, the implementation of these distributions did involve a certain degree of community participation – relief commissions were established throughout the town involving women, church groups and the traditional '*chef*' structures for the operational aspects of these distributions.

4.19 SCUK's household economy study undertaken after the immediate distributions, is another example of participatory research to arrive at a detailed understanding of people's conditions and views as to appropriate ways forward. In the context of the volcano response, this research is felt to be the most sophisticated effort by any organisation to gain a deeper insight into family livelihoods, and to tailor programme interventions accordingly. The results have influenced not only the second phase activities of the SCUK programme, but the interventions of other agencies as well.

4.20 To summarise, the different components of the response in both Goma and Rwanda exhibit varying degrees of beneficiary participation. This is influenced, on the one hand by the overall nature and characteristics of civil society (see further discussion below), and on the other hand by practical expediencies and constraints.

Thus, for example, the planning and implementation of immediate food distributions prioritised timeliness and survival over consultation, while educational activities in camp settings and second phase assessments featured greater levels of public involvement. An understanding of SCUK's commitment to participation was evidenced in many discussions with staff throughout the evaluation, while at the same time it is important to recognise that the facilitation of more-than-tokenistic participatory techniques is a skill area requiring specific training and capacity building. Finally, while monitoring and evaluation initiatives are critiqued below, it is pertinent to note here that these can be important areas in which promote authentic participation, and there is opportunity to further develop staff capacity.

## **Timeliness**

4.21 The timeliness of the SCUK response is worthy of particular merit. Issues of internal co-ordination are considered below, nevertheless it is pertinent to mention here the efforts not only of the teams on the ground in Rwanda and eastern DRC, but also the rapid engagement of the Burundi programme, the South Sudan programme, and advisers based in Nairobi and London. Some informants to the evaluation believe this to have been one of the 'best' recent SCUK responses in terms of co-ordinated, immediate engagement with events on the ground.

4.22 Several factors combined to facilitate this timeliness. In Rwanda, the SCUK team in Ruhengeri was uniquely positioned to engage with the arrival of the displaced, being one of small number of international agencies with ongoing work in the area, having established linkages to local government structures, with some logistical and communications capability, and with a modest amount of supplies and equipment in storage for instant deployment. Proactive engagement at the level of national authorities and co-ordination structures by the Programme Director and the Kigali team ensured the proper positioning of work in Ruhengeri and Gisenyi within the dynamics of the institutional environment. An small pre-existing inventory of non-food items in Ruhengeri facilitated immediate engagement of the programme there.

4.23 The historical experience of the Rwanda team with issues of separation and child protection, and the relevance of these skills in terms of the rapid movements of people displaced by the volcano eruption was crucial. As was the creativity and dynamism of the team in other areas such as the preparation of food (it took four days for the first WFP food rations to be delivered) and the establishment of minimum facilities at the temporary camp in Cyuve. An important factor related to timeliness in Rwanda was success in contacting and recruiting ex SCUK staff members with relevant experience and an understanding of organisational values and approaches.

4.24 Likewise in Goma the SCUK team was well positioned for timely engagement based on its long term credibility, its solid knowledge of the operating environment and established links to local authorities and other agencies. These factors were sufficient to overcome the major obstacles created by the loss of the Goma office and many of its assets, and the fact that both international and national staff (and their families) were among those initially displaced from the town. Within three days of the eruption the team were fully engaged with co-ordination structures being established, and within one week the first round of distributions were underway.

4.25 The South Sudan programme support team in Nairobi demonstrated the value of a serious in-region procurement and logistics capacity. This office has historically served several programmes within SCUK's East and Central Africa and

Southern Africa regions, and represents something of a model to which other regions within SCUK's global portfolio might aspire to. Following the eruption on Thursday 17<sup>th</sup> January a first request for supplies was received by the Nairobi office on Saturday 19<sup>th</sup>, and despite difficulties in formalising arrangements over the weekend the first of three chartered aircraft departed for Kigali on Monday 21<sup>st</sup>, with a further flights on the following two days. The combination of, on the one hand extensive knowledge and networks in the procurement world, and on the other hand a flexible approach to potential bureaucratic constraints, proved highly effective.

4.26 The SCUK programme in Burundi also demonstrated the flexibility and capacity to quickly mobilise resources to support response efforts. Within 5 days additional communications and transport capacity had been positioned in Goma, adding to SC UK's overall ability to respond in a timely manner even in the light of significant infrastructure losses due to the eruption.

4.27 Internal documents reveal timely engagement at London headquarters. A Red Alert meeting bringing together relevant departments took place on Friday 18<sup>th</sup> January, the day following the eruption, and at the same time an amount of £100,000 from the Emergency Response Reserve was approved by senior management. Due to unusually favourable circumstances the Emergencies Section was able to deploy not one but two Emergencies Advisers to the field, this decision being taken in conjunction with programme management on January 19<sup>th</sup>, and the two staff members departing the UK on January 20<sup>th</sup>. These Advisers were able to support, amongst others, the ongoing assessment and development of the response proposal, as well as the practicalities of the first phase distributions and the handling of media work.

4.28 Principle constraints to timely response in Goma were clearly the loss of programme infrastructure and the initial fragmentation of SCUK personnel in DRC, though as described here these constraints were largely overcome through improvisation, determination and co-ordinated support. In addition the Rwanda programme management reflected on a degree of initial hesitancy due to uncertainty regarding the likelihood of obtaining donor funds, perhaps due to limited experience with rapid onset emergency situations. This appears to have delayed by around one day the initial deployment of protection staff to accompany the displaced.

4.29 Nevertheless, and in summary, the SCUK response was certainly timely – the programmes in both Rwanda and eastern DRC were major players from the outset and able to begin to deliver assistance to the affected population within an impressively quick timeframe. The lessons here are nothing new – quality of performance will generally be enhanced in emergencies where operations are built on ongoing programme work with a sound understanding of the local context and adequate pre-positioning within the institutional environment. Basic logistical capacity and prior knowledge of procurement procedures and transportation chains is a prerequisite to effective and timely response.

## **Reference to standards**

4.30 The evaluation was asked to look at the use of three specific instruments, namely the Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards for Disaster Response, the Interagency Guiding Principles on Unaccompanied and Separated Children (draft), and the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief. The report of the DEC monitoring



visit<sup>xviii</sup> gives a useful overview related to these issues from a humanitarian community wide perspective – this evaluation focuses on issues internal to SCUK.

4.31 Within the SCUK response there are some examples of awareness regarding the minimum standards set out in the Sphere Project, though meeting such standards in practical terms was not always possible. Staff reported that Sphere standards were referred to in the organisation and planning of the temporary camp at Cyuve, specifically in relation to shelter areas and the distribution of these, and the siting of latrines. While standards could not be met from the outset due to the limited availability of material resources, it is pertinent to note that staff from SCUK and others agencies involved in the camp management were at least aware of the existence of such standards, and the relevance of their consideration in relation to planning and implementation. In fact, fast moving events meant that this camp was short lived and quickly disbanded, pre-empting further sustained efforts to ensure the application of standards.

4.32 Examples from Goma of awareness in relation to Sphere standards include the planning of material and human resource inputs for support to therapeutic and supplementary feeding centres, including the overall design and size of newly erected facilities. Following the household economy research, the livelihoods team recommended a shelter module compliant with standards regarding area in relation to family size. Issues around Sphere standards continue to come to the fore in the advocacy work of agencies around the planning of resettlement facilities for those left homeless by the eruption, although SCUK does not plan to become directly involved in the implementation of infrastructure projects.

4.33 At the same time, and in spite of the examples cited above, the evaluation revealed a number of concerns around quality issues and only limited awareness of Sphere standards across the SCUK staff as a whole. In Goma, interviews with beneficiary households from the first phase non-food item distributions indicated a problems with the quality and durability of items such as blankets and jerry cans<sup>xix</sup>. As explained above, these items although distributed by SCUK were in fact procured by other organisations – nevertheless it is of some concern that the co-ordinated interagency response appears to have involved items of dubious quality. As another example, a brief visit to the cholera ward supported by SCUK at the Goma General Hospital raised issues about the rigour with which basic hygiene contingencies were in place in line with recognised standards of good practice.

4.34 Conversations with both individual staff members and group discussions revealed varying levels of formal exposure to the Red Cross Code of Conduct, and consequently a limited capacity to articulate its core components and its relevance to the emergency response programme. Nevertheless many of the fundamentals are evident in SCUK's work. Timely and rigorous engagement under extremely trying circumstances at the onset of the disaster are indicative of a firm commitment to the humanitarian imperative, and efforts to involve the affected population have been touched on above, in line with an understanding of participatory approaches. While working closely with local authorities the programmes have, for the most part, been robust in their objectivity and independence when planning activities, for example in resisting, along with other agencies, efforts of the authorities to make political mileage from the initial food and non-food distributions. The focus on longer-term livelihood issues endeavours to address issues of future vulnerabilities, and demonstrates the desire to exploit developmental opportunities based on solid community level analysis.

4.35 Amongst SCUK staff consulted, there was almost universal ignorance of the draft Interagency Guiding Principles on Unaccompanied and Separated Children. Only one senior and experienced member of the SCUK protection team in Rwanda was able to indicate awareness of these guidelines, with the observation that translation from English is essential if local dissemination is to be achieved. Local representatives of other agencies involved in this initiative appeared equally unaware of recent work on these guidelines by their colleagues at corporate level. Nevertheless, this should not necessarily detract from the overall response to unaccompanied and separated children, which appears to have been largely effective and adequately co-ordinated.

4.36 In summary, regarding all of these reference materials and standards, there is an evident need to promote more comprehensive awareness and technical knowledge amongst SCUK staff, through training and dissemination activities. Public commitment to standards and other manifestations of best practice at corporate level should be accompanied by structured efforts to build capacity amongst staff to meet such commitments at field level. However, in the case of the volcano response the evaluation did not reveal any gross or persistent examples of inappropriate or poor practice.

## **(b) Efficiency and Impact**

### **Determination of Objectives**

4.37 Following the eruption, objectives were established through an initial period of needs assessment, as briefly described above. This mainly involved first hand field observation of conditions on the ground, engagement with affected populations, and participation in emerging inter-institutional co-ordination arrangements. The initial design of the response links an analysis of needs with a considered sense of SCUK's sector specific expertise and capacity. The generic response proposal completed on January 25<sup>th</sup> lays out specific objectives in the areas of child protection, livelihood support, food aid and food security, health, rehabilitation, and the re-establishment of ongoing child soldier demobilisation work<sup>xx</sup>.

4.38 It can be observed that most of these objectives are in fact couched in the language of activities. Thus "undertake measles vaccinations" and "supply basic drugs to the health system" (both activities) as opposed to objectives around the prevention of epidemics or other derived outputs in terms of the impact on people's health. The implications of this are raised in the discussion of monitoring and evaluation and impact assessment immediately below.

4.39 Actual implementation has broadly followed the activities outlined in this initial plan, and the initial analysis holds up as being robust in the sense of being viable within the operating context and in generally accordance programme capacity.

### **Indicators, monitoring and evaluation**

4.40 There is little evidence of the use of indicators for monitoring of the various programme components, or for validating the final impact of activities undertaken. The rhythm of operations appears to have resulted in a situation in which, at the time of the evaluation visit coinciding with the winding down of emergency response activities, monitoring and evaluation systems underpinned by an articulation of indicators had not been put in place in any systematic way.

4.41 This situation of a generalised lack of indicators seems to have been in part aggravated by a lack of insistence by donors on such information. A review of approved funding proposals and donor contracts reveals, on the whole, an absence of logical frameworks or similar tools for steering activities and gauging outcomes. As such, the narrative of the generic response proposal first developed at the end of January appears to have remained as the principal working document throughout the subsequent period of implementation.

4.42 Several informants to the evaluation from the SC UK teams were open in recognising that programme skills in monitoring and evaluation remain relatively weak, and as such this is an important area for further capacity building. While there is a general sense of having responded 'well' to this emergency, there is little in the way of systematic and empirical evidence to demonstrate project outcomes and impact. (It should be noted that the livelihood team in Goma was planning a more in depth evaluation of the work undertaken in this sector). The timeliness of urgently required humanitarian activities should certainly not be stymied by the prior need to elaborate complicated sets of indicators. However, where feasible it can constitute good practice to subsequently revisit the originally stated, hastily developed objectives, in order to refine these and generate appropriate indicators and monitoring systems while projects are still in course.

#### **Progress towards achievement of goals**

4.43 As noted, many of the original objectives are in themselves activities, and these were not subsequently developed into structured frameworks for the monitoring of envisaged outcomes. At the time of the evaluation very few documents were available regarding programme outcomes. Further, the potential within this evaluation for an independent and in-depth assessment of impact of a wide range of activities was limited. However, there is evidence that activities in both Rwanda and Goma were generally implemented as intended within the overall emergency response programme, and that these activities may in some cases have contributed to higher order outcomes, even if the latter were not clearly articulated. The following paragraphs are written in relation to the objectives as expressed in the original proposal:

4.44 In the area of child protection, achievements towards the objective of reunifying children separated from their parents during population movements can be seen as broadly successful. Internal SCUK and ICRC data confirm only a small handful of cases outstanding at the time of the evaluation, from an initial caseload of around 1,700 on both sides of the border. At the same time, there is mixed evidence as to the efficiency of the programme in the establishment of proper documentation processes for reunification work – while the overall caseload has largely been dealt with there is reason to believe that some of this work could have better expedited with greater preparation and depth of expertise regarding documentation and information management. SCUK undoubtedly played a practical role in the monitoring of circumstances of children in camps and transit centres (for example ensuring separated washing areas for boys and girls, lobbying for additional security at night times for single women with children), and contributed to a heightened awareness of children's issues in the combined system-wide response.

4.45 With livelihood support, SCUK broadly achieved stated objectives in the distribution of shelter and household items, and was instrumental in contributing to a co-ordinated and consistent interagency effort. While the objective to distribute

vegetable seeds to households was dropped, the general evolution of the livelihood support component in the aftermath of the household economy research undertaken is mentioned elsewhere, and is to be subject to a separate impact evaluation. The initially stated objective for rehabilitation work in Goma (material support for house construction) was superseded by support to school and water system repair, as well as refuse collection and road reconditioning, including cash-for-work components consistent with the livelihood support approach emerging from the household economy research.

4.46 Objectives under the classification of 'food aid and food security' were partially achieved. The first phase distribution to 10,000 families was exceeded in practice (11,500 families), though the distribution of food to 'vulnerable populations in the medium term' was dropped in favour of other income generating initiatives linked to rehabilitation work. The household economy research was completed and the information used to contribute to the wider food targeting strategies of the WFP and others.

4.47 In the health sector the combined efforts of agencies and local authorities were successful in mitigating against the onset of a major public health crisis in Goma. This is correctly seen as a major success of the community-wide response. While it is difficult to ascertain from the information available the precise impact of SCUK's inputs, they may reasonably be considered as having contributed in some degree to the successful containment of major threats to public health. Other health objectives for SCUK in Goma were largely activity based and related to the provision of supplies, materials and other resources to the local health authority. Despite some cases of unforeseen delays, these activities were on the whole achieved as planned, enabling the establishment of feeding facilities and a cholera treatment ward at the general hospital, and supporting the cold chain for vaccination work, amongst others. In Rwanda SCUK similarly supported the Ruhengeri provincial health authorities with financial and material inputs to facilitate expanded preventive activities such as immunisation campaigns, and some curative services to the transient population. SCUK also supported public health measures within its overall responsibility for the management of the temporary Cyuve camp, for example through the provision of latrine blocks.

4.48 With respect to objectives in the area of education, the Rwanda programme, in conjunction with UNICEF, carried out important activities with children and adults in the temporary transit centre at Cyuve and later at the border camp in N'kamira. These included discussions and awareness raising on HIV prevention and reproductive health issues, particularly for groups of adolescents. In Goma initial estimates for the distribution of 'back to school' packs for children were surpassed, and education infrastructure was repaired within the rehabilitation work (see below).

4.49 Prior to the volcano eruption SCUK was involved in child soldier demobilisation and reintegration work in Goma town, and the objective to reconstruct a transit centre destroyed by lava flows was achieved by March. This centre, operated by the Division of Social Affairs, furthermore was also able to support reunification efforts for children separated from families at the time of the eruptions and later returning to Goma from Rwanda.

4.50 To conclude, most of the stipulated objectives of the response programmes in both Rwanda and Goma were met. In some cases objectives were modified as an acceptable consequence of the fine tuning of the intervention, for example in the area of livelihood support. Many stated objectives were activity based, and in some cases

intended impact was neither documented nor monitored. However, there is circumstantial evidence that many activities contributed towards a positive impact within the affected population.

## Use of resources

4.51 It is beyond the scope of this evaluation to undertake a formal cost-benefit evaluation. Nevertheless, some simple analysis of the funds obtained for the emergency response, and the subsequent deployment of these funds, may be useful. Following an initial period of assessment, planning and liaison with donors, internal financial management documents show that the field programmes worked from early in February 2002 onwards with a combined budget requirement of close to £1.5m. Of this close to £1m was actually obtained from a variety of donor sources for work in both Goma and Rwanda. Figure 1 summarises the sources and extent of income obtained for the emergency response.




Figure 1: Income distribution for emergency response, by source

4.52 At the time of the evaluation visit the implementation period for these activities was ending – the implementation periods for all grants with the exception of the on-going volcano surveillance work ended by mid July, at the latest. Final reports to most donors have subsequently been submitted. Programme expenditure in Rwanda closely matched income, with a negligible under-spend as of July considered as reasonable within typical programming variances. However, in Goma approximately £82,000 remained unspent from the DEC grant (which would later be returned to the DEC pool), and non-food items purchased to the value of approximately £92,000 (including freight and handling costs) remained in warehouses. Further, an amount of approximately £127,000 had been spent on office re-establishment costs and capital items (principally vehicles).

4.53 Figure 2 gives an approximate breakdown in summary form of the use of income<sup>xxi</sup>.




Figure 2: Summarised use of income obtained for emergency response

4.54 Several factors combined to create this result. Firstly, there was a legitimate need to re-establish basic programme infrastructure in Goma following losses during the eruption. Secondly, while the programme in Goma supported initial food and non-food item distributions as part of a co-ordinated effort by all agencies, the actual non-food items distributed were not those that had been procured by SCUK. In spite of an exceptional effort in terms of timely procurement and deployment to the affected area, by the time the Goma programme had possession of these items a decision was then made to discontinue distributions. Thirdly, in relation to DEC funding, programme management in the field seemed unaware of the framework for time-bound expenditure and the requirement to return unspent allocations at the end of the stipulated implementation period. It was assumed that a simple request for a non-cost extension would be sufficient, while in reality the DEC format is different. And fourthly, as described above, overall budget-monitoring mechanisms appear to have been insufficiently robust to allow for appropriate financial management decisions to have been made. Specifically, the team in Goma remained unclear for a prolonged period about the real costs incurred in Nairobi for the procurement of relief items.

4.55 The undistributed relief items were purchased with funds from donors, and as such are reflected as expenditures in ledgers at the time of the evaluation, and subsequently in reports to donors. However, such expenditure could legitimately be considered as 'non-implemented'. For as long as these relief items remain warehoused, they have had no positive impact on the lives of those affected by the volcano emergency. Part of the rationale of the team is that prevailing conditions in the Kivus are worse than those in Goma itself, and that these items may be more usefully deployed in the future as part of regular programme work. While the logic

behind this view is understandable, these items were funded and procured for the benefit of the volcano affected population, and to report the purchase of the items in relation to the volcano response, while they remain in storage for alternative future use raises questions of transparency.

4.56 The under-spend of DEC funds is of particular concern, given the fact that funds claimed by SCUK from this interagency initiative are effectively deprived from other participating agencies. DEC fundraising and subsequent allocations to implementing agencies are premised on the fact that participating agencies are in conditions to respond to the immediate needs of the affected population, and that within established parameters agencies should request funds that can reasonably be deployed within the stipulated timeframe. It should be noted that at least one other member agency requested an amount for its Goma response significantly below its theoretical entitlement. To return money at the end of the implementation period is to have deprived the affected population of assistance or alternative interventions that could otherwise have been delivered by sister agencies.

4.57 To summarise, there is evidence that the programme work in Goma could reasonably have provided a greater level of inputs to the affected population, within given levels of capacity. Factors creating this situation include poor communications regarding donor frameworks, incomplete budget monitoring systems, and programmatic decisions to intentionally limit the level of assistance to the volcano affected population in order to preserve inventories for future use across eastern DRC.

#### **Stewardship<sup>4</sup>**

4.58 This evaluation does not constitute a financial audit – the author does not intend to give any opinion as to the level of good stewardship, or alternatively misappropriation of resources. Nevertheless, the field visit to Goma coincided with a visit by one of SCUK's Internal Auditors, in whose opinion the systems put in place upon re-establishing the office following the loss of the previous infrastructure are seen as generally robust, including the application of solid procurement protocols. The absence of any official fiscal regime in eastern DRC (e.g. taxation of businesses, use of formal receipts) makes verification of expenses sometimes difficult, but internal systems were in place to ensure the reasonable nature of programme expenditures. There may be a need to tighten partner agreements, to introduce more rigorous mechanisms to verify the integrity of expenditures by such organisations. No similar opinions were offered or are included here in relation to the Rwanda programme.

### **(c) Coverage**

#### **Geographical coverage**

4.59 The extent of physical destruction from lava flows, the pattern of displacement following the eruptions, and the location and coverage of SCUK's existing programmes both in Rwanda and Goma combined fortuitously to enable comprehensive engagement from a geographical perspective. In Rwanda SCUK infrastructure in Ruhengeri was well placed to respond immediately to the needs of

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<sup>4</sup> These comments are included here for the record only, and do not constitute a technical opinion by the author.

people arriving there, in addition to subsequent activities in the border camps of N'kamira and Mudende. Similarly in Goma, despite the added complication of having to re-establish office facilities, SCUK had significant human and material infrastructure to engage fully within the perimeters of the damaged town. On both sides of the border SCUK benefited from the institutional capital of established linkages with other organisations and communities in order to quickly facilitate a credible emergency response.

4.60 In both Rwanda and Goma there is evidence of a high degree of inter-institutional co-ordination, albeit with some inevitable tensions, the result being a broadly equitable interagency first phase response across the affected population. While this may be more questionable from a medium term perspective in view of the uncertain future of those left homeless and awaiting clarity around resettlement plans, certainly in the immediate emergency phase there seems to have been a concerted effort to provide a consistent level of support and comprehensive coverage. Thus in Goma SCUK's initial food and non-food item distributions formed part of a larger, co-ordinated effort in which the affected parts of the town were all contemplated by the combined group of intervening actors. Similarly in Ruhengeri, SCUK worked with other reputable agencies in attempting to verify population figures and co-ordinate provision to all geographical locations where people gathered.

#### **Beneficiary identification, targeting**

4.61 Both in Rwanda and Goma SCUK's efforts in the area of family reunification were by definition targeted at involuntarily separated or unaccompanied children. The processes put in place in conjunction with other agencies to identify children and verify their circumstances ensured that provision and services were on the whole directed towards genuine cases. Services provided by the SCUK programme in Ruhengeri to the Cyuve camp population were intrinsically targeted at those people resident in the camp, and efforts were made with other agencies to ensure consistent identification and quantification of these, through repeated and comparative registrations.

4.62 On both sides of the border SCUK's health inputs were primarily in the form of institutional support to local health authorities, including in some cases clearly defined target groups such as malnourished children. Of note in Goma is the decision made by local health authorities to waive fees for health service users immediately after the eruption, in order to maximise inclusion and facilitate the provision of services to as much of the population as possible.

4.63 Issues of targeting are potentially of most concern with regard to the distribution of food and non-food items in Goma town. For the first round of blanket food and non-food distributions SCUK worked in close co-ordination with authorities and community structures in an effort to ensure comprehensive and equitable coverage. Registration for entitlement involved the '*chef de quartier*', '*chef de cellule*' and '*chef de avenue*', as well as relief commissions established with the particular involvement of women and church groups. Allocation numbers were given out to those identified as beneficiaries, and SCUK was able to distribute commodities to those people with numbers, while cross-referencing against lists.

4.64 During interviews with residents there were some complaints that not all households had been present at the time of registrations and were thus excluded from distributions, also that the standard-distribution-per-household approach is insensitive to family size and household composition. While there is some substance



to both of these claims, these initial distributions undertaken by SCUK can be considered as being well organised and timely, given the difficulties inherent with targeting where the population is moving fast, and the urgency of the situation.

4.65 Several international agencies have previously raised concerns about the second phase of targeted distributions, in relation to ongoing problems with the elaboration of beneficiary lists in the context of rapid population movements and the potential for manipulation by certain stakeholders<sup>xxii</sup>. Residents interviewed during the evaluation verified this situation. In fact SCUK completed just one targeted distribution of non-food items within its two allocated '*quartieres*' to a total of around 2,000 families with the overriding targeting criteria being that of having lost their houses.

4.66 SCUK's decision to halt distributions at this stage and store remaining relief items procured for the emergency has been described above, and as such the programme did not become involved in the nuances of targeting particular beneficiaries for further relief items within Goma town. In broad brush terms, and as argued elsewhere, this decision can be questioned given the prevailing level of needs and the fact that many Goma residents were, at the time of the evaluation, still continuing to struggle to re-establish dignified minimum living conditions.

4.67 The cash for work initiatives underwritten by SCUK in Goma as part of its livelihood support strategy (infrastructure rehabilitation, refuse collection etc.) have attempted to target particular groups such as women with HIV and widows. The rigour to which this was achieved and its appropriateness to the operating context will be examined in the future in depth evaluation of this particular component.

## (d) Sustainability

### Developmental approaches and capacity building

4.68 An reoccurring topic in both Rwanda and Goma during the evaluation visit, and reflective of debates highlighted in other reports, is the extent to which international agencies are committed in practice to working alongside local entities and strengthening the capacity of these. Stakeholders in Ruhengeri cited only two local NGOs as being involved in the emergency response, and informants from international agencies were strongly critical of local entities in general. Meanwhile in Goma, amongst a proliferation of international agencies there is certain sense of pessimistic inevitability regarding the constraints to successful working partnerships with local entities.

4.69 This situation should be placed in its recent historical and contemporary context of extreme levels of communal violence, corrupt and /or authoritarian regimes, lawlessness, the perceived collective failure of the international community to address the horrors of the previous decade, chronic poverty, and a largely disempowered and weak 'civil society'. International agencies are quick to cite past failures in terms of partnership with local entities. One result of all this appears to be a general level of mistrust amongst international entities towards local organisations, underpinned by serious concerns regarding technical expertise, transparency and accountability.

4.70 In terms of partnerships with local organisations, notable within SCUK's emergency response were health sector inputs, which in both Rwanda and Goma

contemplated support to activities undertaken by the local health authorities, as well as child protection and demobilisation work in Goma, which involved local NGO CAJED and the Division of Social Affairs. In terms of local structures, of particular note as described above is the involvement of 'chefs' and relief commissions in the distribution of humanitarian assistance in Goma. The livelihood support work in Goma attempts to incorporate a developmental perspective in the recovery phase via detailed understanding of household subsistence strategies and economic opportunities, and also involves partnerships with entities such as the local water authority.

4.71 Constraints to capacity building during the volcano response include the short timeframe, particularly in Rwanda where an initial large influx of people quickly downsized to a much smaller population, and where work in the camps supported by SCUK effectively terminated within a matter of weeks. While the response period has been longer in Goma, it cannot be overemphasised that the success of the crucial first phase activities derived from decisive and direct action by international agencies to secure lives and mitigate against major health problems. It is, anyway, questionable how much genuine capacity building can be achieved during a short operation such as a two or three-week distribution, and the priority must clearly lie with meeting the humanitarian imperative while preserving accountability through effective and transparent management of resources.

4.72 In summary, although much of the work has been through direct implementation or in conjunction with other international agencies, the SCUK emergency response includes some examples of work involving local partners. At the same time, expectations in relation to local capacity building need to be managed realistically and placed within the operating context of a rapid onset emergency in an already fragile and difficult working environment in which partnerships must be built up slowly over time. Rather than attempting to thrust untried and relatively inexperienced local partners into the stressful operating theatre of a major crisis under the banner of 'capacity building', a more productive strategy might be to incorporate credible partners into on going emergency preparedness planning, and ongoing work in less intensive moments. This could include training and staff development, particularly around issues of best practice and humanitarian principles, such that operational collaborations during periods of emergency may be more likely to succeed. This in turn requires the allocation of resources, which should be of interest particularly to those donors looking for a strong developmental and capacity building component during the emergency response phase.

## (e) Coherence

### **Inter-institutional co-ordination**

4.73 On both the Rwandan and Congolese sides of the border, the level of effective co-ordination of the emergency response deserves particular mention. While informants to the evaluation cited occasional incidents of confusion and friction amongst operational entities, these can be judged as typical occurrences within the normal dynamics of a response to a highly publicised rapid onset emergency, and do not detract from a forceful impression of a genuinely co-ordinated effort. The humanitarian community as a whole appears to have exhibited a remarkable degree of co-operation in collating information and forming a consensus as to appropriate immediate actions. SCUK was at the heart of such co-ordination, both in Rwanda and Goma.

4.74 Co-ordination in Ruhengeri began on the evening of January 17<sup>th</sup>, with a first meeting called by another international agency and attended by SCUK and others, including national authorities. A provincial co-ordination committee involving agencies and provincial level ministries was established. The assignation of sector specific lead agencies followed as early as the evening of the following day, including SCUK for the management of the temporary camp at Cyuve, and for the health response in conjunction with the Ruhengeri hospital. Numerous meetings of the co-ordination committee ensued, sometimes several in one day, in order to respond to the dynamics of a fast moving situation.

4.75 Following the short initial period of prioritisation around Ruhengeri and Gisenyi in Rwanda, the focus quickly reverted back to Goma following the spontaneous return of the majority of the displaced. This was in the face of a certain level of opposition from Rwandan authorities, wishing to centralise the co-ordination on in Gisenyi and consequently channel funds through Kigali. Here the one-tier and decentralised approach of the UNICEF representative in Goma – holding the UN's Humanitarian Co-ordinator mandate – seems to have been particularly welcomed and helpful in overcoming initial ambiguities around UN co-ordination (i.e. the simultaneous presence of MONUC, OCHA and the Humanitarian Co-ordinator). Sector specific working groups were quickly established, with SCUK leading on children's issues and participating in other areas. Characteristic of strong interagency co-ordination was the effort to ensure comprehensive coverage and equity of provision during first phase food and non-food item distributions. For the latter, UNICEF acted as a reference point for the pooling and division of goods amongst operational agencies.

4.76 A sometimes-competitive institutional landscape is part and parcel of the emergency response environment around the world, and dealing with these issues is the bread and butter of programme management. In relation to the volcano response, and notwithstanding examples of good co-ordination outlined above, the evaluation inevitably raised some examples of inter-institutional friction, most notably in the area of tracing and child protection work where mandates may be perceived as overlapping, and an early division of roles and responsibilities is desirable. However, and in the light of a relatively successful tracing effort as described above, these difficulties can be considered as within the normal day to day steering of emergency response work.

4.77 In conclusion, numerous examples of SCUK's commitment to transparent co-ordination were identified during this evaluation. Documentary evidence reveals SCUK participation in key forums at all stages, and appropriate notification to other entities as to programme plans was extended. External informants emphasised SCUK's positive contribution at co-ordination meetings and working groups, with timely provision of information considered as reliable and credible by other organisations. The co-ordinated first phase distributions in Goma are notable in that a success was made of ensuring consistent levels of assistance across the town, regardless of the actual distributing agency. In the areas of health, tracing, and rehabilitation, agencies consulted generally praised SCUKs contribution to open and frank information sharing and co-operation.

### **Advocacy and influencing**

4.78 The evaluation produced several examples of low key, day-to-day influencing by the SCUK teams in Rwanda and Goma as part of the ongoing development of the

humanitarian community's response. For example, in Ruhengeri the SCUK team played an important role in moving children's issues up the agenda of institutional actors, particularly regarding educational and protection needs in the temporary Cyuve camp. Similarly in Goma SCUK has played a role along with other agencies in drawing to the attention of authorities important issues in relation to long-term plans for the resettlement of homeless families.

4.79 Three specific advocacy initiatives merit more detailed consideration. Firstly, and as mentioned at the beginning of this report, the backdrop to the volcano emergency is one of desperate conditions throughout eastern DRC with disproportionately low levels of humanitarian assistance and donor commitment. While some believe optimistically that recent developments within the peace process may lead to a more positive overall outlook, it is likely that any improvement in the basic conditions of an impoverished and long suffering population will be slow in coming. Several informants to the evaluation considered that more could be done in terms of ongoing advocacy work around the DRC crisis, specifically for SCUK this could mean building on last year's "No End in Sight"<sup>xxiii</sup> report in conjunction with Oxfam and Christian Aid, and its message highlighting the gravity of unmet humanitarian needs. In the aftermath of the volcano eruption, it is not clear to what extent opportunities were analysed and taken to draw attention to the wider DRC crisis.

4.80 Secondly, SCUK's already mentioned household economy study and report<sup>xxiv</sup> is an example of the deployment of strategic resources to complement existing competencies and historical programme work in order to influence the broad emergency response. External organisations informing this evaluation cited the timely value of this work in bringing to wide attention a more complete understanding of household conditions and ways forward to address these. The ensuing cash-for-work rehabilitation activities undertaken by SCUK and its partners are probably of too small a scale to have a major impact in themselves on the aggregated economy of Goma. Nevertheless this pilot experience provides an opportunity to contribute to broader debates about appropriate responses to livelihood shocks in urban settings in the future. The findings of the technical evaluation, and of similar work being undertaken in the region, should be disseminated widely.

4.81 Thirdly, the evaluation was provided with documented research undertaken by a consultant to the health team looking at issues of cost recovery (fee paying) for access to basic health services following the disaster, and the relationship to utilisation rates. From statistical information relating to the period from January to March 2002, the research demonstrates the detrimental effects on utilisation of the reintroduction of fees for health services, following the suspension of fees in the immediate aftermath of the disaster. This is a further example of serious research to support future advocacy work. On the down side, it was observed that had this work been undertaken at an earlier stage it would have had relevance when the decisions about the reintroduction of fees were being taken, rather than coming as a retrospective critique. The national staff members of the health team in Goma also expressed their disappointment at being on the periphery of this work, which was carried out by an external consultant. At the time of the evaluation the report had yet to be translated into French and fully assimilated by the team.

### **Rights based approaches**

4.82 The evaluation was asked to consider the potential added value that could have been generated through greater use of rights based approaches, as compared

to what actually happened with project implementation<sup>5</sup>. Firstly, it should be noted that there is no coherent overall view across the humanitarian environment as to rights based approaches. While the rights based discourse has increasingly permeated institutional rhetoric and the day to day language of humanitarian workers, there remains a wide range of opinion and approach in terms of the meaning and practical application of such discourse. Secondly, it is not possible to establish what would have been done had things been done differently, nor the outcomes of this. Earlier sections of this report reflect on the use of Sphere and the Code of Conduct, two of a range of rights based instruments. However, certain additional and general observations in relation to rights based approaches are of relevance here.

4.83 While in the Rwanda programme some of the more experienced staff members report previous involvement in debates and awareness raising around rights based approaches, in Goma a plenary discussion with a broad cross section of staff revealed minimal exposure to these issues. There was little evidence of familiarity with SCUK's recently published child rights programming guidelines, and limited articulation of some of the basic conceptual building blocks contained therein such as the notions of 'rights holders' and 'duty bearers', or of 'universality', 'indivisibility' and so on. There is certainly familiarity within the team on the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and within the limited time available for discussion useful ideas emerged around 'child focus', 'child centred work', 'participation' and so on.

4.84 From the perspective of theoretical frameworks and the ability to articulate rights based discourse, there is clearly scope for further efforts and initiatives with programme staff to stimulate debate and reflection. Some staff members expressed a desire to better understand issues of children's rights and rights based programming, and noted with regret that they had not had sufficient orientation or training in these areas. A recurring observation throughout the evaluation visit was that the context in eastern DRC is largely devoid of any acknowledgement of, or respect for, rights in general, hence the enormous challenges in promoting broader discussion of such approaches.

4.85 Reflections emerging from discussions with staff from both programmes were encouragingly self critical, and demonstrative of a willingness to acknowledge limitations to current understanding of institutional frameworks and approaches to practical application in areas such as children's participation. On a more positive tack, facets of SCUK's approach to child rights programming are evident within the emergency response. Activities to address immediate 'gaps' in the fulfilment of certain rights, as well as efforts to influence the agendas of other entities, and to advocate around the respect for other rights, have been described. Endeavours to enhance inclusiveness and participation, albeit within the constraints of the operating environment, are present, including some instances of gender sensitive observation and analysis during development of the projects, particularly within the Rwandan protection work.

4.86 In overview, creative ways need to be found to enable field staff to be brought up to speed with discussions, discourse and frameworks emanating from the centre of the organisation, in order for there to be further exploration of these areas and assimilation of their implications for field operations. At the same time there may be a tendency for field staff to play down the rights based content of their programming

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<sup>5</sup> See Terms of Reference at annex (a) in section 6, below.

due to unfamiliarity with institutional vocabulary, while in reality some of the characteristics of these frameworks are in fact present in current ways of working. In particular, there is an observed need to explore further the practical implications of SCUK's child rights programming guidelines in rapid onset emergency situations. Tensions may be perceived, for example, between the need for timely delivery of first phase relief assistance to protect physical integrity, and the ideal of extensive consultation with affected children<sup>6</sup>. Further exploration of practical tools for analysis and planning in fast moving emergency environments would be helpful.

## (f) Internal organisation

### Emergency preparedness

4.87 The DRC emergency preparedness<sup>xxv</sup> plan at the time of the volcano emergency dates from the end of 2000, and is a succinct document of some six pages with a brief description of the DRC context, the programme's main areas of expertise, and an outline of human and other resources that may be called upon in the event of an emergency. It appears that the plan had not been reviewed since the end of 2000, and was of little practical value during the volcano response (though the analysis of core areas of expertise as health, protection and livelihoods remained valid). One striking characteristic of this plan is that there is no mention of volcano or earthquake related scenarios, despite the fact that the eastern DRC programme is situated in Africa's most active volcanic region, and SCUK has supported seismic monitoring and volcano observation during recent years. While the plan covers some basic scenario planning, there is no analysis of areas for capacity building, or indeed any kind of action plan to enhance preparedness levels, for example through staff training.

4.88 The SCUK Rwanda emergency preparedness plan<sup>xxvi</sup> at the time of the eruption is more substantive, identifying displacement scenarios due to communal violence, and highlighting programme competencies in health and protection. Again, no specific mention is made of volcano related scenarios. Activities to enhance preparedness levels are proposed, such as staff training, pre-positioning of supplies, regular review meetings, and ongoing institutional networking. However, due to the dynamics of the Rwanda programme and ongoing processes of internal change, it appears that the proposed preparedness activities have never been systematically implemented. As in Goma, consultation with a sample of staff revealed a generalised level of ignorance as to the content and provisions of the emergency preparedness plan.

4.89 The status of the East and Central Africa Regional emergency preparedness plan is unclear, but was briefly discussed with support staff at the regional office in Nairobi. The plan covers the period from 2001 – 2004, but due to changes in key staff within the region it appears that the impetus of this initiative has been temporarily dissipated. The document consolidates individual country plans, and considers some of the challenges in terms of staff development and deployment of resources within the region. No activities appear to have been developed following the elaboration of the document, and staff members at country level seem generally unaware of the existence of the regional preparedness plan.

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<sup>6</sup> The Emergencies Section is currently developing a framework for a piece of work to look at these issues.

4.90 One notable exception to the above is a series of regional health workshops focussing on emergency preparedness and response, including a three day workshop shortly before the volcano emergency. Staff on the ground reported this initiative as being very useful and having a positive effect on the health component of SCUK's intervention.

4.91 In general terms, therefore, the utility of these different emergency preparedness plans in relation to the actual response to the volcano eruption can be considered minimal. There is no clear evidence that the plans were referred to at the time of the disaster in any substantive way. In this light, the timeliness and co-ordination of the initial response, as praised elsewhere, are all the more impressive and reflect a strong commitment to humanitarian ideals along with flexibility and pragmatism. Nevertheless, the general correlation between structured emergency preparedness planning and the quality of emergency response is evident from experiences around the world, and emergency preparedness plans should be revisited in the light of the volcano experience. In particular, there is a need to plan for structured staff development initiatives to build technical expertise in programme work, and a clearer understanding of humanitarian frameworks and principles.

4.92 Emergency preparedness plans should ideally be periodically updated, discussed and disseminated widely amongst staff, and integrated into operational planning cycles rather than having some kind of stand-alone, add-on status. With an envisaged shift towards regional emergency preparedness as a result of an ongoing reduction to the number of countries in which SCUK operates, the quality and maintenance of preparedness will become more crucial to effective response, as discussed later in this report.

4.93 Other specific issues highlighted during the evaluation to be considered in taking emergency preparedness planning forward include, amongst others; media training for staff, systemised back up procedures for office records and documents, adequate prioritisation to administrative, financial and human resource contingencies (given that the success of programmes is ultimately dependent on these areas), staff training in a variety of programmatic competencies, systemised procurement protocols and the development of 'kit' specifications ahead of time, and greater integration of partners into planning processes. Many of these areas are contemplated by the existing SCUK generic Emergency Preparedness Planning Guidelines – the challenge is to ensure that these issues are integrated in a meaningful way into programmes' thinking and work plans, through processes of periodic review and assimilation. There is a role for the Emergencies Section to engage with programmes to a greater degree to support and monitor such planning processes.

4.94 In terms of broader, humanitarian community wide emergency preparedness planning, the evaluation provided with a new contingency plan for Goma and Gisenyi developed through OCHA facilitation in the months after the volcano eruption<sup>xxvii</sup>. SCUK participated in this initiative, and there is an ongoing role for the organisation in promoting the periodic discussion and update of the contingency plan. Provisions within the plan should inform revisions to SCUK's internal preparedness planning. There has been no such initiative with the Rwandan authorities in Ruhengeri, though the SCUK programme is actively promoting the need to exploit learning from the recent response to formulate interagency contingencies for the future. Again, SCUK can play a leading role in driving this process forward, and in highlighting due consideration of children's issues in any emerging planning processes.

## **Evacuation contingencies and other staff care arrangements**

4.95 The management of events around the evacuation of SCUK staff and assets from Goma, in the face of lava flows that would eventually destroy the office compound, remains a contentious issue amongst some members of the Goma team. Other staff members are somewhat more sympathetic to the difficulties and constraints faced by senior staff involved in the management of the evacuation. From the varying accounts provided during the evaluation it is difficult to reconstruct with complete accuracy the sequence of events around evacuation, nevertheless some general observations and lessons are of value.

4.96 On January 17<sup>th</sup> 2002, the day of the eruption and penetration of lava flows into Goma town, the Goma Programme Manager and Senior Logistician were both at the Bukavu office. Telephone contact was maintained with a senior expatriate member of staff still in Goma who effectively took charge of management on the ground. Telephone contact with the Kigali office was also established, though initial reports were (with hindsight!) relatively unconcerned. In Goma January 17<sup>th</sup> was a public holiday, however throughout the day a number of staff visited the SCUK compound, with a small group of senior national staff congregating there during the afternoon. Provisions were made to remove cash and some prioritised assets such as computers from the property, and the last remaining staff members finally left the compound at around 1930 hrs, around two hours before its destruction. Many archives and institutional records were lost along with personal effects and one vehicle.

4.97 During the ensuing period national staff made their own decisions regarding movements of themselves and their families, many crossing to Rwanda with the majority of the population of the town, some moving southwards or westwards further into DRC. There was no provision of institutional resources for the evacuation from the town of national staff or their family members. Mobile phones appear to have been quite effective in maintaining frequent contact amongst senior staff, and within 48 hours a significant degree of regrouping had been achieved inside Rwanda, including the arrival of the Programme Manager from Bukavu. In the ensuing days the team showed remarkable endeavour in initiating response operations, while eventually occupying and conditioning a new office location.

4.98 In the weeks following the eruption, and prior to the evaluation visit, some measures had been taken in response to these experiences. Efforts had been made to reimburse staff for the loss of personal effects at the old office, and a consultant had been employed to re-establish support systems, including the drafting of revised evacuation guidelines<sup>xxviii</sup>. Nevertheless concerns remain amongst national staff regarding the extent of support and provision afforded by the organisation in future evacuation scenarios.

4.99 Of primary note here is that the SCUK programme in Goma did not have, at the time of the eruption, an updated, disseminated and widely understood contingency plan for evacuation situations. A visit in October 2001 by an external security consultant had found the general security arrangements of the programme in eastern DRC to be of an acceptable level, with the proviso that the guidelines were 'in need of updating and some additions'<sup>xxix</sup>. Senior staff in Goma confirmed that the detailed guidelines were quite outdated, and the communications tree quite informal. Consultation with other staff indicated a generalised ignorance of any existing evacuation protocols or procedures, and there was clearly very little familiarisation with whatever older guidelines may have existed.



4.100 Similarly, there appears to have been no formalised delegation of responsibilities or clarification of line management hierarchies in the absence of the Programme Manager. The senior expatriate staff member who effectively headed the programme on the ground during evacuation was operating without any clear remit or previously defined role and responsibilities, and without clear written guidance of procedures to follow and criteria against which to take decisions.

4.101 To conclude, there is a need to instigate an improved security management regime, in which there is an ongoing cycle of discussing, updating and disseminating guidelines including evacuation procedures. The new draft guidelines referred to above represent a good step forward, though there is still work to be done in the fine-tuning of these, and in awareness raising throughout the team amongst both expatriate and national staff. This should not take merit from the team's understanding and management of conflict related security issues within a highly complex environment in eastern DRC, which has been commended in the past. Nevertheless, the volcano eruption demonstrated shortcomings in evacuation planning and the institutionalisation of practical contingency plans.

4.102 Of particular note is the need for further clarity regarding the differing arrangements during evacuation for expatriate and national staff, perceptions around which have been the source of much of the dissatisfaction regarding existing contingency provisions. Again, this is partially addressed in the new draft security guidelines. These issues are by no means unique to the Goma programme and must be dealt with by many programmes around the world operating in volatile environments. Experience shows that even where written guidelines are produced there remains an ongoing need for discussion and awareness raising and clarification of details within the whole team as part of a holistic approach to security management, if misinterpretations and resentments are to be avoided. It is inevitable and undeniable that there are differences in the organisation's position regarding expatriate and national staff, while at the same time opportunities exist to make contextually relevant provisions at a local level in order to support national staff to an appropriate degree.

4.103 Beyond immediate evacuation contingencies, support to staff from the Goma programme displaced along with the general population into Rwanda was generally considered by those individuals involved to have been of a high standard. Some issues regarding co-ordination between programmes working in this way, particularly in relation to terms and conditions, are discussed later. However staff consulted during the evaluation on the whole praised the flexibility and general attitude of senior management with regard to practical demonstrations of concern and care for staff and their families. Provisions of food and support to accommodation and health care arrangements were typically seen as better than comparable efforts made by other agencies for their employees. While some staff raised the matter of consistency – this in relation to provisions made to assist those who chose not to cross the border but were able to remain in Goma town or were displaced within the DRC – senior managers should be given credit for sensitivity in their efforts to support staff personally affected by events.

#### **SCUK's child protection policy**

4.104 Discussions with staff revealed a varied level of awareness relating to SCUK's child protection policy across the Rwanda and Goma programmes. In Rwanda experienced staff members from the ongoing protection team have

substantial experience of child protection issues, and report that prior to the volcano emergency the Rwanda programme as a whole had made progress with efforts to implement the child protection policy. For example, standard recruitment procedures involve child protection issues at the interview and screening stage, and employment contracts include child protection policy related clauses. While recruitment procedures were 'fast-tracked' to allow for rapid response to the emergency, senior staff members report that they were still able to provide a basic induction and orientation in relation to the child protection policy.

4.105 Staff from the Rwanda programme also expressed some concerns regarding the extent of their capacity to monitor child protection abuses amongst high numbers of people on the move during the first days of large-scale displacement. The dynamics of the displacement and the rapid return to Goma of most of those who had originally crossed into Rwanda made monitoring and follow up difficult. In more stabilised camp settings monitoring was felt to have become more systematic. One particular case of abuse at the temporary transit camp in Ruhengeri was documented and reported to authorities. Since the emergency the Rwanda programme has reinvigorated efforts to raise awareness around child protection issues and SCUK's child protection policy has been shared at meetings and workshops with other international NGOs.

4.106 In Goma, some staff reported that prior to the volcano emergency there had been no opportunity to roll out the child protection policy either within the SCUK team or amongst partners, while others referred to some preliminary discussions with the Goma and Bukavu teams during 2001. The policy was shared in Goma in a workshop in April 2002, three months after the volcano eruption, effectively renewing a process of awareness raising about the policy in general. A 'code of conduct' was subsequently elaborated and posted in SCUK offices and circulated amongst partner organisations, some of which duly indicated their familiarity with this document during the evaluation visit.

4.107 Staff members responsible with taking forward the dissemination and application of the policy noted some of the challenges associated with raising awareness of child protection policy issues in the Goma context, and a perceived lack of support from the wider organisation regarding practical ways forward. Of particular concern is the fact that since very little training has been done around children's rights, and indeed rights in general, there is a limited level of understanding on which to build discussion and appreciation of the child protection policy. At the time of the evaluation a reporting and investigation mechanism remained under discussion and had yet to be formalised and disseminated – plans were underway to take this forward, in addition to issues around recruitment and induction. In spite of these limitations, senior management in Goma was involved at the time of the evaluation visit in processing a particular case of allegations involving a representative of another international agency, demonstrating awareness around these issues and a commitment to action.

4.108 Of relevance is information from the Burundi programme management that those staff seconded to the Rwanda / Goma operation had been previously inducted and sensitised around the organisational expectations in relation to the child protection policy, as well as issues of HIV.

4.109 In summary, there is some additional work to be done in raising awareness and in further implementation of the child protection policy, most notably within the eastern DRC operation. The programmes in the Great Lakes region are no different

from those elsewhere around the globe who continue to wrestle with contextual issues in order to strengthen the policy's practical application. Particularly with regard to the relative isolation of the programme in eastern DRC, there is a need to find ways to offer further support from within the wider organisation. The volcano emergency has perhaps served to focus minds on the challenges ahead, and follow up initiatives should be encouraged and assisted.

### **Advisory functions**

4.110 For the most part, those consulted in the SCUK field programmes in Rwanda and Goma rated the advisory support to the response effort received from within the wider organisation as satisfactory, in relation to both timeliness and approach. Field staff generally praised the collaborative, 'horizontal' nature of this support, and the avoidance of attempts to impose decisions from outside.

4.111 In some cases, field staff indicated that more timely assistance would have added further value to the advisory support received, underpinned by greater clarity as to roles and approach. The arrival of a Media Officer from London headquarters, while coinciding with the launch date of the DEC appeal, was felt too late to support staff in the management of media issues during the height of international attention – indeed many international media crews were leaving the scene by this point in time. Although the media training undertaken with staff was considered helpful, senior management of the Rwanda programme felt uncertain as to SCUK's overall strategy towards communications media, and its desired profile.

4.112 Likewise, management of the Rwanda programme indicated that an earlier arrival of the Emergencies Advisers from London would have been useful to provide more effective support and confidence building during the initial and chaotic first few days following the eruption. At the same time the practical limits to rapid deployment are recognised. Perhaps of more significance than the precise timings of deployment is the expressed need to further clarify the aims and roles of the Emergencies Section, so as to create greater cohesion across the organisation and more effective reaction in the face of sudden onset emergencies.

4.113 In Goma, managers and staff indicated a generally high level of satisfaction in terms of support and advice received, with one possible exception in relation to the health component of its response. During the course of the evaluation the health team in Goma reported their need for, and expectation of, of higher degree of advisory support in the formulation and planning of their emergency response activities, and their disappointment that external support did not materialise, despite an initial budgetary provision for this. At the same time, the Regional Health Advisor in Nairobi reported a willingness and availability to visit Goma, but in practice limited support to written advice since field management indicated that an on the ground presence was not in fact needed. This situation may have been compounded by ongoing personnel changes within the Goma health team around the time of the emergency, but is largely illustrative of the need for all those involved to endeavour to overcome practical constraints to communication.

4.114 Broadly speaking, therefore, the engagement of different advisers in relation to the volcano response can be assessed as effective, while acknowledging that room for improvement always exists in terms of timeliness of support and effective communication. In the case of the volcano effort, the inputs of permanent advisory staff were complemented by specific pieces of work undertaken by external consultants, thus scaling up overall support capacity. The nature of sudden onset

emergencies combined with advisers extensive briefs and ongoing commitments means that it is difficult to legislate precise details and terms of engagement for any given situation – rather, flexibility coupled with clear and fluid communications are at a premium. In line with earlier descriptions, a particular shortfalls are evident in effectively communicating donor frameworks to field management, and in the monitoring and communication of some financial issues.

### **Co-ordination and support between programmes**

4.115 Rwanda and Goma management were in contact on January 17<sup>th</sup> 2002, the day of the eruption, and at a meeting the following day inside Rwanda it was agreed that the Goma Programme Manager would assume responsibility for protection activities involving both Rwanda and Goma personnel, while the Rwanda Programme Director would lead on donor liaison and media work from Kigali. At this meeting issues of staff care and provision were dealt with pragmatically and flexibly as discussed above, in relation to food and accommodation for displaced employees and their families. The Rwanda programme would subsequently serve for the facilitation of procurement for the work in Goma, given the loss of systems and infrastructure there.

4.116 The involvement of the South Sudan office in Nairobi and the rapid procurement and dispatch of materials is mentioned above as a key factor in the timeliness of the overall response. Meanwhile the Burundi Programme Director, after initially becoming aware of the eruption through international media coverage, quickly liaised with his Rwandan counterpart leading to the deployment of vehicles, generators and medicines. Inventiveness in Burundi expedited customs and other bureaucratic matters. Three drivers voluntarily seconded from the Burundi programme eventually remained in Goma for around three months, and though although this was longer than originally anticipated their absence was considered as manageable within the Burundi programme.

4.117 Issues of terms and conditions for national staff involved in support to SCUK programmes in other countries inevitably arise in such situations, and the volcano response was no exception. Staff have mentioned various factors such as the disparity between standard per diem rates for Rwanda and DRC employees (derived from the disparity in the real cost of living between these two countries), differences in overtime and income tax arrangements, and so on. While senior managers from the different programmes expressed their full awareness of the scope for misinterpretation by staff of such discrepancies, and of the potentially negative effects of this on team morale, the standardisation of these arrangements across the region would likely present its own inconsistencies, given the distinctive context in which each country operates. Nevertheless, efforts to rationalise arrangements regarding terms and conditions across different countries is important as the organisation attempts to strengthen regional preparedness planning, typically involving the development of staff rosters and the exchange of human resources. This should be an area for further specialist review and analysis, in order to maximise the potential for inter-country deployments.

4.118 Perhaps the least satisfactory area of inter-programme co-ordination is felt to be with regard to the budgeting and accounting of relief items deployed to Goma. Immediately following the onset of the emergency the Rwandan programme authorised expenditures with the South Sudan programme in Nairobi for non-food item procurement. Although after a short time budget holding responsibilities between Goma and Rwanda were consciously separated by those responsible, it

would appear that confusion prevailed for considerable time during which actual expenditures remained unclear. It is still not entirely obvious why such confusion could have persisted for so long, though one contributing factor would seem to be the fact that SCUK simultaneously supported procurement in Nairobi for another leading international NGO in Rwanda, leading to lack of clarity regarding the respective purchases and expenditures. The fact remains that at the time of the evaluation visit, almost six months after actual procurement, staff in Goma were still attempting to unravel details pertaining to these purchases. As mentioned above, uncertainty over actual spending undoubtedly contributed to the incomplete monitoring of funds from certain donors, and less than optimal resource use.

4.119 In summary, geographical proximity, pre-existing operational capacity, and flexible management backed by a principled commitment to humanitarian action combined to make the aggregated effect of a co-ordinated response involving different country programmes one of the most prominent and positive characteristics of SCUK's response to the volcano eruption. Achievements on the ground were undoubtedly enhanced by such flexible co-operation. While there is a need to pre-empt certain administrative and employment-related issues arising from inter-programme collaboration through better preparedness planning, there exists a broad consensus amongst senior staff that liaison was effective and well managed. The major exception to this was in the area of financial management around procurement issues.

#### **Future changes to programme portfolio**

4.120 Comments were requested within this evaluation exercise on the implications for future emergency response of the current changes to SCUK's programme portfolio. Presently SCUK is uniquely positioned amongst leading international agencies with programmes throughout the Great Lakes countries, namely in DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and Tanzania. As part of a world-wide reduction in the number of country programmes operated by SCUK, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda are to be phased out during the next two to four year period. Strategies in relation to both emergency and non-emergency work continue to evolve, as these changes accompany parallel processes to re-frame overarching organisational objectives and approaches. Much has been said and written, and much more will continue to be said and written during coming months, as combined thinking with regard to these changes evolves – comments here are intentionally brief, and offered as a contribution to ongoing debates.

4.121 The proceeding sections have described how a generally solid SCUK response to the volcano eruption was built upon the convergence of a number of factors. These include, amongst others, timely access to affected areas made possible by pre-existing geographical programme coverage; a collaborative effort between neighbouring country programmes, including the interchange of human and material resources; strong programme credibility and institutional linkages in and around the affected area, derived from historical and contemporary presence and profile; a reasonable contextual understanding of local conditions, including political, economic, social and cultural factors; and well developed logistical and procurement systems involving inter-programme support across the region. Programme closures will undoubtedly impact on the status of each of these factors, and it is easy for those involved in the volcano response to imagine the additional difficulties that could have been encountered had, for example, the Rwanda and Burundi programmes already ceased to be operational.

4.122 Of particular concern are perhaps two of the three pillars of SCUK's aspiration for emergency response, as articulated in the current emergencies policy<sup>xxx</sup>. Firstly, the ability to meet the immediate needs of children and their families affected by disasters and emergencies, (with the emphasis on *immediate*), is self evidently linked to the extent of programme infrastructure and how efficiently the human and material resources necessary for quality intervention can be deployed to required areas. It is also linked to programmes' capacity for ongoing analysis, including in certain situations the management of early warning indicators, in order to intervene in a timely and appropriate fashion.

4.123 Secondly, the ability to bring added value to an emergency response through formulating activities on a sound understanding of local context, and through exploiting strong linkages with local communities and institutions – in other words the developmental approach, to use popular terminology – is evidently linked to the scope and depth of ongoing programme work, and the adequate pre-positioning of programmes, including their capacity for continuous situational analysis. Tensions clearly exist between the desire to continue to meet these policy aspirations on the one hand, and a decreasing programme base with which to work, on the other.

4.124 Possible ways forward have been sketched in a number of submissions from the Emergencies Section during recent months, and some of these are mentioned again at this point. While they may be of varying degrees of utility to the specific context of the Great Lakes region, they are offered simply as broad-brush ideas around which further discussions might take place, and further details regarding their potential might be envisaged. This is not to argue that institutional emergency response capacity will remain unaffected, since it clearly will be, nor that things will continue in exactly the same way – rather, these approaches may help to mitigate against some of the effects of a reduction in programme infrastructure. They may enable SCUK to remain relevant for children caught in major emergency situations by focussing on areas where it is still able to provide genuine added value.

4.125 The volcano response has illustrated again that quality emergency intervention is built on 'access' and 'intelligence' – from the capability to respond through access to affected areas and the subsequent timely deployment of resources, and from the capability to 'keep a finger on the pulse' of what is happening in a given context through the collection and analysis of information. An audit of potential partnerships in those countries where SCUK will no longer have a continuing operational presence, done in the light of these two factors, may be useful. Besides pragmatic measures such as the maintenance of legal registration and permission to operate with national authorities, are there partnerships that may be able to facilitate future access for SCUK, in the case of a major emergency situation? What are the desirable characteristics of a partnership, or partner organisation, that may be able to facilitate such access (congruence of mission and principles, technical and logistical capacity, transparency and integrity in the stewardship of resources, and so on, to suggest just a few)? Do any existing partners fit this profile? If not, are there opportunities within transition plans and exit strategies for the exploration and establishment of new partnerships? Similarly with regard to updated information and analysis. Which are the key institutions within a country or region that might source useful political and humanitarian information and analysis? Does SCUK currently work or network with these, and if so how might relationships be maintained during and beyond programme closure? Can new partnerships of this nature be nurtured?

4.126 Critical to these ideas is the notion of maintaining institutional relationships 'at a distance', and some deconstruction of the requirements to keep relationships 'live' and meaningful will be required. While none of this may be easy, there is a range of partnership types that can be explored, each with potential opportunities and potential pitfalls. These include government entities, non-governmental organisations, international agencies, sister agencies of the Save the Children Alliance, local policy institutes and think tanks, amongst others. What might SCUK offer to make these relationships meaningful (advice, access to information networks, training, credibility through association, hard resources during actual emergency periods, perhaps)?

4.127 In addition, the notion of regional emergency preparedness merits further development. To continue with the current example of a reduction in the Great Lakes region from five to two programmes, how can the remaining two programmes, in addition to regional personnel in Nairobi and other country programmes that will remain in existence, contribute to ongoing information gathering and analysis? What are the relevant linkages and networking opportunities at national and regional level? How can the remaining two country programmes and the regional office contribute to an eventual response? Are there opportunities for the pooling and interchange of staff or assets? What are the skill gaps and training needs of staff so that they might be empowered to effectively contribute in their respective areas of technical expertise? How might logistical and procurement capacity be aggregated within the region?

4.128 Some sector by sector analysis within this overall framework might be useful, in order to identify specificities related to each of the core areas of SCUK's emergencies work. A potential risk associated with these shifts is that the organisation might focus more and more on protection functions, since these are typically thought to involve less operational infrastructure, to the exclusion of the provision of assistance in crucial areas such as health and nutrition. While the importance of protection work at the very heart of SCUK's mission is recognised, experience has often shown that organisational credibility and the ability to sustain viable operations are enhanced through work to address a range of children's rights, including survival rights and access to basic services as well as protection.

## 5. Summary of Main Areas for Further Development

5.1 This evaluation has attempted to cover a wide range of themes within a short field visit, and present the findings as a reasonably concise overview. Many of the issues mentioned could be further detailed by those involved in the response, and it is hoped that the preceding narrative will provide scope for discussion and analysis. Rather than attempt at this point to present an extensive 'shopping list' of minutiae in terms of specific recommendations, it may be of more use to re-emphasise some of the main strategic areas for potential development.

5.2 Firstly, opportunities to strengthen some aspects of the 'nuts and bolts' of programme cycle management should be considered, with particular emphasis on cultivating greater usage of structured monitoring and evaluation techniques and tools to help verify project outcomes. Scope for implementation of systemised approaches within the practical constraints associated with rapid onset emergencies should be explored. Included in this would be a general enhancement of documentation practices throughout the project cycle.

5.3 Similarly, efforts should be considered to build the confidence of field teams with regard to some of SCUK's stated approaches to work. Our ability to meet the aspirations expressed in institutional discourse is self evidently contingent upon the extent to which we are able to develop and support personnel. Particularly in Goma, and for understandable reasons, the team appears to have suffered from a generalised lack of exposure to some of these organisational themes, and there is enthusiasm and interest for greater engagement. Human resource development clearly constitutes a major component of preparedness work. Participatory techniques, rights based frameworks, ways forward around the implementation of the child protection policy, technical protocols around documentation for tracing work are some of the particular areas for further development identified during the evaluation.

5.4 As described, financial and grant management can also be enhanced. Any critique of management systems in Goma should clearly include acknowledgement of the fact that programme infrastructure and archives were lost in the eruption, nevertheless six months down the road there was evident lack of clarity regarding certain expenditures and donor requirements. Opportunities to systemise communications in these areas are important, with the provision of additional support for field teams where appropriate.

5.5 The general strategic area of emergency preparedness presents scope for ongoing refinement, particularly in the light of changes to programme portfolio. Benefits may emerge from a renewed focus on regional preparedness thinking, and some suggested starting points have been outlined in the final paragraphs of the main text. This should not detract for the need for ongoing maintenance of preparedness planning at individual country level, nevertheless regional management should revisit progress to date with regional preparedness and evaluate options for moving forward. For those countries currently involved in transitional work as part of exit strategies, some useful work can be done prior programme closure around opportunities to maintain access and generate information for ongoing analysis within the regional set up.

5.6 The experience around the evacuation from Goma, along with the destruction of facilities and the loss of assets, provides an opportunity to re-visit evacuation contingencies. While some work has already gone ahead with this in the Goma



programme, broader lessons here are in relation to the need for holistic approaches to security management, and the internalisation of procedures and frameworks.

## 6. Annexes

### i. Terms of Reference for the Evaluation (Extract with Objectives)

#### **Overall Objectives**

- To evaluate the appropriateness of the SCUK response to the crisis caused by the eruption of the Goma volcano, including consideration of efficiency, impact, coverage, sustainability, and coherence.
- To evaluate the appropriateness of internal organisation and the effectiveness of working relationships between different parts of SCUK involved in supporting the response.
- To draw lessons from these aspects in relation to future programme portfolio changes, where appropriate.

#### **Specific Areas of Review**

##### a) Appropriateness

- Were the actions undertaken appropriate in the context of the needs of the affected population, and the context in which the organisation was operating?
- How were the needs determined – what kind of situation analysis was undertaken, were any particular “tools” used.
- Was the assistance appropriate in terms of the customs and practices of the affected population?
- To what extent were potential or actual beneficiaries consulted as to their needs and priorities? What was the level of beneficiary involvement in project design, implementation and monitoring? How effective were these processes in ensuring relevant and timely product delivery in support of the most needy and vulnerable?
- Was the assistance provided in a timely manner? What were the constraints to this?
- Were international standards – specifically the Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards for Disaster Response, Interagency Guiding Principles on Unaccompanied and Separated Children and the Red Cross Code of Conduct – used in the planning and implementation of the response?

##### b) Efficiency

- How were project objectives and indicators determined?
- Were resources used efficiently? Was there an appropriate balance between the use of internal and external resources?
- Did an emergency preparedness plan exist and to what extent was it utilised? To what extent would greater preparedness measures have resulted in a more effective and less costly response?
- To what extent could have preparedness mitigated the impact of the event (e.g. incidence of family separation)
- Were any inputs misused or misappropriated, and if so, how? What could have been done to avoid such misuse?

##### c) Impact

- What evidence is available that the activities undertaken contributed to the stated goals of the programme?

- What systems or indicators were used to assess the effectiveness of the work?

d) Coverage

- Was assistance provided to all major affected population groups? What criteria were used to determine the geographical coverage?
- What efforts were made to ensure that particular populations and vulnerable groups were not overlooked?
- Were the beneficiaries correctly and fairly identified?
- Was gender considered in the emergency assessment and subsequent programme implementation? If so, were these aspects systematically monitored?
- Were children's issues and perspectives considered in the emergency assessment and subsequent programme implementation.

e) Sustainability

- Was assistance provided in a way that took account of the longer-term context and developmental opportunities?
- How was the capacity of local stakeholders (local government, local civil society groups) enhanced? Or did the response hinder such entities?

f) Coherence

- What steps were taken to ensure that actions were co-ordinated with other responses taking place?
- What co-ordination structure was in place, or established? How did SCUK work within such a structure? , How were needs determined in relation to the response of other agencies?
- Were advocacy opportunities exploited to complement the relief programme?
- To what extent was a rights-based approach incorporated into programme planning and implementation? What could potentially have been the added value of greater use of a rights-based approach, as compared with the actual response implementation?
- How did SCUK use its position to influence the response of other organisations?

g) Internal organisation

- To what extent were existing country level and regional level preparedness plans appropriate? Were there any gaps in planning and co-ordination?
- How effective and timely was the evacuation of staff and assets from Goma? What lessons can be drawn in relation to future evacuation contingencies?
- To what extent were the provisions contemplated by SCUK's Child Protection Policy implemented during the emergency response programme? What lessons can be drawn in terms of high-risk areas of work with children in the region?
- Were measures to support and care for staff working across borders adequate (i.e. staff from the Goma programme operating inside Rwanda)?
- How appropriate were the support and advisory functions carried out by London HQ and Nairobi Regional Office staff? How can these support roles be enhanced for future operations of this type?
- How effective was the co-ordination and mutual support between the four SCUK country programmes involved (i.e. East DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, South Sudan? What lessons can be learned for enhanced regional preparedness and joint response operations?

- What are the implications of the global portfolio changes (i.e. phasing out of the Rwanda and Burundi programmes) in terms of future support to the DRC programme (for example to a mass displacement scenario)?

ii. List of Informants to the Evaluation

*Pending - to be included with final version of report*

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- <sup>i</sup> Save the Children Emergency Response – Immediate Response to the Eruption of Mount Nyiragongo, Goma. Internal SCUK document, undated.
- <sup>ii</sup> Human health and vulnerability in the Nyiragongo volcano crisis DR Congo Jun 2002, Final Report to the World Health Organisation, Baxter, Dr. P.J. and Ancia, Dr. A., June 2002.
- <sup>iii</sup> DR Congo – Volcano Nyiragongo OCHA Situation Report No. 2, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 18 Jan 2002.
- <sup>iv</sup> The Volcano Eruption in Goma, Democratic Republic of Congo. Report of a Monitoring Visit. Disasters Emergency Committee. Sandy Macaulay. April 2002.
- <sup>v</sup> DRC: Relief reaches Goma volcano victims. Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). January 23<sup>rd</sup> 2002.
- <sup>vi</sup> DR Congo – Volcano Nyiragongo OCHA Situation Report No. 8, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 24 Jan 2002.
- <sup>vii</sup> Human health and vulnerability in the Nyiragongo volcano crisis DR Congo Jun 2002, Final Report to the World Health Organisation, Baxter, Dr. P.J. and Ancia, Dr. A., June 2002.
- <sup>viii</sup> Mortality in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. International Rescue Committee (IRC). May 2001.
- <sup>ix</sup> Poverty in the Midst of Wealth. The Democratic Republic of Congo. OXFAM Briefing Paper #12. January 18<sup>th</sup> 2002.
- <sup>x</sup> Annual Report 2001 – 2002, Draft 1. Save the Children UK Democratic Republic of Congo. Internal Document. April 15<sup>th</sup> 2002.
- <sup>xi</sup> Democratic Republic of Congo Country Strategic Plan 2002 – 2004. Save the Children UK. Internal Document. Revised June 2002.
- <sup>xii</sup> Rwanda Country Strategy Paper 2001 – 2005, SCUK Rwanda Country Programme, version October 31<sup>st</sup> 2000.
- <sup>xiii</sup> SC Rwanda Programme – Preliminary Transitional Plan. Internal Document. Undated.
- <sup>xiv</sup> For example, OCHA estimates 760,000 of 3.3m inhabitants of North Kivu are displaced, and quotes an infant mortality rate of 122/1000, a severe malnutrition rate of 13.9%, measles coverage at 47.4%, and a primary education enrolment rate of 53%. Taken from Note d’information humanitaire à l’Est de la Démocratique République du Congo. Dernière version . Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). May 2002.
- <sup>xv</sup> Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal, Democratic Republic of Congo, United Nations and Partners. Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, November 2001.
- <sup>xvi</sup> Une économie nivelée: une évaluation de l’économie des ménages dans la ville de Goma (DRC) après l’éruption du Nyiragongo. Rapport final. Save the Children Food Security Unit. Levine, S. and Chastre, C. March 2002.
- <sup>xvii</sup> Save the Children Emergency Response – Immediate Response to the Eruption of Mount Nyiragongo, Goma. Internal SCUK document, undated.
- <sup>xviii</sup> The Volcano Eruption in Goma, Democratic Republic of Congo. Report of a Monitoring Visit. Disasters Emergency Committee. Sandy Macaulay. April 2002.
- <sup>xix</sup> The number of households interviewed was not enough to be considered as a representative sample, more of a quick straw pole. Nevertheless, all the families interviewed made similar observations giving substance to concerns regarding the quality of items received.
- <sup>xx</sup> Save the Children Emergency Response – Immediate Response to the Eruption of Mount Nyiragongo, Goma. Internal SCUK document, undated.
- <sup>xxi</sup> Authors own calculations from financial information given during the evaluation field work, in conjunction with SCUK reports subsequently presented to donors.
- <sup>xxii</sup> The Volcano Eruption in Goma, Democratic Republic of Congo. Report of a Monitoring Visit. Disasters Emergency Committee. Sandy Macaulay. April 2002.
- <sup>xxiii</sup> No End in Sight. The human tragedy of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Save the Children, Oxfam, Christian Aid. August 2001.
- <sup>xxiv</sup> Une économie nivelée: une évaluation de l’économie des ménages dans la ville de Goma (DRC) après l’éruption du Nyiragongo. Rapport final. Save the Children Food Security Unit. Levine, S. and Chastre, C. March 2002.
- <sup>xxv</sup> Emergency Preparedness Plan, Save the Children (UK), Democratic Republic of Congo. Internal Document. Undated.
- <sup>xxvi</sup> Rwanda Emergency Preparedness Plan. Save the Children UK. Internal Document. Undated.

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<sup>xxvii</sup> Plan d'urgence pour Goma, République Démocratique du Congo et Gisenyi, Rwanda. Plan d'urgence dans l'éventualité d'une activité volcanique ou sismique. Nord Kivu, République Démocratique du Congo. Préfecture de Gisenyi, Rwanda. Dernière version, March 28<sup>th</sup> 2002. Authorship not stated.

<sup>xxviii</sup> DRC Safety and Security Guidelines. Version II (Goma). Turner, N. Aril 27<sup>th</sup> 2002.

<sup>xxix</sup> Security Visit to DRC and Rwanda (1<sup>st</sup> to 18<sup>th</sup> October 2001). Main Findings and Recommendations. Edwards, L. October 29<sup>th</sup> 2001.

<sup>xxx</sup> Global policy on emergencies. SCUK. July 1999.